260. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Korean-Japanese Relations
Your memorandum to me of April 24, 1962 (National Security Action Memorandum No. 151),1 asks for a report on appropriate action to bring the negotiations between Japan and the Republic of Korea to a successful conclusion.
Governor Harriman discussed this problem at length with our Ambassadors in Tokyo and Seoul, and with Japanese and Korean Government leaders, during his recent trip to the Far East. It was evident from these conversations, as well as from the subsequent reporting of both Embassies, that the principal obstacle to a settlement at present is the gap between unrealistically high Korean claims against Japan, arising out of the Japanese occupation, and unrealistically low Japanese counter-offers. The Koreans have indicated to us a willingness to settle for considerably less than they have previously asked, but the Japanese seem less willing to settle than they were at the end of last year.
United States influence toward a settlement should, therefore, be exerted at this stage more on the Japanese than on the Koreans. However, our ability to influence the Japanese on the question of their relations with Korea is limited. Prime Minister Ikeda is reluctant to take the political risks which he believes such a settlement would involve for him, especially before the House of Councillors and Liberal-Democratic Party elections in July of this year. The Japanese, however, may be willing to raise their offer and pursue a settlement more actively after their elections are out of the way.
Moreover, I understand that former Prime Minister Yoshida in a conversation with you on May 3 agreed as to the importance of a settlement with Korea, although he, too, felt it must wait until those elections have taken place.2 Therefore, I would assume that Mr. Yoshida’s considerable [Page 566] prestige and influence may prove helpful in inducing Prime Minister Ikeda to move decisively toward a rapprochement with Korea, beginning sometime this summer.
In the interim we hope to utilize possibilities for Korean development now being explored by third countries to stimulate interest of the two sides, and particularly of the Japanese, in a settlement. We have in mind interest the Germans are showing in giving supplier credits for a steel mill, perhaps to be followed by credits for a fertilizer plant, shipyard, coal mines and coal cars. Moreover, at the present time a group led by General Van Fleet is in Korea investigating possibilities for investment by a number of important American firms. We hope that the Japanese will decide they do not want to be left behind. In any case, Mr. Janow, Assistant Administrator of AID, is shortly to visit Japan and Korea, perhaps accompanied by a political officer. There he is to assess developing attitudes, ask questions and stimulate interest. We hope that this also will help allay the restiveness of the Koreans by giving some sense of forward motion. AID is also studying incentives which we might offer the two Governments to encourage a settlement. Such a settlement, required by the self-interest of both parties, will of course require that each move toward the other’s position on Korean claims and, we think, that Korea accept Japanese loans as part of the settlement “package”. Messages from you to both parties might at some point help materially to precipitate a settlement. For the present, however, I believe we should keep such possible measures in reserve for a time when they may be expected to have the desired effect.3
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 151. Confidential.↩
- Document 256.↩
- According to the memorandum of conversation of the Kennedy-Yoshida meeting on May 3: “The President underlined the importance he placed on the settlement of Japanese/Korean relations and urged that this be done. Mr. Yoshida said he fully agreed that the question ought to be settled and settled promptly, but that it should wait until after the senatorial elections in June. The President underlined that we had protected the security of Korea largely because of its importance to the security of Japan. Korea could not achieve healthy economic growth without close economic relations with Japan, and the President implied that now was the time for Japan to do her share.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/5-362)↩
- At the White House staff meeting of May 18, Komer stated that “the ROK/Japanese negotiation problem was still hung up.” McGeorge Bundy told Komer to turn this problem over to Michael Forrestal as it was more properly in his area. Komer returned to the issue, remarking that “we need a policy on the negotiation problem after the Japanese elections on 1 July. The fear is that the Japanese will just walk off and drop any attempt to reach an agreement with the Koreans.” Bundy remarked that he had spoken to Vice President Johnson about going to Japan and hoped he could do something. (Memorandum of White House Daily Staff Meeting, May 18; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-September 1962)↩