Attachment
KOREA: A POLITICAL-MILITARY STUDY OF SOUTH KOREAN
FORCES
[Here follow pages 1-35, which comprise sections I-VII:
“Introduction,” “Underlying Factors,” “Political Environment,”
“Economic Environment,” “Subversion and Insurgency,” “Military
Environment,” and “Total Environment.”]
[Page 560]
VIII—Alternative Defense
Policies
1. Of the many possible variations, three alternative defense
policies were adopted for investigation. These are described in some
detail in Annex M. They are summarized in the following
paragraphs.
Option A
2. This option involves the provision of in-place forces in South
Korea, which, together with available U.S. and ROK reinforcements, can contain, on a
non-nuclear basis, an attack by North Korea alone. Since any major
North Korean military operation requires Chinese Communist support
and agreement, and at least tacit assent by the USSR, and since the Chinese have
previously demonstrated their willingness to intervene if necessary
to preserve North Korea as a Communist state, the question
immediately arises as to what is necessary to keep the Chinese out.
Since, under this assumed defense policy, it is not in-place
military forces in South Korea, it follows that there must be some
other military sanction available of sufficient strength and
credibility to cause the Chinese to refrain from open intervention.
This military sanction now exists. It is visible to the Chinese in
the form of U.S. [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified]forces now in the area.
Option C
3. This option is essentially the present defense policy of the U.S.
with regard to South Korea—that is, to be able to contain, on a
non-nuclear basis, open aggression by combined ChiCom/KorCom forces.
[2 lines of source text not
declassified]
Option B
4. This assumed defense policy is identical with Option C, except
that it envisages immediate use [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] by the defending forces.
It was assumed that the Chinese would retaliate with whatever
indigenous [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] they might
have after the U.S. initiated [less than 1 line
of
source text not declassified] operations. In
view of the very few weapons estimated to be available to the
Chinese, this assumption would result in one-sided use of [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] except for a
very few, area-type weapons deliverable by Red China. (Section VI
above)5
5. Sub-studies made by or for the Study Group clearly indicate that
there would be an appreciable reduction in force requirements under
this Option as compared with Option C. The Study Group was unable,
however, to assess with any precision the impact of [3 lines of source text not declassified]. No
further attention, therefore, has been devoted to this Option.
[Page 561]
General
6. In all three Options, it has been assumed that the mission of the
defending forces is limited to containment of the initial Communist
offensive. No geographic requirement is assumed except that there be
retained sufficient depth to permit a further UN buildup if that should be necessary. It will be
noted that this mission is somewhat at variance with the present
mission of UN forces, which at least
implies a requirement to retain Seoul, and which requires readiness
to conduct a subsequent counter-offensive.
7. Two analytical sub-studies were made for the Study Group to serve
as yardsticks for air and ground force requirements under Options A
and C. Air considerations are covered in WSEG Staff Study No. 88
(available in draft form to the Study Group)6 which has been taken
into consideration. A study limited to ground combat operations in
the Korean environment is attached at Annex O.
8. Analyses of the two alternative defense policies follow in
Sections IX and X. Option C is considered first, so that a situation
which represents essentially the present defense policy can serve as
a basis for analysis of change.
9. The methods used for these analyses are the product of the Study
Group and do not represent either the methods of analysis nor the
judgments of the responsible Commanders. It is emphasized that these
analyses are based upon the large number of assumptions and
estimates, some of a highly tenuous nature, set forth elsewhere in
this study and particularly in Annex L. Even though the results of
the analyses are set forth in direct terms, they are not intended
and should not be construed to be of an absolute or categorical
nature, since they are highly sensitive to the validity of the
assumptions and estimates used.
[Here follow pages 39-55, which comprise sections IX “Option C,” X
“Option A,” and XI “Implications of Major Force Reductions in ROK Forces.”
XII—Over-All Conclusion
- 1.
- The Study Group, in comparing the two assumed defense policies
(Options A and C) examined in this study, believes that Option
A—if its adoption were linked to some highly significant and
publicly evident change in the political or military situation,
and if based on firm U.S. resolve to use its nuclear strength as
necessary—would provide strong assurance that South Korea would
not be attacked, and probably that it could not be successfully
attacked. If it had been adopted earlier (in connection,
[Page 562]
say, with the
withdrawal of Red Chinese forces from North Korea), political
and economic advantage would probably have ensued.
- 2.
- The Study Group considers that a reduction in ROK forces of the magnitude which
would result from adoption of Option A, would, under present
circumstances, entail risks and disadvantages which far outweigh
any potential economic advantage which might ensue.
- 3.
- Circumstances which would permit the early adoption of a
defense policy entailing dramatic reductions in ROK military strength, without
jeopardy to U.S. objectives and position, must include a prior,
major improvement in the political and economic environments
within South Korea, and additionally some visible political or
military event at least approaching the significance of the
ROK force reduction.
- 4.
- The Study Group concludes, therefore, that the defense policy
of the U.S. for the security of South Korea should not now
undergo drastic revision and that the armed forces of the
Republic of Korea should remain at approximately the level now
programmed.
[Here follow 18 annexes.]
