Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

93. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy¹

Washington, August 3, 1961.

SUBJECT

• The Congo

Your memorandum of July 26 raised, among other matters, several questions regarding the Congo.²

As you know, the Congo Parliament on August 2 gave a virtually unanimous vote of confidence to Cyrille Adoula, who had been designated formateur by President Kasavubu August 1. There are three Deputy Prime Ministers, Gizenga, Sendwe, and Bolikango (Ileo’s Vice Prime Minister). Bomboko continues as Foreign Minister and Ileo has become Minister of Information and Culture. Gbenye is Minister of Interior. Sendwe is a moderate and heads the Balubakat Party of North Katanga.

We had hoped that Adoula would become Prime Minister because he is the strongest and most attractive of the moderate Congolese leaders (a biographic sketch is enclosed).³ Gbenye is the most powerful of Gizenga’s lieutenants and we would therefore hope that he would not long continue to hold the politically sensitive Ministry of Interior. However, we considered that the risks of Gizengist inclusion in the government in a minority position and controlling no politically sensitive ministries would be less of a risk than leaving Gizenga in his Orientale redoubt where he is a standing invitation to Communist penetration and where his isolation tends to drive him closer to the Soviet Bloc.

Gizenga will not be pleased with the politically unimportant position of Deputy Prime Minister and will be tempted and doubtless urged by the Bloc to remain in his redoubt. His recent protest to the UN that the conditions for the meeting of Parliament to which he agreed had been broken by (1) the frequent visits to Parliament of Kasavubu and UN officials and (2) the failure of the Congolese army either to be withdrawn from Léopoldville or be disarmed was probably designed to lay the groundwork for assertions that Parliament’s action was taken under Western duress.

Gbenye has given evidence of independent ambition and we can only speculate that Adoula offered him a politically attractive ministry in order to weaken any effort Gizenga might make to withdraw his group once again to Stanleyville.

Adoula’s victory removes any legal basis for Gizenga to claim that his regime is the legal government of the Congo. It is the second Soviet defeat in the Congo. The Soviet and Czech missions which arrived in Stanleyville just a short time ago are now in an embarrassing position.

The UN representative, Linner, through his efforts had made a large contribution to this successful outcome.

In addition to reintegrating Gizenga’s territories and endeavoring to block his efforts to rebuild his power, we still wish to encourage the reincorporation of Tshombe’s South Katanga into the rest of the Congo. Whether the Congo has a unitary form of government or some type of federation is, of course, a matter for the Congolese to decide. However, we believe that building a viable Congo, the next major task, would be greatly facilitated if the mineral-rich Katanga were to be included in some workable way.

Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak has made it clear in his frequent conversations with Ambassador MacArthur that he agrees with this view and has in fact made his position clear to Katanga authorities and to the large Belgian mining interests in Katanga. We anticipate that he will continue to work closely with the UN and with us to bring this about.

We are doing everything possible to hasten the arrival in Léopoldville of Ambassador-designate Gullion. The performance of our Charge in Léopoldville meanwhile has, I believe, been excellent.⁴

Dean Rusk

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Secret. The source text does not indicate the drafter, but another copy indicates that the memorandum was drafted by Vance. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–361)
2. The paragraph on the Congo reads as follows: “I feel that we should review the situation in the Congo. I have asked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to speed up the Gullion hearing. What should be our policy on the Parliamentary meetings? Should we talk to the Belgians in regard to Katanga?” (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Presidential Record of Report on the Congo)A July 26 memorandum from Battle to Thomas J. Dunnigan of the Executive Secretariat states that Bundy had told Battle that Kennedy was concerned because the United States had no Ambassador in the Congo, and he was not sure the problems were receiving the consideration they deserved. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.70G/7–2661)
3. Not printed.
4. The President’s Deputy Special Assistant, Walt W. Rostow, commented on Rusk’s memorandum in an August 4 memorandum to the President. It stated that although it was still possible that Tshombe’s army might revolt or Gizenga might remain recalcitrant, “you should know that there is optimism all over town that the Congo situation is on the way to solution” and that “the constructive development of the Congo from here on out is going to be one of the most important and interesting tasks in all Africa.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo)