270. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy0
Washington, March 31,
1963.
SUBJECT
- Kashmir: Tactics For Fifth Round1
1. Our Proposed Tactics
In our efforts to encourage India and Pakistan toward a resolution of the
Kashmir dispute, British and United States officials have just agreed, ad
referendum, to courses of action described in the attached three papers.
Your approval is requested.
[Page 530]
2. What Ambassador Galbraith Proposes
Ambassador Galbraith has proposed much
different tactics for the coming weeks:2
Prior to the Karachi talks we should strike a “crude bazaar level” political
bargain with Nehru. We would offer India defense
production assistance, backup support on air, and sizeable long-term aid. We
would ask in return that India promise to offer Pakistan in advance of the
Karachi talks a substantial position in the Vale and ironclad guarantees on
the rivers.
If India accepted, it would be up to Pakistan to respond with a suitable
offer. If it did not, we would go ahead with military aid to India.
We would tell the Indians now that when a Kashmir settlement is effective we
will provide India with high performance fighters, pilot training and
probably C-130’s.
3. Difference between suggested U.S./U.K.
tactics and Ambassador Galbraith’s Proposal
Our tactics assume that more common ground needs to be built up before the
two parties can face the final confrontation without great risk to
themselves and to our interests. Ambassador Galbraith’s are designed to purchase not a settlement, but
an immediate breakthrough from the Indian side. The price is an open-ended
military commitment to India. Since this is just the thing which the
Pakistanis fear most, we would expect them to react violently. This would
reduce the likelihood of a Kashmir settlement and increase Indo-Pak tensions. We would, therefore, suffer a
severe setback in our efforts to strengthen subcontinental defense against
Communist China. Moreover, we would risk losing the special advantages of
our relationship with Pakistan.
4. Emerging Differences with the
British
We are agreed with the British on Kashmir tactics through the Karachi talks.
You should, however, be alerted to the prospect that differences regarding
military aid and Kashmir are likely to arise in the future:
If there is no progress in the Karachi talks, we will encounter increasing
difficulty in getting British cooperation on additional military assistance
to India.
The British might reluctantly agree to commitments on air defense under the
scope of the joint recommendations but would find great difficulty in
providing defense production assistance. They have not considered long-range
military assistance to India; quite apart from the Kashmir issue it would
require a reversal of long-standing policy toward Commonwealth
countries.
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Attachment3
SCENARIO FOR KASHMIR NEGOTIATIONS
I. Objectives for the fifth
round—April 21:4
To get discussions concentrated on the Vale and the possible
alternatives; to devise means for pursuing future negotiations more
effectively.
II. Suggested action for accomplishing
this:
- 1.
- U.S./U.K. should agree upon the preparations required and the
joint line of action to be followed in regard to the fifth
round.
- 2.
- An early, high-level approach to President Ayub and to Prime Minister
Nehru is probably
desirable if U.S./U.K. exploratory talks with officials prior to the
fifth round are to be productive.
- 3.
- It will be necessary to seek through other forms of diplomatic
representation to impress upon both sides the political necessity of
making concessions in regard to the Vale.
- 4.
- We should seek by quiet behind-the-scenes talking with both
parties based upon the joint instructions agreed upon by the U.S.
and U.K. to prepare the ground for a more fruitful fifth round. This
would include discussions with the two parties of a U.S./U.K.
statement of the elements which would indicate the general limits of
what we believe to be a practicable settlement. We hope that this
might make it possible for the two parties to abandon their
reluctance to reveal their bargaining positions.
- 5.
- The U.S. has found value in having Embassy efforts supplemented by
a single U.S. representative to present the Washington views to the
two sides and proposes to send Elmore Jackson back to the
subcontinent about April 7.
- 6.
- No commitments on air defense, defense production, or long-term
military assistance will be made prior to the fifth round, but
urgent planning and continuing consultation will be necessary in
order that decisions can be taken at short notice if developments in
the negotiations make this desirable.
III. Post-fifth round follow
up:
The presence of the UK and US officials in
the subcontinent for the CENTO meeting
in late April will provide an opportunity for discussions in Karachi and
Delhi of the problems of securing the subcontinent
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against Chinese ambitions and the central
importance of a Kashmir settlement and improved Indo-Pak relations to this end.
By late April the U.K. and the U.S. must be prepared: to discuss both in
New Delhi and with numerous high ranking Indian official visitors
questions relating to U.K./U.S. military aid for the next phase; to
Indian air defense and to defense production requirements; and to use
the discussions in this regard to encourage forward movement by the
Indians on the Kashmir question. Hearings on aid to India will already
be under way before the U.S. Congressional committees, but the floor
debate and decisions may not take place until mid-summer.
The Pak consortium meeting (pledging) is
scheduled for the end of April; the Indian consortium meetings, both
preparatory and pledging, are scheduled for May.
The President of India visits the U.S. and U.K. in June.
Attachment5
JOINT U.K./U.S. INSTRUCTION FOR FIFTH ROUND KASHMIR
TALKS6
Our objective before and during Karachi meeting is to get parties into
serious discussion of Vale and of line south of Vale.
We do not believe that present pattern of periodic three-day ministerial
meetings with no provision for detailed examination of alternatives in
interval is productive method of negotiation. Accordingly, our objective
at Karachi should be sufficient ministerial agreement on political
elements of solution so that parties, possibly through quiet discussion
at technical level, could then proceed either directly to
Nehru-Ayub meeting or to a final ministerial meeting followed
promptly by Ayub-Nehru meeting.
To achieve these objectives we must take vigorous action to step up badly
lagging tempo of talks. Practice of urging parties narrow differences by
offering proposals and counterproposals has not been productive.
Therefore, we plan stimulate proposals regarding Vale by discussing with
parties a number of elements which would indicate general limits of what
we believe practicable settlement. (Instructions
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regarding these elements will be sent
separately.)7 We would not expect either party explicitly to
accept these elements but we would hope that concentration on these
elements will assist parties, prior fifth round, to shape realistic
proposals to be considered at Karachi.
In your discussions with Indians and Paks
leading up to fifth round, you should be guided by appropriate portions
of instructions relating to fourth round, including authorization take
specified emergency action if necessary to avoid breakdown of talks. In
addition, you should take following line:
- (1)
- There must be substantial achievement at Karachi talks.
Following preliminary discussions at Rawalpindi, Delhi, and
Karachi, and regrettable slow-down at Calcutta, talks have
reached decisive stage. Major progress is essential and if there
is to be such progress both parties must be prepared to make
major compromises. We regard fifth round as key test of
seriousness with which both sides seek compromise settlement
which so much in interest of both economic and military security
of subcontinent.
- (2)
- We believe main business of Karachi talks should be serious
discussion of Vale, and you should make this clear to both
parties. In order to help them come to grips with problem, we
will be discussing with them a number of elements which we
believe would apply to any mutually acceptable agreement on
Vale.
- (3)
- You should continue to insist that each side must accord other
a substantial position in Vale and their proposals must take
this central principle into account. Each party must come to
Karachi prepared give fair hearing to proposals of other. While
we continue believe solution which would lead to least
difficulty would be achieved by delineation of an international
boundary, we will support any feasible settlement upon which
India and Pakistan can agree.
- (4)
- You should tell Indians it would have most unfortunate effect
on Karachi talks were they again to raise subject Pak-Chinese border agreement, and
it should now be dropped.
[Page 534]
Attachment8
ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT
It is proposed that the following points, which are designed to encourage
the parties to concentrate on the immediate questions at issue, should
be put to the parties by the Ambassador and by Elmore Jackson, after the
latter’s arrival on the subcontinent. The British, through their High
Commissioners, will concert, as appropriate, in the presentation and the
subsequent discussion.
- 1.
- Neither India nor Pakistan can entirely give up its claim to the
Kashmir Valley. Each must have a substantial position in the
Vale.
- 2.
- India and Pakistan must both have assured access to and through
the Vale for the defense of their positions to the north and east.
These defense arrangements must be such as not to impede a
disengagement of Indian and Pakistan forces.
- 3.
- Outside the Valley, the economic and strategic interests of the
two countries should be recognized, e.g., India’s position in Ladakh
and Pakistan’s interest in the development of water storage
facilities on the Chenab.
- 4.
- The position of the two countries in the Valley must be such as to
permit:
- (a)
- clearly defined arrangements for sovereignty and for the
maintenance of law and order.
- (b)
- political freedom and some measure of local self-rule for
the inhabitants.
- (c)
- free movement of the people of the Valley throughout the
Vale, and their relatively free movement to other parts of
Kashmir and to India and Pakistan.
- (d)
- the rapid development by India and Pakistan of tourism in
the Kashmir area—with its important foreign exchange
potential for both countries.
- (e)
- the effective use in Kashmir of development funds,
available from external sources, for such purposes as
improving water and forestry resources, the development of
communications and small industries, and improving the
health and welfare of the people.
