Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

269. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, March 25, 1963, Midnight.

3693. Dept Pass White House and Defense. I have now settled in my mind on the tactics for the next approach to the Indians on Kashmir. This supplements and extends Embtels 3602¹ and 3607² to which incidentally I have as yet had no response. We assume here that the Department has not lost its interest in a Kashmir settlement. If this is so would hope there might be more positive indication to this effect in the speed and precision of future comment.

As the basic point of departure let me note that I have exhausted my present line of argument. The Indians are listening to my speeches on the security of the subcontinent and the need to placate our Congress with exceptional equanimity. I would attribute this to my own incoherence were it not that the eloquent letters drafted for the President are producing an equal absence of perturbation. At the same time as shown by the past and forthcoming trips of the local power elite to Washington, Indians have a continuing and increasing concern for war production assistance, longer-run defense aid and air defense. There is also (Embtel 3607 again) increasing concern about developing independent strength by the IAF. As the immediate fear of the Chinese Air Force recedes and national pride re-asserts itself they are beginning to think of new equipment. This yearning will continue and increase.

One further point. Instead of waiting for the April talks, there is a chance for speeding up these dreary negotiations by getting the Indians to outline an offer in advance. This would put them in a very good light, and put the Paks in a position where they would have to prepare a responding step. This offer should be fairly definitive and could be wholly contingent on a Pak response. The Calcutta exercise (Embtel 3602) is causing me to have doubts about whether the existing forward process is going forward at all. We need a bigger step. In light of the above I propose:

(1) After preparatory work with Krishnamachari, Shastri and FonSec Desai and possibly Chavan, I propose to go to see PriMin and put forward a plain political bargain. Alternatively, “I may ask” the above cast to do it for me and preliminary soundings with TTK suggest that this could be best course. The deal is that we will give the Indians substantial support on machinery, equipment and raw material for the development of their defense industry. We will give them backup support on air. We will negotiate a sizeable program of longer-term aid. These things we are prepared to work out with Krishnamachari on his forthcoming trip to Washington. But we must however have something from the Indians. That is a clear indication that they will make a substantial concession, not a sliver, in the valley. I shall note that one dominant view, which I happen to hold, is that Vale should be divided with the rights to the valley residents to move and trade freely across the line. There must also be ironclad guarantees to the Pakistanis on the rivers. Something on this line should be offered in advance of Karachi as a major move to settlement. At Karachi Indians should propose a joint team of experts to work on mutually acceptable arrangements in valley for presentation first to ministers and then to summit.

(2) I will stress that early indication of offer along the foregoing lines will serve two purposes: (A) it will set the stage for Krishnamachari’s negotiations and enable him to sew up these vital matters, and (B) it will make it possible for us to put the arm on the Paks in an equally serious way. We do not know whether the Paks will accept. But the Indians will have put the ball plainly in their court. If Paks don’t respond to a suitable offer, we will of course go ahead with military aid. The Paks will have lost their right to complain.

(3) The foregoing concerns the major step. I come now to a later stage of the bargain. I plan to say that we are aware of the Indians need for transport planes, high-performance fighters and pilot training. The C-119’s we will provide as part of the present program. However, we have no choice but to go slow on high-performance fighters and pilot training and probably C-130 type transport because of the danger of an adverse and damaging Pakistan reaction. But it should be understood that just as soon as a Kashmir settlement is effective we will provide planes and training so welcome this accretion to the air strength of the non-communist world. I am perfectly aware that this takes us some steps beyond present thinking. Notice however that it is an offer that is contingent on a settlement. Should we get a settlement, some fighters and training would be a small price. And it gives Indians strong incentive for further adjustments and amendments beyond the major step. Once we get the major steps, small changes can follow always assuming the Paks can be brought along.

There are risks in the above strategy and I have no doubt that they will be adequately discussed. This is the first time we have descended to quite such a crude bazaar level with the Indians. They may not like it and the sensitive Nehru soul may be somewhat seared. The Communists and the Menonites will [garble] a barter of sacred territory for the defense and sound off. However, I must stress that I have exhausted the verbal lines of approach including those that are still to be suggested by the Department and this is the most practical next step. Moreover, it might work. Accordingly:

(1) May I have Washington support for the defense production air defense and longer-range arms aid which are our part of the bargain? May I note that if caution causes you to cut back on my offer you will be directly damaging my case. And may I note that these are things that in one form or another we are going to do anyway, so why not use them?

(2) To avoid misunderstanding I should give some indication of the general magnitude on defense production and longer[-range arms aid?]. While these figures need not be precise, I will need guidance and neither vagueness nor parsimony will help me a bit.

(3) May I have specific approval for talking about the longer-run air prospect in event of a full settlement?

(4) May it be understood (Embtel 3607) that air defense deals with procedure but at the moment it seems at all odds the most promising course?

(5) May it be known that I view with continuing alarm the indication in the cables that Sandys may return to the subcontinent and I regard as irresponsible the failure to tell the British when this talk of the glint in Sandys’ eye comes up how disastrous this would be. (They are clear here.) I am in fact persuaded that at any time we seem to be close to agreement he will be back with the hope of propping up his admirably unpromising career and presumably with his talk of CENTO, nuclear deterrents and the rest. I must again urge in strongest terms the grievous damage that this would do and the importance of preventing it. If nothing else serves, you must have in mind a direct appeal by the President to Macmillan.

(6) May I have, for God’s sake, reasonably prompt reply? If you are very prompt I might plead for speed here so you could put the bite on Bhutto. May I also remind all hands that just as Washington considers it prudent to remind ambassadors to move with all firmness, vigor and determination, so ambassadors are entitled in characteristic humility to ask Washington to collect itself effectively for supporting action. I notice with mild distaste my feeling that while I should be expected to move GOI with some celerity, the tempo USG must be taken as given and very deliberate at that.

Galbraith

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Karachi.
1. Telegram 3602 from New Delhi, March 18, contained Galbraith’s assessment of the Calcutta round of the Kashmir Ministerial talks, which he described as “a frail dish,” and his suggestions for tactics to pursue in the wake of those talks. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 3607 from New Delhi, March 18, Galbraith outlined what he saw as the unique opportunity to influence India policy offered by the negotiations taking place over the Indian request for air defense support. (Ibid., DEF 1-4 INDIA)