Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

268. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, March 23, 1963.

I’ve summarized on attached page State’s reply last week to your query¹ about risks of renewed Chicom attack on India this Spring.

Just this week Indian sources have been playing up alleged 2-4 division Chicom reinforcements and hostile tone of recent Peiping notes. We have no evidence of buildup, have tracked down source of above report, and think it false (see Delhi 3667 and 3637 attached).² Our hunch is that Indians are playing threat up partly as a pitch for US aid, partly to keep Indian people alive to threat.

We think Chicoms would lose more politically than they’d gain militarily by renewed attack. It would almost certainly serve our interests rather than theirs.

Bob Komer

Attachment³

Washington, March 14, 1963.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached response⁴ to your query about the possibility of renewed Chicom attack on India, and the impact of our aid on India ability to resist, can be summarized as follows:

1. We see little likelihood of renewed major Chicom attack this spring. Their withdrawal from areas seized last fall, lack of any subsequent major build-up, and our analysis of Chicom intentions all suggest that the Chicoms feel they achieved their limited objectives, and are unlikely to risk triggering US/UK intervention. There might, however, be a renewal of minor skirmishing.

2. The Chicoms are capable of reoccupying all of the areas they seized last fall. However, the Indian army has elected not to re-occupy and defend these areas. In the NEFA the Indians would defend down on the Assam plain and would give a much better account of themselves in general than last fall. The Chinese logistic problem would also be much more difficult, if they tried to advance out of the Himalaya foothills into the critical river valleys. The Indians might well be able to contain any such Chicom advances, particularly if they used their air, though the Chinese might make some further gains.

3. If the above estimate is correct, our aid has been at about the right pace, considering our desire to use its rate of flow as leverage on Kashmir. Given the present limited absorptive capacity of the Indian forces, they could not really have used a great deal more. What aid we gave did much to meet their emergency needs. The key further short-run step we could take would be to provide the US/UK “air umbrella,” which we will be recommending shortly.

4. The longer term military threat to India may be greater than the immediate one, depending on how both sides handle themselves in the disputed zones. Therefore we ought to consider moving shortly on (a) the next tranche of military assistance beyond the $120 million emergency ceiling (b) assisting Indian defense production (c) rehabilitating the Indian air force (which we hope the UK will take on).

R.W. Komer

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 3/22/63-3/31/63. Secret.
1. The query was expressed in NSAM No. 223, Document 260.
2. Not attached. Dated March 22 and March 21, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CHICOM-INDIA)
3. Secret.
4. Not found.