Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

271. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 1, 1963, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Mr. Harriman
• Mr. McG. Bundy
• Mr. Talbot
• Mr. W. Bundy
• Mr. Kaysen
• Mr. Jackson

The Secretary opened the discussion by indicating the importance which he attaches to the defense of the subcontinent. He emphasized the central role of a Kashmir settlement in the development of that defense system.

Mr. Talbot interpreted the present status of the Kashmir negotiations. The last Indian-Pakistan Ministerial Meeting in Calcutta did not move the two parties forward. It may have gotten them over certain hurdles growing out of the Pak-Chicom border agreement. In talks here in Washington during the last few days with the British, a general line of approach has been developed which includes moves to re-emphasize to India and Pakistan the importance which the US and UK attach to a Kashmir settlement.¹ It also included an agreement (ad referendum) on:

1. A scenario for the period preceding and immediately following the next Ministerial Meeting in Karachi, scheduled to begin on April 21.

2. A paper setting forth certain “elements of a settlement,” and

3. The informal use of a background paper elaborating various alternative approaches to a settlement.

As a means of emphasizing the importance which the UK attaches to a settlement, the British are considering the possibility of the Prime Minister addressing letters to Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub. The United States has already moved in this area by sending Walt Rostow and Bob Komer for talks with senior officials in India and Pakistan.

The President indicated that he understood some of the reasons why, under present circumstances, the Indians might be brought to a willingness to reach a compromise settlement on Kashmir. He asked what incentives there were for President Ayub to compromise. It was pointed out that the next few months might be the last good opportunity for Pakistan to settle. The US and UK might be able at the present time to persuade the Indians to make a substantial compromise. The two countries may not have at hand equal leverage in the future.

The President asked if Duncan Sandys was likely again to become directly involved in the negotiations. Mr. Harriman indicated that he did not share Ambassador Galbraith’s feeling about the usefulness of Mr. Sandys’ efforts. He felt that the latter had already been of substantial assistance in getting the present negotiations underway.

The President asked if the Indians understood that they must settle the Kashmir question. Mr. Talbot suggested that there had been some slippage in the Indian approach during the period surrounding the Pak-Chicom border agreement but said that Mr. Rostow’s trip was designed to re-emphasize to the Indians and the Pakistanis the importance of a Kashmir settlement.

The President asked why, if the US was going to make certain military assistance available to India during the next few months, certain of the arrangements could not be made promptly in a manner which could relate them to a more forthcoming Indian offer on Kashmir. The Secretary and Mr. Talbot suggested the problem was partially one of timing. It was pointed out that the India-Pakistan negotiations had not yet reached the stage where it was possible for the US and UK to get a sufficiently clear reading of what the ultimate compromise should be for us to put our full weight behind a particular Indian offer. In addition, a US-Indian deal would certainly leak. This would lead almost certainly to a Pakistani rejection.

The President asked how soon decisions could be made on a military aid program for India. The Secretary of Defense pointed out that while the US might, at an early stage, reach a decision in regard to air defense questions, and perhaps on the first stage of a defense production program, the Indian government’s requirements for the later stages of their defense production program and for their long-term military assistance program, were most unclear. The US, as of now, has no firm indications from the Indians for these latter requirements. It would thus be difficult at this stage to relate most of these military programs to a specific Indian offer on Kashmir. If such relationships were to be considered desirable, they could be established much more effectively in early May.

The Secretary of Defense indicated that the costs of an air defense program and of the first stage of a defense production program would not be difficult to handle.

The Secretary suggested that the aim of the United States should be to secure a Kashmir settlement and not just to stimulate an Indian offer which, if the Pakistanis turned it down, would clear the way for additional military assistance to India. This would lead to an accelerating arms race between India and Pakistan and continued wastage of US and other economic resources on the subcontinent. He emphasized the importance of our looking at the defense of the subcontinent as a whole.

The President suggested that perhaps the proper course would be to indicate to Ambassador Galbraith that we might come to some such proposal as his following the meeting in Karachi.

Mr. Talbot said that he hoped that enough progress could be made in narrowing the gap between the two parties before and during the Karachi meeting and it would be possible after that meeting for the US to be much clearer in stimulating or promoting compromise proposals. In response to a question, Mr. Jackson indicated that he thought it would be premature to attempt to work out a final proposal for settlement, of the kind which Ambassador Galbraith suggested, previous to the Karachi meeting. He felt that, using the elements of a settlement on which the US and UK had agreed (ad referendum), it should be possible to get India and Pakistan at the Karachi meeting into a discussion of the Vale. He believed that, following such a discussion, the US would have a much more definite view of the nature of the ultimate compromise toward which the parties should be encouraged to move.

The President suggested that Ambassador Galbraith be told:

1. That Washington is moving promptly to define our response to Indian military aid requests;

2. That we are lacking adequate information with regard to the Indian need for a long-term military aid program and that we urgently need the Ambassador’s assistance in getting more precise estimates, and;

3. That the kind of proposal on Kashmir which he has suggested could better be considered later in April or early in May.

Mr. Talbot asked whether this meant that the President approved the scenario which had been worked out with the British. Mr. Bundy suggested that the President might wish to put the consensus that had been reached at the meeting to Ambassador Galbraith, getting his comment, before making a final decision. The Secretary suggested that the consensus should similarly be sent to Ambassador McConaughy for his comment.

The President assented to this approach.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret. Drafted by Elmore Jackson on April 3. The meeting was held at the White House.
1. See Document 270.