262. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State0
3432. Department Pass White House and Defense. We continue to have a serious problem here of keeping Indians moving on Kashmir, firm on China and threading our way between Pakistan baiters, anti-American and other local thickets. The Menonites and fellow travellers are working very hard for a comeback. They are naturally discontented with the way Indian public opinion has moved toward the West in recent months and would like to neutralize the anti-communist and anti-Chinese reaction.
This group has a potentially very dangerous argument that the US responded promptly enough with the help when the Chinese came last fall but now we are subordinating Indian aid to domestic considerations, our fear of arousing the Pakistanis and other adverse factors. It follows that India need not pursue an active Pakistan policy for she is not going to get much help anyway. There is further danger of a realpolitik argument that Americans being largely indifferent, India had better make up with the Chinese along Pak lines.
As you will be aware, I have been meeting these arguments with considerable energy and some success. But given the state of Indian alarm over the Chinese there is a feeling that we are being very studious and deliberate. This was reflected, as these things always are, in Nehru’s comment this time to Chalmers Roberts. Accordingly, it is very important that we have rapid movement on the air defense matter. Most immediately if I could indicate the prospect of a fairly prompt response, I would be in a far stronger position in pressing at Calcutta on Kashmir. “You must uphold our hand at this juncture while we are getting you air support.” I have just been over the intelligence data and it seems clear that the danger of air operations from Tibet is not large. Accordingly, in accepting some commitment to support the Indians against Chinese air attack we are not running an appreciable risk. At the same time, the supporting effect here will be perfectly enormous. Particularly after this Bhutto trip to Peking I need something to work on. Note also value of example to those who seek to move GOI of successful movement of USG.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-4 INDIA. Top Secret; Operational Immediate.↩