261. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
The waning prospects for a Kashmir settlement have been further dimmed by (1) Pakistan’s border agreement with Peiping, which has given India a new excuse for stalling; and (2) Pakistan’s still adamant refusal to consider any form of partition which doesn’t give it the Vale. Aziz Ahmed’s latest talk with Talbot (To London 4566 attached)1 shows rigidity of Pak stand.
Meanwhile we have reached US/UK agreement on tactics for the next round (London’s 3330 and 3331 attached).2 In essence we will press the Indians to show willingness to give the Paks a position in the Vale, and press the Paks to be sufficiently responsive to keep the talks going.
The British agreed not to toss in internationalization at this point, but we believe they still see it as the preferred solution, and suspect that they may have talked about it with the Paks. Since the UK idea involves some form of self-determination, i.e. reversion to Pakistan after a few years, it is a flat non-starter. But if the Paks so choose, they can try it out at some point and get an Indian turn-down. Then we can get back to talking partition.
It’s hard to tell how much Pak intransigeance is really bargaining tactics and how much a feeling on Ayub’s part that public opinion will not accept partition at this point or that by waiting until Nehru dies, the Paks can get a better deal. We are trying to disabuse the Paks on the latter score.
We could probably get a fifth or even sixth round of talks. Since these highly publicized ministerial rounds sharply restrict maneuverability of the negotiators, however, we are looking for a way to get private talks going instead, with the ministerial sessions coming at much longer intervals.
The odds are increasingly against an early Kashmir settlement, but we must play out the hand. At the minimum we must get the Indians to be sufficiently forthcoming that the failure can be attributed to Pakistan. If this is the case, it should ease our problem on going ahead with aid to India. The Paks will no doubt be unhappy, but at least we’ll be able to counter that we made a real effort to get India to come to terms.