263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Dacca0
383. For Ambassador McConaughy. Deliver following message from President to Ayub at earliest opportunity.
March 9, 1963
“Dear Mr. President:
I must tell you of my concern over the turn of events between the third and fourth rounds of the Kashmir talks. As you know, we and the United Kingdom pressed for these talks at Pakistan’s urging. We have done our best to get talks started and to keep them going. Indeed, I have gained confidence that we are on the right track from the fact that your government has repeatedly expressed its appreciation for our efforts. I also feel we have made progress in getting India to offer terms better than any in recent years. There is a reasonable prospect that under proper circumstances India will go further still. Thus we have hoped that a resolution of the long-standing dispute between you and India was in sight.
Now, however, the timing and form of Pakistan’s negotiations with Peiping, however justifiable these might be on other grounds, have had the predictable effect of seriously clouding the atmosphere. The Government of India will now find it more difficult to gain public acceptance of necessary concessions to Pakistan. I know you had your reasons for concluding the border agreement with Communist China. But there is no blinking how adversely it has affected the negotiations.
It was with this in mind that I noted and was encouraged by your statement in Dacca on the next round of talks. You said the agreement with Communist China would not prejudice the Kashmir talks in Calcutta and that Pakistan would enter them with honest intention to seek an equitable and honorable settlement.
To this end, I feel that the Pakistan delegation at Calcutta should take the initiative by advancing a far more forthcoming and realistic position than that adopted not only at the Karachi meetings but also subsequently heard from some of your officials. I can tell you that I am also urging Mr. Nehru to approach the negotiations in a forthcoming spirit.
Any serious effort to settle the Kashmir issue requires the willingness of each side to reckon with the interests of the other in the Vale of Kashmir. Yet at Karachi, neither side came to grips with this central issue. [Page 519] I continue to think that the best solution involves an international boundary through Kashmir. Nevertheless, should you believe some other formula would be workable, I hope you will come forward with it at Calcutta.
Let me again underline my conviction that there will probably never be a better opportunity for an honorable settlement on terms as good as those we think attainable now. If we do not succeed in our efforts this time, it would seem almost inevitable that the issue would, for all practical purposes, be settled on the basis of the status quo.
The Kashmir discussions are a challenge requiring patience and determination along with a high order of statesmanship. I know we can count on you to do your share. I hope that we can keep in close touch as the discussions continue.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
John F. Kennedy”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Gatch; cleared by BNA, Harriman, McGhee, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi, London, Karachi, and Calcutta.↩