258. Notes on Discussion0
INFORMAL NOTES ON DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT ON KASHMIR NEGOTIATIONS
The President met February 21 at 5:30 p.m. with Secretary Rusk, Governor Harriman, Mr. Talbot, Mr. Komer and Mr. Schneider to discuss the U.S. role in the Kashmir negotiations.
Mr. Talbot opened the discussion by presenting a resume of the current status of the Kashmir talks. Speaking from a wall map, he explained that in the third round of talks both parties got down to maps and suggested lines by which Kashmir might be divided. The Indians made the initial offer and the Paks responded. The President asked about a third line on the wall map, and Mr. Talbot replied that this was our staff suggestion of a line of possible settlement. We were now inclined to move the line somewhat to the right, in favor of Pakistan, but at any rate we were not planning to make a proposal at present. The talks were continuing on a bilateral basis.
Continuing his presentation, Mr. Talbot said that the latest letters on Kashmir from both Aziz Ahmed and Nehru were quite negative. Nevertheless, Ambassador Galbraith believes India can be moved to give Pakistan a reasonable foothold in the Vale. On the other hand, Ambassador McConaughy feels that the Paks are not inclined to seek a settlement and he finds their position extremely rigid. Nevertheless, Mr. Talbot [Page 509] explained, we believe there is a fair chance we can move the parties to a compromise. We believe the Paks may come up with a proposal for internationalization or autonomy in the fourth round. It is just as well that these be considered so that the parties may then move on to drawing lines on maps in future talks.
Mr. Talbot pointed out that we believe the stakes are high enough to justify an increase in our involvement in the talks. We wished the President’s authority to step up our activities from prodding both parties to making certain substantive suggestions regarding aspects of possible solutions. We proposed to begin this prior to the fourth round.
The President commented that he had recently written letters to both President Ayub and Prime Minister Nehru. Did we think there was a need for him to do so again? Mr. Talbot said he believed there would be such a need before the next talks, but not right away.
Mr. Talbot described our coordination of our Kashmir tactics with the British prior to the third round of talks and our plans for similar coordination prior to the fourth.
The Secretary intervened at this point to explain to the President that the major problem we may face in the fourth round is how to get through to the fifth. In view of the political pressures which are likely to be generated by both national legislatures, it will be difficult to make any major progress at Calcutta. There could be greater progress at the fifth round which might be held in April. The Secretary also pointed out that the Paks had offered virtually nothing when they put in their line at Karachi. Our efforts at present, therefore, must be concentrated on getting the Paks to be more forthcoming.
The President then commented rather wryly that if Pakistan doesn’t come through with a better compromise offer, it will probably try to blackmail us into holding off on aid to India.
It was to deal with this problem, Mr. Komer explained, that we proposed to make clear to Pakistan that if the Kashmir talks failed because of Pak intransigence, we would not feel obligated to work out our military assistance to India in consultation with Pakistan. Speculating on other Pak moves, Mr. Talbot said that they may be thinking of taking the Kashmir issue to the Security Council this fall and, following a Soviet veto, raise it in the General Assembly. We believe Zafrullah’s recent tour may have been intended to sound out Afro-Asian opinion with this move in mind. In order to deal with this eventuality, we propose to tell the Paks in advance that if the talks fail because of their intransigence, we would not support them in the U.N. this year.
The President expressed the view that to say this would simply annoy the Paks. They knew perfectly well that they could get nowhere in the U.N. on Kashmir.
[Page 510]The President then turned his attention again to the map, and, in particular, the dividing line which the Department has suggested as a possible basis for settlement. Mr. Komer said that this line represented the most we thought the Indians might give up, since a settlement would depend on Indian concessions.
Mr. Talbot then brought his presentation to a close with a brief review of our complete formula for a settlement, which, he said, would call for special joint Indo-Pak arrangements in the Vale while reserving to each party respective areas of political control in the Vale and elsewhere in Kashmir.
As the discussion came to a close, the President asked if we were suggesting some immediate communication or letter. Mr. Talbot replied that our request was for him to authorize us to step up our involvement in the Kashmir negotiations. The Secretary remarked, we were asking permission to get in from up to our ankles to up to our knees.
The President gave his approval.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret. Drafted by Schneider on February 23. According to the President’s Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Kennedy Library)↩