Attached is a State paper addressed to these issues. Talbot’s people think we may be able to get
through one or two more rounds before we have to start real arm twisting. I
feel that we had better start weighing in harder now, lest the talks lose
momentum, though holding off on precise proposals if possible till after the
fourth round. And since we, not the UK, are
the only ones with real leverage, and both sides are in fact looking to us,
we ought not to try to stay a half step behind the UK.
The alternative would be to plug for one or two more rounds, but to begin
disengaging if there is insufficient progress, and neither advance our own
solution (which will inevitably outrage the side adversely affected) nor use
forms of pressure which risk serious damage to our relations with India or
Pakistan. Moreover, there’s no point in signing on to a real effort unless
we’re willing to go the distance. Injecting ourselves directly into this
dispute will buy us trouble with both sides, and plenty of flak from the
Hill. Since at best we’ve got only a 50-50 chance of pulling it off, we may
end up with a failure to boot.
But we’re unlikely ever to have a better chance to settle Kashmir on other
than the status quo, and a hard try seems well worth the risks. If you
agree, then aside from approving State’s recommendations, I’d urge you
ginger up State by: (1) telling them you want every effort made to bring off
a settlement; (2) explicitly authorizing a hard sell to Ayub on the
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need to compromise now if he is ever to get one,
including warnings that we may be unable to back him if he goes to the GA
and that we’ll have to go ahead with military aid to India.
Attachment3
Washington,
February 20,
1963.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT
1. Purpose of Meeting.
The purpose of your meeting at 5:00 o’clock Thursday is to decide on
future Kashmir strategy. We have reached the point where further real
progress is unlikely without increased United States involvement; even
with it, a settlement is not a sure thing. Whether we should invest the
necessary extra effort, and what leverage we should use are major
questions on which we need your views.
2. The Talks So Far.
[Here follows a two-page assessment of the progress of and prospects for
the Ministerial talks, which is similar to the assessment contained in
the attachment to Document 253. The Department of State assessment is
somewhat more pessimistic than that produced by the NSC Subcommittee, but still concludes that
“there is a fair chance for a settlement.”]
4. Leverage Available To Us.
In India our usable leverage is primarily related to our military aid.
The Indians already seem well aware of the link between it and Kashmir.
This impression will be intensified as we get more into the aid season.
The danger is, however, that if we overplay our hand, the Indians may
conclude that the cost of military assistance, in terms of concessions
in
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Kashmir, is so great as to
make it necessary to seek peace with Communist China.
We might also link our economic assistance with Kashmir. This would
increase the pressures for settlement but, if the Indians failed to
respond and we cut aid, the economic and political consequences within
India would be serious.
In Pakistan we could also tie military and economic aid to Kashmir. If we
did this with military aid we would be resiling from outstanding
commitments to Ayub and if we did
it with economic aid the same objection as in India would apply. Also we
can warn Ayub that the United
States will continue to build Indian military strength if the Kashmir
negotiations fail because of Pak
intransigence. Further, we can tell him that this is his best
opportunity for a Kashmir settlement and the United States and United
Kingdom will not support him in any other Pak moves on Kashmir (e.g., UNGA). If we carry any of these
tactics too far, however, we may either force Ayub to accept a Kashmir compromise
which he cannot sell at home, or put ourselves in the position of having
further weakened his political position.
5. Our Proposals For Future
Action.
a. For Fourth Round
Our involvement in the talks has steadily increased and we believe it
should continue to do so. So far we have done a great deal of prodding
and some stage managing. At each round our Ambassadors have been
credited by one party or the other with “saving” the talks. We plan to
continue our prodding (e.g. further Presidential correspondence) and
begin making substantive suggestions to both sides regarding aspects of
possible solutions (e.g. functional arrangements to mitigate partition
of Vale). We would not now offer an integrated proposal for settlement.
We plan, however, to authorize our Ambassadors, if necessary to save the
talks, to urge the negotiators at Calcutta to schedule a fifth round to
consider such a United States-United Kingdom proposal. We will
coordinate the details of these tactics with the British early next
week.
In India we propose to continue our efforts to insure that the wide range
of Indian leaders who can influence Nehru are aware
of the relationship between United States capacity to aid India
militarily and a Kashmir settlement. We would not similarly link
economic aid, but we propose to warn Indian leaders that Congressional
attitudes on such aid are certain to be affected by India’s approach to
the Kashmir talks.
In Pakistan we propose to remind Ayub that we see no prospect of any better result for
him than a genuine compromise, and make clear to him our determination
to continue military aid to India if Pakistan obstructs the way to a
Kashmir settlement. We plan also to signal that we
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will not in the future take an active role
in support of other Pak moves on Kashmir
if Pakistan is not forthcoming in these talks.
b. After Fourth Round
In any event, we are prepared to put forward a proposal some time after
the fourth round if further bilateral progress seems unlikely, with
exact timing dependent upon progress in future rounds of bilateral
talks. We are now refining such a formula for possible future use, but
its exact content will depend greatly upon the direction in which the
bilateral negotiators have moved. Our formula calls for special joint
Indo-Pak arrangements in the Vale
while reserving to each party respective areas of political control in
the Vale and elsewhere in Kashmir.
6. Implications of This Course and
Risk of Failure.
We are gradually moving toward a degree of involvement in the talks which
may vitally affect our relationships with India and Pakistan. While the
benefits of success would be great, the cost of failure should be
considered. If we tie the extent of military aid to India to a
settlement—and we have already done so to a large degree—failure will
affect this important component of our relationship. Should India appear
responsible for failure, its reputation on the Hill and elsewhere would
greatly suffer, complicating our already difficult tasks. If we push
Pakistan hard without result, we may damage relations with Ayub and weaken his political position
at home. Even if we abandoned our efforts now, some of these same
effects would be felt. Yet with further U.S.-U.K. involvement, they
could become more severe.
On the other hand, if a settlement is achieved, the prospects for the
future of the subcontinent—and our relations with both countries in
it—are immeasurably brightened. Furthermore, even a failure could, if
the effort had resulted in a narrowing of the gap between them, be used
to demonstrate to Congress that an honest effort had been made on both
sides and that neither party should be penalized.
7. Recommendations.
We are asking at this time for your specific approval of our stepping up
our prodding and advancing certain substantive ideas about possible
solutions. We also request your approval of our proposals for use of
leverage as set forth in Section 5. We think we see our way clear
through the fourth round of talks and perhaps to the fifth. You should
know that this course, unless deliberately interrupted, will almost
inevitably lead to a greater U.S. commitment. This is bound to raise
fundamental questions concerning our relations with India and Pakistan
(See Section 5). Failure to achieve a settlement may seriously damage
those relations at a time when the Chinese Communist threat is likely to
require closer cooperation between us and the nations of the
subcontinent. We therefore ask
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that you consider these aspects of the situation while making your
decision.
