Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

259. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 23, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Kashmir: Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement

PARTICIPANTS

• H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador, Embassy of Pakistan
• Mr. M. Jaffri, First Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan

Present

• The Secretary
• NEA—Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary
• SOA—John N. Gatch, Jr.

The Secretary told the Ambassador that we are worried about a Kashmir settlement. It looks to us as if things were getting more difficult. We had sensed some movement during the third round in Karachi on the part of India, but the Pakistan proposals had not seemed to us to provide a basis for further negotiation. Now, Foreign Minister Bhutto’s visit to Peking¹ made things more difficult. The Secretary wondered how Pakistan viewed the picture—had there been any agonizing reappraisals in Rawalpindi? He added that, viewing the Kashmir question from a vantage point 12,000 miles away, there was a tantalizing aspect to it. This was that both sides approached the Kashmir issue as enemies, but the issue itself was the only thing that made them enemies. This differentiates the Kashmir issue from such issues as Berlin and Cuba.

The Ambassador began by stating his Government’s position on the Bhutto visit. He had reported our objections to Bhutto and to President Ayub. These had been considered and the proposal to have the Pakistan Ambassador in Peking sign the agreement had been made to the Communist Chinese. They refused to agree, pointing out that the Nepalese and Burmese border agreements with China had been signed by the King and the Prime Minister respectively, and insisted that at least the Foreign Minister sign the Pakistan one. Pakistan was playing down the importance of the trip—the delegation consisted of only four men who would only spend three days in Peking and one in Shanghai before returning to Pakistan. In any case, India should not read too much either into the fact that the Foreign Minister was going, or into the substance of the agreement itself. Pakistan feels it has acted wisely. The border agreement is provisional and does not prejudice India’s interests.

The Secretary said that if he were the Communist Chinese Foreign Minister in Peking, his primary policy objective would be to wreck the Kashmir talks. It seemed to us that the contrived way these announcements about the border agreement had been made indicated that the Communist Chinese were actively using their relations with Pakistan to achieve this objective. The Secretary said he was not viewing the Sino-Pakistan agreement against the background of better than a decade of bitter Sino-United States relations. Rather, he was viewing the agreement as something which Pakistan, a close friend of the United States, was doing which, in the context of the total situation in the subcontinent, might be very harmful to the fourth round of Kashmir talks.

Ambassador Ahmed reiterated that they had tried to call off Bhutto’s visit but could not. He added once again that the Indians were being too sensitive.

The Secretary pointed out that Pakistan has asked us in the past to influence the Indians on Kashmir. We have been working hard on getting the two sides together. Perhaps the Indians should not get upset by Pakistan’s action, but the fact remains that they are. This puts an additional burden on us in a situation where our influence is already limited.

The Ambassador then turned to the Pakistan position on Kashmir. This, he said, had been stated in President Ayub’s last letter to President Kennedy and amplified in his own letter to the Secretary of February 18. It represented the farthest limit Ayub could go consonant with public opinion in Pakistan. Pakistan continues to believe the best solution is a plebiscite, or, at least, the Dixon [Sir Owen]² proposal for a limited plebiscite with partition. India says it cannot accept either of these for security reasons—i.e., India needs to maintain military supply routes through the Vale for the defense of Ladakh.

At this point, the Ambassador digressed from the subject of Kashmir and dwelt on military affairs. He said that intelligence reports coming to Pakistan indicated that the Indian military wanted to get rid of Ladakh as a military liability. If Pakistan took on the responsibility for the defense of Ladakh, it would result in a real joint defense of the subcontinent—i.e., Pakistan would defend the western flank, consisting of Kashmir and Ladakh, and India would defend NEFA. This arrangement would also provide for the disengagement of Pakistan and Indian forces so vital to a workable settlement. Other settlements would not permit Pakistan to disengage because Pakistan suspicions of Indian intentions would be kept alive by the presence of Indian military forces on Pakistan’s flank. The Ambassador said that, the merits of the Kashmir dispute aside, Pakistan believed the concept of Indian responsibility for the defense of NEFA and Pakistan responsibility for Ladakh and Kashmir was a good strategic one. If the United States agrees, Pakistan thinks rightness of concept should be emphasized with Nehru.

Returning to the Kashmir issue itself, the Ambassador said that the Pakistan position contained in his letter to the Secretary of February 18 demonstrated a desire to be reasonable, since India’s security concerns in Ladakh were taken into account. This position has not yet been imparted to the Indians, unless the United States had told them. Mr. Talbot said we had not. The Ambassador said that even this position would be hard to sell in Pakistan, but Ayub believed he could sell it.

The Secretary said that from a strictly U.S. national point of view, we do not care what sort of a solution is arrived at in Kashmir. We are interested in it only because it is an unsolved problem which affects our other interests because it perpetuates the confrontation of Pakistan and Indian forces. The solution is really up to India and Pakistan. However, it seemed clear to us that India will not give up Ladakh. He wondered whether it would not be useful to try to find an acceptable political line outside the Vale taking the Indian view into more account than was done at Karachi. He realized that one can never say last chance in diplomacy, but he did consider that if Kashmir was not settled now, the situation would become more serious all around, and we would all be set back farther.

The Secretary continued that, for example, a breakdown in the Kashmir talks would be welcomed in Peking as an invitation for more adventures in a disunited subcontinent. Then we and India’s Commonwealth friends would feel compelled to provide India with further military assistance. This would inevitably have repercussions in Pakistan because the military balance would be upset.

The Ambassador said he agreed the Chinese Communists would not like to see a Kashmir settlement, but wondered if Nehru realized this. The Secretary said that in his opinion Nehru’s ideas on Kashmir were involved with considerations that go far beyond whatever interests Peking (or Moscow) may have in the issue. The Ambassador wondered whether Nehru can afford to be sentimental on the issue. He believed a more realistic point of view was necessary.

The Secretary said that we urge utter realism on both sides. Kashmir is the number one problem. Perhaps the Chinese Communist involvement with Pakistan had elevated Nehru’s concern. The Ambassador said Nehru was the biggest stumbling block. Pakistan believed that many other elements in India wanted a reasonable settlement. The Secretary said that if Pakistan was in touch with these elements in India, he would expect that Pakistan would be aware of the lack of appeal its Karachi proposals had. The Ambassador said that his Government had decided not to table at Karachi the plan mentioned in his letter to the Secretary of February 18. Perhaps Indian leaders would be more reasonable if they could learn the details of this plan.

The Secretary said he wanted to get a precise understanding of this plan. We gathered that it meant partition outside of the Vale and Ladakh now, and then a later transfer of Ladakh and the Vale to Pakistan. The Ambassador said that our understanding was correct. He said that the United States should understand that Pakistan and India public opinion on Kashmir were different. Pakistan has a grievance—India does not. Pakistan feels it has been cheated out of what is its rightful territory. Ayub has to deal with this public opinion, but has gone farther than any other Pakistan government before him has ever dared to go. Ayub feels he can prepare the public for a later transfer of Ladakh and the Vale, but if India wants more, Ayub would not be able to convince the Pakistan people.

The Ambassador said that the Pakistan position was firm, and that Bhutto intended not to agree to a fifth round after Calcutta unless the Indians were more forthcoming than simply presenting minor adjustments to the cease-fire line. The Secretary said that Pakistan’s line on the map presented at Karachi was much more unrealistic than was the Indian line.

The Secretary went on to say that the stakes were too high to break off the discussions, and continued effort must be made on both sides. A failure at this point would be serious. The Ambassador agreed, but said effort had to come equally from India. He believes the Ayub offer is reasonable and that Pakistan is prepared to wait for Ladakh and the Vale. Mr. Talbot asked how long Pakistan would wait. The Ambassador said that within a year there would be evidence of recrudescence of Chinese Communist aggression if there was to be any, which Pakistan doubted. The Ambassador said that Pakistan would do its best to see that the talks do not fail. Pakistan was anxious that the United States and India understood this.

The Ambassador then reverted to the question of the attitude of the Indian Army towards Ladakh, and wondered whether we had had any intelligence reports that the Indian Army considered it a liability. The Secretary replied that we had no evidence of this nature.

The Secretary then asked why Pakistan and Indian forces could not disengage in connection with a settlement that gave Ladakh to India. The Ambassador said that the answer to this goes to the root of the problem. Pakistan feels that India has not accepted the fact of its existence, and that if India kept an army in Kashmir ostensibly to defend Ladakh, that army would constitute a threat to Pakistan which it could not disregard. Thus, the settlement would be meaningless.

Mr. Talbot said that the Pakistan proposals do not have enough in them to make negotiations towards a settlement possible. Pakistan must be more forthcoming or there will be no settlement. The Ambassador said that he would communicate this to his government but that he was afraid the Pakistan position would be firmer rather than more forthcoming at Calcutta. He sensed a hardening of the Pakistan attitude. Speaking personally he had been surprised that Ayub had gone as far as he had in the proposal on the Vale and Ladakh. It would be hard to explain to the Pakistan people, and this is why there had been so much furore over the Welles Hangen business. The Hangen broadcast could be construed to give away more of the Pakistan position than was desirable.

The Secretary said that the Pakistan position allowing for only one year delay in transferring the Vale and Ladakh to Pakistan was really no position at all—the year would be consumed by the administrative arrangements. The Ambassador said that the year would provide the answer to a disagreement between India and Pakistan about the immediate Chinese Communist threat in Ladakh. Ayub does not believe it a live threat, the Indians do. Ayub therefore is willing to wait a year to see if the threat materializes.

The Secretary emphasized again the importance of the next round to both sides. He said that if the talks failed because of Pakistan, the sympathy that Pakistan has enjoyed from other governments on Kashmir in the United Nations and elsewhere would be dissipated, and these governments would relax into indifference. The Secretary recalled that Ayub had said to Governor Harriman that any workable settlement would be hard to accept in both countries. The Ambassador said that Ayub had sent a clarification of this statement dealing with the interests of the people involved in any settlement.

The Secretary and Mr. Talbot expressed the hope that the United States and Pakistan could keep in continuous and close communication on the Kashmir issue.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret. Drafted by Gatch and approved in S on March 2.
1. The Embassy in Karachi was informed on February 22 by the Foreign Ministry that Bhutto intended to travel to Peking on February 24 to sign the border agreement with China which had been presaged by the agreement in principle signed by the two countries on December 26, 1962. (Telegram 1603 from Karachi, February 22; ibid., POL 32-2 CHICOM-PAK) The border agreement, which delineated the border between Pakistan and China’s Sinkiang province, was signed in Peking on March 2 by Bhutto and China’s Foreign Minister Chen Yi. (Telegram 1654 from Karachi, March 5; ibid.)
2. Brackets in the source text.