Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

82. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State⁰

Cairo, October 18, 1962, 4 p.m.

655. Deptel 427.¹ Conveyed to Anwar Saadat this morning substance reference telegram and pertinent sections Deptel 409. My presentation encompassed following:

1. Review of present military situation recognizing recent YAR success but probability continued border clashes for some weeks or months.

2. Reaffirmation USG policy on recognition stressing this had evolved from experiences in other situations, notably South America. USG does not normally use recognition as political instrument of support and therefore has evolved pattern of objective criteria fulfillment. In this connection I stressed YAR attempt to hamper or cut off AID activities and current articles in UAR press needling USG on non-recognition were self-defeating tactics and tend to delay, rather than hasten, favorable action.

3. Review of deep and continuing USG interests in Arabian Peninsula stability, with particular emphasis on Saudi Arabia. I pointed out it was fear of UAR and not fear of Yemen regime that caused Saudi and Jordanian support Hassan. If either in its own right or as facade for UAR, YAR becomes spearhead for subversive action against Aden and Saudi Arabia, UAR could expect American reaction of serious character. I then suggested imminent possibility of Faisal leadership of Saudi Arabia offered opportunity to re-assess and mend UAR-YAR-SAG relations.

4. UAR-USA Relations. I reviewed hopeful development of these during past year, pointing out there are few problems directly between USG and UAR, the possibility of friction lying almost exclusively in “third country” situations. Arabian Peninsula is such “third country” and I would hope UAR activities in relation to it would not be of such character as to effect continuation and strengthening of our program here.

In response Saadat stated:

A. Our military estimate of situation substantially correct. While some of the tribes may not be enthusiastically pro-YAR they have definitely repudiated Imamate. He foresaw drawnout skirmishes along northern and eastern borders.

B. As to recognition, UAR Government could understand deliberate and judicious process by which USG makes decisions to recognize. However, this was not comprehensible to either Yemen Government or Yemen-UAR populace who could only interpret present position as deliberate delay. Saadat then made an urgent plea for USG help to Yemen “with or without recognition” in the form of clothing, foodstuffs, petrol, and AID program. He said UAR much concerned over possibility of further Soviet inroads into Yemen and that during his trip to Sanaa he saw Soviet Charge “sitting in chair next to Sallal at all meetings”. He urged we make at least token gesture of supplies on emergency basis.

C. The YAR has no intention of stirring up Aden or Saudi Arabia for at least next decade “which is as far ahead as I can predict”. It has so much to do within Yemen that there is neither energy nor funds for anything else.

D. As to UAR, Saadat gave most absolute assurance there was no intention of using Yemen as subversive spearhead against anyone. “We are satisfied with establishment of republican government”, he said, and maintained only future UAR connection with Yemen would be that of badly needed technical assistance. Saadat returned to this absolute disclaimer of designs against Aden and Saudi Arabia repeatedly.

E. As to Faisal, Saadat counted him personal friend and believed him to have greater rapport with UAR than any other member of Royal Family. However, would be impossible for UAR to take initiative in approaching Faisal should he become effective head of Saudi government since Faisal’s attitude re continuation of Saudi support for Hassan unknown. If Faisal stopped flow of money and arms support for Hassan, some rapprochement would be possible.

Comment: As usual Saadat friendly, receiving me within an hour of my request. However, he appeared more restrained in conversation and used more dogmatic tone than in previous interviews. Consider it significant that Saadat did not press for recognition although indicating its value to us and to UAR in relation to Soviet activities. Haikal took almost parallel line with British Ambassador Beeley yesterday, so presumably this reflects Nasser thinking. As to timing USG recognition, I question statement in reference telegram that we would be letting UAR “emerge with easy victory”. I suggest this victory practically won. Beeley told me this morning that from representations just made by British Ambassador to King Hussein on UK criteria for recognition, he judges UK recognition may be imminent. He himself urges accelerated action, believing success of YAR-UAR now fait accompli and hoping UK can obtain at least minimal values by prompt action.

Badeau

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/10-1862. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Jidda, and Amman.
1. In telegram 427 to Cairo, October 17, the Department of State sent its assessment that Prince Hasan lacked sufficient tribal support to overturn the revolutionary regime without massive external support. It advised that the United States did not want to present the UAR, which was clearly implicated in planning the revolt, with an easy victory that might encourage its adventurism elsewhere. The United States would not rush to recognize the revolutionary regime, but recognition should come as a consequence of the new regime consolidating its military control. The Embassy in Cairo was therefore instructed to proceed with the approach outlined in telegram 409 (Document 80), with the deletion of paragraphs 1 and 7, which had been superseded by events. The Embassy should tell the UAR that recognition was under continuing review and that clarification of the situation would be facilitated if the UAR eased Saudi and Jordanian fears and did not escalate its military involvement. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/10-1662)