Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

81. Paper by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Seelye)⁰

Washington, October 17, 1962.

UNITED STATES POSITION ON RECOGNITION OF YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, OCTOBER 17, 1962

The Yemen Arab Republic appears to have established virtually full control in Yemen with the exception of a small outlying fringe area to the east. It has indicated a willingness to respect international obligations and to adhere to existing agreements with the United States (including an AID agreement). The new Yemeni leaders appear to be determined to run Yemen affairs themselves without undue influence from abroad. Our Charge at Taiz has repeatedly and strongly recommended immediate recognition in order to promote a moderate policy on the part of the new regime to prevent it from turning to increased UAR and other outside support.

While the foregoing would seem to dictate immediate recognition, there are overriding factors which militate against early action. We see no advantage in permitting the UAR, whose complicity in planning the Yemen revolt is now apparent on the basis of recent intelligence, to similar adventures elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are strongly opposed to immediate recognition of the regime. They would view such action as a concession to Nasser and an indication of a lessening of United States concern for their interests in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Jordan Government has sent a special message to the Secretary expressing its deep concern with the turn of events in Yemen, and Prince Faysal has conveyed a similar message to Assistant Secretary Talbot. The Secretary has assured the Jordanian Ambassador that, unlike Yemen, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have powerful friends who would be gravely concerned at any overt act of aggression against them. Mr. Talbot is proceeding to New York on the evening of October 17th to make similar assurances to Prince Faysal. In these circumstances it would be unwise for us to extend recognition to the Yemen Arab Republic at the present time.

We are hopeful that we will be in a position to extend recognition to the new regime within a week or so following 1) a demarche being made to United Arab Republic President Nasser to limit his involvement in Yemen and to desist in his subversion against Kings Saud and Hussein; 2) face-saving moves to enable Kings Saud and Hussein to withdraw gracefully from their support of Hassan’s forces; 3) satisfactory reassurances to the two Kings of our intention to stand by them and to circumscribe Nasser’s influences in the Arabian Peninsula.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.02/10-1762. Secret. Transmitted to Bundy under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck that reads: “In response to the White House request, there is enclosed a statement of our position on recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic.”
1. On October 18, Komer sent Kennedy a memorandum that contained the following reasons for not yet recognizing the new Yemeni regime: “(1) YAR regime is ahead, but by no means fully in control. Tribal war in the hills could go on for months. (2) We’re trying to promote a compromise deal through Nasser. To recognize now removes a major lever on UAR (and YAR too). (3) Meanwhile UK, Jordan, Saudi Arabia are violently opposed to our recognizing. Gore saw Rusk yesterday to plead against it. (4) Only 20 countries have recognized so far, almost all Arabs and Bloc. We’ll be a long way from last. (5) Recognition would be inconsistent with our non-intervention posture at this point.” He concluded: “Though costs of not recognizing will increase with time, we’re not under great pressure yet. Instead let’s hold it out as one means of getting UAR and YAR to provide the reassurances to Saud, UK, and Jordan which latter need.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer)