Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic⁰

Washington, October 13, 1962, 3:57 p.m.

409. Cairo Embtel 600.¹ Following for your background:

In October 11 conversation with Talbot Prince Faysal reflected great confidence based on historical pattern of previous Yemeni revolts that tribes slowly mobilizing in northern hills will rally to restore Imamate.² Meanwhile UK has assets in Yemen and presently appears inclined join forces with SAG and Jordan in form money, arms, and encouragement in effort overthrow Sallal. On basis present estimate USG not so confident as UK and others of their capacity overthrow Sallal particularly as UAR appears committed maintain Sallal and probably prepared substantially escalate forces possibly with USSR support, at least to maintain control southern half of Yemen. UAR may also have capability upsetting situation inside Saudi Arabia particularly if hostilities extended to Saudi soil or Saudis commit own forces in Yemen. Nevertheless at minimum we believe Saudi-Jordan-UK combination could maintain major harassing action against Sallal for some time and at maximum create a stalemate with neither side able control whole country. Since situation fraught with danger for all parties, Haikal approach may well reflect Nasser’s recognition these factors. We are assuming UAR is firmly committed to sustaining Sallal regime and if necessary is prepared to play brinksmanship both by use own forces and by inviting greater Soviet help.

If these assumptions are correct USG feels Haikal approach, which combines olive branch with implied threats, could provide opportunity work out accommodation under which new Yemeni regime friendly to UAR and West is legitimized and US, UK, Saudi and Jordanian interests safeguarded by UAR cessation of pressures and by inducements on Yemeni regime to eschew activism in Aden. Would be necessary for UAR give earnests of its good intentions by cessation of propaganda and subversion against Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Aden and by eventual restoration of decent relations. This no doubt difficult for UAR given its “Arab socialism” doctrine and present bent for destruction of “reactionaries”. However, situation may develop requiring UAR choice between vast benefits of economic “cooperation” with West and direct confrontation with vital US-UK interests in Aden and Saudi Arabia. In effect, Yemeni situation has precipitated UAR into dilemma in its relations with US which cannot be solved satisfactorily by continuation its present course. Equally important, it may now appear to UAR that it no longer has capacity unilaterally to bring revolution to successful conclusion and to avoid any stalemate.

We thus may have at present juncture unique and probably short-lived opportunity negotiate a modus vivendi operable for next several years, which would give firm assurances needed to persuade our friends to back out of Yemen involvement.

Hitherto we have tried keep out of inter-Arab affairs but now we have legitimate and understandable need to step in and stay in. We wish to pursue this opportunity carefully but firmly. In initial stages of effort in Cairo believe useful employ Haikal as middleman. If progress made, direct contact with high officials and eventually Nasser would become necessary.

With this background you should inform Haikal of following US views:

1. We see real mess developing over Yemen if UAR on one side, Saudis and Jordan on other involved in open fighting. UK and USSR will find it hard stay out. So will we despite our present desire for noninvolvement.

2. US recognition of Sallal complicated by confused internal situation, substantial external interest expressed from several sides, and threat escalation into inter-Arab warfare.

3. From US vantage point problem appears quadrangular consisting a) internal Yemeni clash, b) Saudi fears (fully shared by US) of implications Yemeni revolt for stability its own regime, c) UK concern (fully shared by US) for safety Aden and d) UAR sympathy and support for reform-minded Yemeni Government for which US had instinctive sympathy. We aware of course of wider UAR interests in Arab world. Jordan involvement is minor. Agree with Haikal re potentiality Soviet intervention but consider Soviet involvement minor at present and not in interest UAR.

4. USG believes internal situation can be resolved satisfactorily if outside intervention kept limited as at present. Situation in Yemen itself less crucial than differences among external interests. In this connection, UAR is not itself threatened but others have vital interests at stake which must be satisfied if crisis to be avoided. UAR correctly assesses US concern for maintenance stability Saudi Arabia and Aden and security of our vital interests there.

5. All US officials who talked with him here most impressed with statesmanlike attitude Prince Faysal. Believe he is not basically inimical either to UAR or to progressive ideas. He is not of course prepared to preside over demise royal regime or to endure vicious personal propaganda attacks and this is crux of matter. We see every prospect that Faysal’s role will become even more crucial in pressing implementation of reform program. Saudi Arabia and we intend render all possible assistance this direction. For this reason believe UAR would do well attempt re-establish good relations formerly enjoyed with him.

6. We also urge that UAR take initiative develop effective contacts with UK. Direct dialogue on current situation would not be amiss at this juncture.

7. Important point is that UAR must satisfy us, Saudis and UK that it will refrain indefinitely from promoting subversion, propaganda or other threats to vital interests in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Aden. As long as Saudis believe Hassan winning they may be unwilling agree cease supporting him. However should stalemate come in Yemen, we would have increased maneuvering room with them. We would like to know what we might work out with UAR that would provide in clear terms needed reassurances for all. If we can reach suitable understanding with UAR we willing make major effort persuade other parties withdraw from present engagements. If we successful, security of Yemeni regime from outside intervention would be assured, it would receive general recognition, friendly countries could work closely with Yemen to resolve internal divisions and pursue internal development, and serious risks and losses which otherwise probable would be avoided. Yemeni regime in turn would be required by combination of persuasion and attractions of UAR and Western assistance to abstain from intervention in Aden affairs for extended period. UAR thus would emerge in statesmanlike posture using its influence in area affairs to promote stability and modernization. In meantime, US and UK would continue working for liberalization measures in other parts of Arab world.

8. While we favor modernization process and shall encourage it, protection of our vital interests requires peaceful, orderly transition. We cannot afford chaos in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, nor can the UAR. We do not want to be put in position where we must choose between UAR and other Arab states.

9. In making this presentation you also authorized to draw on explanatory introduction to this message except for explicit reference to active UK involvement.³

FYI. Gist of Cairo’s 600 and full explanation of foregoing given UK Ambassador here. You should do same with Beeley who will be receiving instructions from London probably Monday.⁴ If UK concurs our proposal you should approach Haikal soonest. If Beeley receives instructions to object to our proposal, you should await further word from Department. UK concern as expressed here by UK Ambassador would be, given known UAR unreliability and bitterness of Arab rivalries, whether our leverage would be adequate assure UAR restraint over considerable time span. We made clear that in light evident importance to UAR of having large-scale assistance from West we believe we have considerable leverage with UAR and that seriousness of our intention to protect mutual US-UK interests in Arabian Peninsula is evidenced by fact we proposing put new US-UAR relationship “on the line” if UAR willing make necessary commitments. Ambassador agreed it essential have early UK political assessment of potentialities of Yemen situation, alternatives, and manner in which HMG would propose meet various contingencies. We pointed out that present opportunity for broad approach to UAR may be short-lived, time of essence, we want consult with UK and want UK consult with US but cannot bind ourselves to UK position, and in any event we would of course avoid anything damaging UK position Aden.

For London: You should provide substance Cairo’s 600 and foregoing to Foreign Office with request it be held in complete confidence. We do not wish other parties become aware this proposed negotiation.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/10-1062. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Strong and Barrow, cleared by Rusk, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to London, Jidda, and Amman.
1. Document 77.
2. A memorandum of Talbot’s conversation with Prince Faysal on October 11 at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-1162. A summary of the portion of the discussion that concerned Yemen was transmitted to the Embassy in Jidda in telegram 168, October 13. (Ibid., 786H.00/10-1362) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.
3. Badeau commented on these points in telegram 636 from Cairo, October 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/10-1262)
4. October 15.