Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

77. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State⁰

Cairo, October 10, 1962, 6 p.m.

600. El Ahram editor Heikal called today as personal messenger Nasser discuss Yemeni situation and transmit to me President’s views.

In describing current situation Heikal closely approximated reports from Stookey and recent foreign correspondents from Taiz. Stated that regime in control of country, excepting Northern and Northeastern frontiers, enjoying large measure popular support including principal tribal elements. He maintained UAR had positive evidence of Saudi military personnel operating within Northern Yemen borders as well as Jordan technical mission details of which squared with our information. He then made following points as direct message from Nasser.

1. UAR continues agree general principle no foreign military intervention in hope that Yemen will not become cockpit for Saudi, Jordanian and UAR conflict.

2. Military intervention on part of Saudi and to lesser extent Jordan has already taken place. Principal form unlimited gold, substantial arms and actual personnel. In probing this point, Heikal admitted that Saudi troop concentrations had not yet crossed Northern border but undoubtedly would do so shortly. However, Jordanian technicians already in country.

3. In face of this military intervention UAR could not allow new regime to be driven to wall. Present involvement principally of technicians and some material but no major troops supplied as currently rumored.

4. UAR has no intention of resuscitating UAS and has categorically refused Yemen plea for same.

5. While appreciating USG criteria of recognition, UAR hopeful recognition shortly forthcoming both to convince Yemen that USG not actively behind Saudi involvement and forestall possible Yemeni movement toward Soviets. Heikal stated latter point not meant as threat but realistic appraisal of the situation which has Nasser deeply worried. Nasser expects Soviets to repeat maneuver by which they almost gained ascendancy in Iraq and is anxious to have this forestalled.

In response I reiterated both limits of USG influence on Saud and Hussein and clear USG policy of non-involvement in Yemeni factional strife. Heikal said Nasser believes this and is under no illusion that we have power to stop Saud from his present reckless course. I stated lack of any knowledge re USG recognition and summarized basis on which recognition normally takes place.

In long rambling discussion which followed Heikal said that Nasser had no intention of embarrassing USG with present policy. He noted that Saudi Arabia discontented and ripe for revolt but factors inhibiting such movements like clear American interests in protection petroleum supply and lack of any group in Arabia strong enough to ensure dependable and stable post-Saud regime. Were royal regime to be toppled only result prolonged period of chaos which would be against UAR as well as USG interests. Heikal also stated categorically that UAR using all its influence to focus Yemeni regime concern on internal tasks letting Aden question lie dormant. He says this is intent of Yemen regime and only active British support of anti-regime factions would be likely to change it.

Comment: Vice President Anwar Sadat today requested I call on him tomorrow undoubtedly to discuss Yemen question.¹ Apparent that UAR deeply concerned lest it be drawn into military adventure yet really determined to prevent collapse Yemen regime due to outside forces.²

Badeau

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/10-1062. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Jidda, Amman, Taiz, and USUN.
1. In telegram 610 from Cairo, October 11, Badeau reported that during this meeting, Sadat confirmed that the message delivered by Haikal had come directly from Nasser. After discussing the situation in Yemen, Sadat restated the substance of Nasser’s message and said that U.S. recognition of the new Yemeni regime would be a major factor in stabilizing the situation, including staving off British attempts to overthrow the regime. Sadat stated categorically that the UAR was using its influence with Yemen to focus the new regime’s attention on domestic affairs. (Ibid., 786H.00/10-1162)
2. In telegram 618 from Cairo, October 12, Badeau reported that he had been informed by the British Embassy that Haikal had met with British Ambassador Sir Harold Beeley on October 11 and gone over much the same ground as reported in telegram 600, including the specific assurance: “President Nasser wished assure HMG he did not intend any damage to British position Aden.” (Ibid., 786H.00/10-1262)