Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, October 11, 1962, 8:27 p.m.

2070. During call by Wright of British Embassy October 11 Department officer stated following: USG seeking means limit present conflict in Yemen and avoid serious side effects. Considerable peril in escalation of conflict raising prospect:

1. Full scale UAR military commitment in contrast present limited intervention;

2. Eventual entry Soviets who have stake in extending influence across Red Sea;

3. Serious repercussions within Saudi Arabia if Saudis become overcommitted (since no visible alternative as ruling group to Royal Family, latter’s collapse likely cause fragmentation country and ensuing chaos detrimental US vital interest);

4. Jeopardizing vital US/UK interest in Aden by reducing concerted US/UK capability exercise moderating influence YAR and UAR re external adventures (any sustained UK support Hassan risks inducing UAR press rather than mute irredentist claims to Aden).

Wright was assured we “mean business” and consider we and UK together have means bringing home to UAR and Yemen seriousness of our intent.

We pointed out unhappy results to be expected if Yemen issue raised in UNSC view fact new regime already legitimized by recognition Soviet Bloc and most Arab countries. UAR could claim its intervention justified by 1956 Military Pact, while Saudi Arabia and UK more vulnerable to criticism in unsympathetic councils.

Wright indicated British understand YAR in control Hodeida, Sana’a, Taiz, Mocha, Ibb, Qataba and Bayda. However, in northeastern Yemen Hassan forces making gains and Saada and Marib captured October 7 and 8 respectively. British estimate outcome is uncertain but likely to lead to stalemate with fringe tribal opposition continuing. We questioned whether either side would tolerate stalemate and whether such situation would not invite increasing commitments on both sides, particularly in case UAR.

London may share foregoing with FonOff.¹

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/10-1162. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Seelye, cleared by Strong, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, and Taiz.
1. In telegram 1551, October 13, the Embassy in London reported that the substance of telegram 2070 was conveyed to Walmsley of the British Foreign Office who said the British Government appreciated U.S. concern over possible adverse effects on Saudi Arabia arising out of the Yemen situation, but had to consider a threat to Aden area as an equally significant factor. Walmsley maintained the British Government was providing no direct support to Prince Hassan, and did not contemplate doing so. He thought the situation too unclear to decide whether early recognition of the new regime was desirable. (Ibid., 786H.00/10-1362)