79. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)0
Phil—
Further to my long talk with Jim1 and you last night, let me urge that we move forward soonest on an “honest broker” effort to resolve the mess in Yemen.
Unless we’ve changed our estimate that a protracted struggle is in the offing, I see dire possibilities of escalation which cannot be to our interests, and pressures on us from both sides will multiply. Yet if we come down on UK/Jordan/Saudi side there goes our new relationship with Nasser; if we come down on other side, we open Pandora’s box. If we do nothing, we offend all our friends.
I need hardly add that a compromise would be most worthwhile from US standpoint if it protected our investment in Nasser and at the same time preserved the essential interests of our other friends.
Nasser’s overture via Haikal and Sadat gives us an opening.2 Gamal seems interested in a deal, or at least in buying us off by assurances he has no intention of encouraging in Riyadh what happened in Sana’a. As you know, I favor going back at him strong, and in effect saying what convincing evidence can we give the Saudis, Jordanians, British that if they go along with YAR, you’ll play ball with them?
[Page 178]If Nasser responds favorably, we can then put the proposition up to our friends. We should press them hard. Obviously, they’d be taking a gamble, on no more assurances (in last analysis) than Nasser’s word, but in some respects it’s as good a gamble as the one they’re embarked on now. At any rate, we could press our friends to parley while they fight, meanwhile urging them and Nasser to keep the fighting localized.
A compromise which would work can hardly be spelled out now, but its essential elements seem clear: (1) acceptance of YAR and even promises of help (Critchfield’s idea of constitutional monarchy or Hassan as religious leader seems far-fetched but perhaps worth a sounding); (2) UAR promises to call off war against Arab kings—and evidence of good faith by ceasing radio war; (3) reassurances about Aden from Nasser and YAR; (4) rapprochement between UAR, Saudis, Hussein, probably based on replacement Saud by Feisal (who could carry it off).
Only we can promote such a deal and in effect act as umpire and (to a degree) guarantor. Neither side will trust the other, but might rely on us if we say we’ll oppose the side that reneges on the bargain. At any rate, I don’t see what this effort costs us if it fails. Our position isn’t any worse; indeed, this effort can serve as justification for continued non-recognition of either side.
But if we go down this road, the time is now—before things get out of hand or the unpredictable intervenes. And we ought to press both sides hard, because only by a strong US line can we rock either side sufficiently to offer a fair chance of success.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy, Kaysen, and Grant.↩
- Reference is presumably to James Grant.↩
- See Document 77.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩