Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

76. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, October 9, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Yemen Situation and its Implications

Situation Report

The British decision to support Prince Hassan “covertly”,¹ coming on top of a) the movements of one to three Saudi battalions to the Yemeni border in evident support of Hassan, b) the presence of elements of the UAR military in Yemen’s principal city of Sana’a and in the port of Hodeida, and c) a Soviet military presence carried over from the previous regime which still apparently is minor, seriously endangers the stability of the Arabian Peninsula. British intervention, which can hardly be concealed for long, is likely to lead to a sizable commitment of UAR forces in Yemen and conceivably to a Yemeni-UAR invitation to the Soviet Union to increase its participation. Our estimate is that the new Yemeni regime is fairly firmly in the saddle and that the UAR is committed to keep it there. We doubt that even with British support Prince Hassan can restore the old Imamate which, even if restored, is too discredited to survive for long. Major Saudi military participation seems likely to lead to violent repercussions at home, very possibly even the demise of the Royal Family. Included in the ultimate results would be the weakening of the very position in the area the British seek to preserve by their support of Hassan.

Our Considerations

1) The presence of 120 Americans in Taiz.

2) Broadening of the conflict in Yemen, with potential Soviet over-tones.

3) Threat to the stability of the whole peninsula.

4) Severe stresses on our policy toward and relations with the UAR and difficulty with Saudi Arabia.

5) Association by implication with an Imamate generally discredited not only in the Arab world but in almost the entire Free World.

6) Keeping our hands relatively free without creating a serious issue with the UK.

Action Program

Accordingly, we propose the following action program:

1) Firm representations to the British either here or in London or both. We would state we have grave reservations for the above reasons and because of the presence of some 120 Americans in Yemen who risk getting caught in the middle, but if their decision is final we are prepared to wait up to two weeks before taking any action ourselves. If by then Hassan’s forces are unable to show meaningful gains, we shall have to proceed with unilateral recognition of the new republic.

2) A heart-to-heart talk between Prince Faysal and me in New York in which I would emphasize in the strongest terms the importance of Prince Faysal’s returning to Saudi Arabia forthwith to undertake the following tasks of utmost importance to Saudi Arabia: (a) the assumption of firm and enlightened leadership in a country which is now virtually rudderless and in shock over events in Yemen; (b) the introduction of measures to strengthen the internal fabric of the regime and to gain more popular support, e.g. refurbishing of the government, acceleration of the economic development program and institution of constitutional government; and (3) the initiation of a new and dynamic foreign policy based on enlightened self-interest and devoid of recrimination, e.g. a search for a sensible modus vivendi with the UAR and restoration of relations with the UK. In urging these endeavors I would offer Faysal US good offices and support, and I would apprise him of the general course we propose to follow.

3) Instructions to Ambassador Hart in Jidda to caution Saudi authorities of the hidden dangers of their Yemeni involvement and of the need to push ahead with reform and progress in Saudi Arabia as the best defense against Nasser’s revolutionary message and events in Yemen. Also to suggest that Ambassador Hart consider how our Military Training Mission personnel might best be brought into play.

4) A clear statement to the UAR that we are staying out of the Yemeni conflict unless UAR action forces us into it. We would warn the UAR against raising the level of its military participation in Yemen lest it broaden the conflict, and request the UAR to cease its propaganda alleging US participation or responsibility.

5) A circular instruction to posts in the field apprising them of appropriate portions of the foregoing.

Recommendation

That you authorize the action program outlined above.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/10-962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Strong and Seelye. A handwritten note on the source text indicates the memorandum was seen by Secretary Rusk on October 10.
1. British Ambassador Sir David Ormsby Gore informed Rusk of this decision during a meeting on October 9. The memorandum of conversation is ibid., 786H.00/10-962; for text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.