83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia0
187. Assistant Secretary Talbot called on Crown Prince Faysal in New York evening October 171 view latter’s increasing concern over turn of events in Yemen. Faysal had been reported by Ambassador Khayyal as seeking US intervention in Yemen.2 After congratulating Faysal on his appointment as Prime Minister (which Faysal claimed to have heard only third hand) Talbot stated following:
- 1)
- In light of glimpse given Faysal earlier of US global responsibilities we hoped he would realize direct involvement US forces in Yemen could have very serious repercussions for entire free world.
- 2)
- US has deep and abiding interest in stability Saudi Arabia and its progress. We consider our interests in Saudi Arabia vital and would justify full US support for maintenance of Saudi Arabia’s integrity and preclusion of active outside intervention. We prepared consider measures indicating concrete support for SAG in addition to destroyer visits and civic action.
- 3)
- Imam Mohammed and Prince Hassan have not appeared able muster sufficient support among Yemeni people carry forward their attempt overturn YAR. UAR appears have committed its prestige to [Page 187] preservation YAR and to taking steps necessary insure its continuance in power. Yemeni national forces should prove an effective bar against UAR control of government and we doubt likelihood of UAR/YAR merger. Should we recognize regime, we intend endeavor persuade new regime concentrate on internal problems in Yemen and eschew foreign adventures. This, together with strengthening fabric of government and society in Saudi Arabia, most practical effective means preventing Yemeni conflict from threatening SAG.
- 4)
- US has made known in Cairo its concern for stability of Saudi Arabia and has stated in no uncertain terms its intention protect vital US interests there. We seeking influence UAR policy in direction moderation. We believe matters will be facilitated were His Highness to return and initiate dynamic program of reform and modernization to which we will lend full moral support and all possible material assistance.
While Faysal appeared reconciled prospect US non-intervention Yemen, he asked we delay recognition further. Seemed moderately satisfied Talbot’s expression of assurances re Saudi Arabia. We concerned he may misinterpret latter to connote stronger guarantee than intended, including perhaps preservation Royal Family at all costs. We shall provide further guidance for purpose clarification following Faysal’s return Saudi Arabia. Faysal EDT NY October 21, ETA Saudi Arabia October 24.
Would be useful receive from Jidda (1) list of reform measures by which SAG might meet more serious internal criticisms (you may wish to consult with Aramco), and (2) list of measures which might be feasible for USG undertake as means of demonstrating concrete support for SAG in addition to fleet visits, and civic action which already in process. We envisage need for both short run and perhaps dramatic demonstrations during possibly critical period over coming weeks in Saudi Arabia, as well as long term efforts.
Accordingly, still intend withhold recognition new regime until situation clarifies. Ambassador Hart’s views invited.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86H/10-1962. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Seelye on October 18, cleared by Strong, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to London and Cairo.↩
- The memorandum of Talbot’s conversation with Faysal, held between 8:10 and 9:05 p.m. at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, is ibid., 786A.13/10-1762. Earlier on October 17, news broadcasts had announced that King Saud had appointed Prince Faysal Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia.↩
- The memorandum of Talbot’s conversation with Ambassador Al-Khayyal on October 16 is ibid., 786H.00/10-1662. During the morning of October 17, Prince Faysal subjected Isa K. Sabbagh, Public Affairs Officer of the Embassy in Jidda and translator during Faysal’s New York visit, to a lecture on the dangers of U.S. inactivity in Yemen. The memorandum of conversation is ibid., 786H.00/10-1762.↩