Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

348. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State⁰

Cairo, October 21, 1963, noon.

904. Deptels 1550,¹ 1597,² 1610,³ 1618.⁴ In ninety minute conversation with President Nasser at 1830 October 20, reviewed in detail Yemen situation and transmitted USG views as set forth in reference telegrams.

Conversation began with transmission President Kennedy’s oral message (reference telegram 1618). After digesting this President asked for detailed presentation which I made as follows:

1. From beginning Yemen affair USG chief concern support tranquility in Arab world, safeguard evolutionary stability of SAG and prevent Yemen involvement becoming cause celebre in UAR-USG relations. To this President Kennedy had committed personal interest and prestige in seeking to mediate as friend both parties.

2. Now clear hopes of YAR stability envisioned at time USG-Yemen recognition and subsequent disengagement negotiations somewhat premature. Situation continued perilous to all parties concerned and military solution obviously insufficient.

3. In answer to President Nasser’s previous request for specifics USG position on political and economic development in Yemen (Embtel 779)⁵ I outlined approach set forth in reference telegrams, emphasizing beginning of political readjustment inescapable condition for effective international participation in economic development.

4. [Garble] USG is to consider these essential long-term needs, absolute precondition maintenance of UNYOM beyond November 4 date. Without this USG and other interested parties could not act. Therefore chief point of present presentation fate of UNYOM and strategy make continuance possible.

5. As President Kennedy indicated in oral message, USG considers UAR has not matched SAG in fulfilling disengagement responsibilities. In addition to this, impossible to obtain Faisal’s support for continuance UNYOM without public and dramatic UAR disengagement gesture prior to November 1. Without request from SAG, Secretary General unlikely support extension UNYOM.

6. In view above I urged UAR announce and begin some major troop withdrawals prior November 1, citing recent UAR military-Davies conversations in Yemen re sufficiency single division to secure present situation in country. I also mentioned utility of abandoning bombing within Yemen except when UAR-YAR troops under direct attack.

Nasser’s response emphasized following:

1. While appreciative of frank tone President Kennedy’s message, President apparently not fully informed about SAG activities, which continued larger and more ominous than President apparently realized.

2. Recalling Bunker conversations re disengagement, President Nasser pointed out SAG had only partially fulfilled disengagement since (A) Saudi supported activity had continued in DMZ; (B) supply bases in Jizan and Najran (which President claimed were included within DMZ) had not even begun to be dismantled; (C) heavy shipments arms and ammunition recently building up in Jizan and Najran and this being done surreptitiously; (D) SAG had not denied use of soil to Badr; within past two weeks UAR had information Badr had visited Jizan and reliable intelligence report October 18 stated King Saud had communicated to Badr within last few weeks stating his unfailing support of Badr and royal family. (FYI: Cortada confirms he heard similar information in Yemen from non-Egyptian sources.)

President Nasser then reminded me he had told Bunker during conversations that major troop withdrawals could not reasonably begin until after lapse of three month period from actual beginning disengagement but that he had agreed to small immediate token withdrawal which had been carried out. In course of making above points, Nasser referred repeatedly to UAR intercept operation citing messages between members of SAG Government and Royalist forces re movement of supplies under cover of darkness. He admitted that a division or division and a half of troops would probably be sufficient to maintain present military position but said this posited on reasonable assurance that SAG stimulated Royalist activity would not flare up after troop withdrawal. So long as current surreptitious SAG support for Royalists continued, he feared any major troop withdrawals would trigger immediate expansion Royalists activities necessitating slow and costly operation of returning troops to Yemen.

I then took line that most basic and critical issue was effect discontinuance UNYOM. Whoever might win battle of mutual recrimination re sluggishness of disengagement, all parties would lose disastrously if UNYOM ended. Clear from my talks with Ambassador Hart that Faisal prepared to reinstitute massive aid to Royalists. While deeply concerned over this, USG not in position to force SAG to desist. Result would be immediate outbreak tribal guerrilla activity in North Yemen, twilight for any prospects UAR ridding itself of heavy Yemen burden, and strain on UAR relations with neighbors and USA. In these terms vital question not who at fault but how to get action. This meant in effect making gesture enabling us to elicit Faisal support for continuance UNYOM.

Nasser admitted return to pre-disengagement conditions of last winter most undesirable. However, political situation among tribes better as result of recent activities such as those described in earlier meeting (Embtel 779). I refused to accept this as either factual or logical, pointing out that renewed massive SAG help would certainly result in shift of some tribal loyalties away from YAR and that situation year hence would be much worse than last winter. I then returned to UAR military and Nasser statement that only one division sufficient to insure present military position if SAG aid not reinstituted. On basis of this I found it hard to understand why UAR could not make some substantial troop withdrawal that would be both earnest of its disengagement bona fides and gesture making possible effective representations to Faisal for continuance UNYOM.

Nasser then said that some troop withdrawals had been made. I stated by last current estimate UAR strength approximately 28,000 troops as compared to 32,000 at height Yemen campaign. In this connection I queried President further about the statement maximum troop strength in Yemen had been 40,000 (Embtel 779). Nasser stated approximately this figure had been reached in Yemen for short period due to overlapping between departing battalions and their replacements. However, by inference he accepted 32,000 troop number as effective maximum operational force and 28,000 as present strength. I said one difficulty in situation was that UAR had never made official statement regarding troop withdrawals either to UN or to USG. If in fact substantial troop withdrawals had been made, it was much to UAR’s interest to make this fact known. I then suggested that UAR inform SYG directly of troop withdrawals to date and plans for further withdrawals, emphasizing strongly necessity of some public and admitted major troop movements before November 1.

Nasser said he would consider this but returned to his fear that while SAG had indeed diminished direct financial and arms support to Royalists since July 4, it had no real intention of allowing situation in Yemen remain quiet and was awaiting first opportunity of troop movement to reinstitute aid. He said he had foreseen this and had therefore warned Bunker that significant troop withdrawals could not take place in less than three months. I pointed out that more than three months had passed since positioning of UNYOM and again urged inescapable necessity of making possible continuance of UNYOM by withdrawal gesture. In this connection I felt UAR should not equate its position with that of SAG. UAR large and important state well on road to modernization and thus could afford gestures that would be difficult to expect from Faisal. Statesmanship at this juncture would pay rich dividends in quieting Yemen and in UAR public reputation.

With this as lead I then expressed my personal disquiet at foreseeable effects of continuing Yemen imbroglio on UAR-USA relations. Reason for this realities of public opinion in western world and USG which then sufficiently aroused could seriously circumscribe ability of administration to carry through given foreign policy. What I said was not to be interpreted as a threat but rather as a realistic appraisal of foreseeable pressures within USA generated by failure to UNYOM mission which would be laid at least partially at door of UAR.

I then briefly repeated argumentation for continuance UNYOM and dire results of its collapse, urging Nasser inform SYG directly of withdrawals to date and plans for future. Nasser answered he could inform SYG of past withdrawals and would consider what further steps he could take. I pointed out it would be necessary also to inform Canada and Yugoslavia directly of UAR desire continue UNYOM and Nasser said he knew these two countries had been hesitant about continuing role.

In final word, I told Nasser I would report conversation as held and we would expect him to communicate directly with Secretary General.

Comment: In contrast with earlier conversations (Embtel 779), Nasser much less willing to admit UAR burdens in Yemen. He said if only alternative was to continue struggle with SAG, he was duty bound to do so since he had committed himself to cause of progress in Yemen. While conversation was very frank and baldly direct on both sides, Nasser displayed no irritation and was disposed to give me as much time as necessary. Fuller comments follow.⁶

Badeau

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to USUN, Jidda, London, and Taiz.
1. Telegram 1550 to Cairo, October 16, was sent for action to Istanbul as telegram 77, Document 340.
2. Dated October 19. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (UN) 8 YEMEN)
3. See footnote 2, Document 347.
4. Document 347.
5. Dated October 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN)
6. Badeau’s comments are in telegram 918 from Cairo, October 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN) On October 27, during a lengthy conversation, Nasser told Badeau that he thought he could withdraw another 5,000 troops from Yemen by January 1, 1964. Badeau reported on the conversation in telegram 969 from Cairo, October 27. (Ibid.) Both telegrams are in the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.