Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

349. Telegram From the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State⁰

Dhahran, October 24, 1963, 3 a.m.

113. From Ambassador Hart. Department telegrams 313¹ and 315² to Jidda. Have just finished three hours very intense argument with Faysal,³ most of it with him alone, at which delivered President’s oral message (he wants copy and I will deliver him Arabic version unsigned and headed “secret”) and accompanying instructions. Details will follow from Jidda. Important results are as follows:

1. Faysal will weigh with Council of Ministers in immediate future question of extension mandate UNYOM. His mood is very negative but I think he realizes burden which he would assume in being the party which cancels UNYOM. Also believe warning of possibility that YARG will call for special SC session charging SAG with violation Yemeni sovereignty and of possibility special presence might be established in Yemen to observe and report on Saudi interference and infiltration may have given him pause.

2. He construes President’s message and my accompanying explanations as meaning that Hard Surface could be withdrawn if aid Royalists resumed and that under certain circumstances therefore he could not rely upon US for defense of Saudi Arabia and must consequently discuss with Council of Ministers “in next day or so” problem of national defense and how to obtain it by other means and from other sources. He clearly has in mind purchase of planes and hiring of mercenary flyers. He mentioned he was aware this would take time. I warned him very strongly of adverse effect mercenaries would have on morale RSAF.

3. Regarding reconciliation with UAR he takes position Nasir will stop propaganda attacks against Saudi Arabia whenever Nasir is ready. When he does and seeks restoration relations with SAG latter will respond positively. There is no need for “secret” talks, which could not succeed in promoting better atmosphere unless Nasir had so decided in advance. Faysal has no fear of UAR propaganda attacks, regards them as of no importance and does not care how long they go on.

I made clear that in my personal view Hard Surface could not remain and become a screen for renewed Saudi help to Royalists. Faysal did not directly comment, except to say that he would have to look to other sources of help. Although he reiterated he could not sit with hands folded he did not say he would not give us further time to exercise pressure on Cairo. He simply would not give UAR right to buy time to crush Royalists. He considers self obligated to Royalists by Treaty of Jidda 1956.

Faysal read for me excerpt text Nasir’s October 22 speech at Suez in which Nasir stated he had withdrawn total 12,000 troops while sending back 6,000 replacements and that under no circumstances would the Yemeni revolution [sic] and would always leave sufficient forces within Yemen to ensure this. I remarked to Faysal that I felt this open defiance of Nasir’s commitment was bound to evoke sharp reaction in Washington.

Request to Beirut: That Omar Saqqaf be contacted, given foregoing info plus my personal recommendation he return to Saudi Arabia at once. This is time for basic decision making and voices of reason are needed at this very moment. Even Saturday (his planned date of return) may be late.

Horner

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 YEMEN/UN. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Beirut and USUN and repeated to Cairo, London, Taiz, Aden, Kuwait, and Jidda.
1. See footnote 4, Document 346.
2. Document 346.
3. Hart’s report on his conversation with Faysal on October 23 was transmitted in telegram 435 from Jidda, October 24. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 YEMEN/UN) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.