Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

340. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Istanbul⁰

Washington, October 16, 1963, 9:56 p.m.

77. For Chiefs of Mission Conference. Following are steps re Yemen we now have under consideration on which we desire your comment:

I. PRESERVATION OF UNYOM

A. UAR

1. Objective: UAR formally indicate its willingness to SYG, Canadians and Yugoslavs continue financing UNYOM as long as necessary.

2. Tactic: Insure UAR follows up its latest undertaking to UNSYG to urge Canadians and Yugoslavs continue UNYOM participation for at least another month.

B. UK

1. Objective: Get UK complement our efforts urge Faysal support extension UNYOM.

2. Tactic: If current efforts fail, Secretary or possibly President speak to British Ambassador.

C. Canada and Yugoslavia

1. Objective: Keep Canadian contingent in Yemen (assuming UNYOM stays).

2. Tactic: Since Canadians now state retention their contingent dependent on continuation Yugoslav contingent, urge Yugoslavs leave their troops in Yemen.

D. SAG

1. Objective: SAG indicate its willingness to SYG continue finance UNYOM beyond November 4.

2. Tactic: Upon return to Jidda Ambassador Hart inform Faysal UAR has agreed to extension of UNYOM and that, if UNYOM withdrawn as result Saudis unilateral refusal support and continue financing UNYOM, YAR might call for SC meeting on grounds Saudis arming and supporting dissident group within Yemen; such meeting could result (1) condemnation of SAG for threat to peace; (2) establishment UN presence in Yemen to report on Saudi interference and infiltration into Yemen.

E. UN SYG

1. Objective: Get SYG to agree UNYOM should continue after November 4.

2. Tactic: Stevenson and Cleveland approach SYG to this end in NY. (See Deptel 78 to Istanbul)¹

II. CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO TERMS OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT

A. UAR

1. Objective: Prior November 1 have UAR stop its bombing attacks inside Yemen and make appreciable net withdrawal of troops; and continue desist from bombing Saudi Arabia under any circumstance.

2. Tactic: As soon as possible Ambassador Badeau deliver Presidential message stressing our belief Saudis are carrying out their end of disengagement bargain and urging most strongly Nasser comply with foregoing three points, emphasizing that Nasser’s failure do better re disengagement definitely risking invalidating whole disengagement agreement by (a) forcing end of UNYOM and inviting resumption Saudi aid to royalists, (b) causing more chaotic situation in Yemen which can only benefit Soviets, and (c) indefinitely postponing day when UAR enabled withdraw troops from Yemen. While actual economic assistance would necessarily depend on progress re political solution, we will seek through our UN channels and bilaterally to develop framework for such support. We would state this readiness to Nasser in specific terms conditioned on sufficient troop withdrawals within the next 2 weeks to serve as positive evidence of significant disengagement. We would also confirm our readiness to make moves aimed at mobilizing necessary economic support for Yemen.

B. Saudi Arabia

1. Objective: Prevent Saudis from resuming aid on or after November 4.

2. Tactic:

a. See I,D,2 above

b. Ambassador Hart make approach Deptel 302 to Jidda² or feasible variant.

c. Speak to British Ambassador (I,B,2) urge UK inform Faysal he cannot rely on UK military support should he resume aid to royalists.

d. If appears necessary following meeting with Faysal, Ambassador Hart follow up with Presidential message recapitulating recent history USG-SAG relations and strongly urging Faysal not resume aid to royalists.

C. UK

1. Objective: Obtain assurances from UK that on UAR achievement substantial withdrawal (e.g. down to 15,000 in Yemen) UK would recognize YARG and that UK would publicize this prospect in advance.

2. Tactic: Raise both in London and Washington.

III. POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN YEMEN

A. UAR

1. Objective: Persuade Nasser support or, if necessary, encourage YARG implementation of Amran resolutions and inform new leaders in YARG (VP Iryani, etc.) that they are free to take into YARG as many royalists elements as compatible with maintenance of republic. Also (a) inform Nasser re US willing use its good offices get parties together but it not suitable for USG supply names or details reconstituted YARG, and (b) report plans to coordinate outside economic assistance, including budgetary support, to help make broad-based YARG viable contingent, however, upon establishment such regime and evidence UAR satisfactorily complying with terms of disengagement.

2. Tactic: Mention substance first sentence in Presidential letter (II, B, 2).

B. Saudi Arabia

1. Objective: At minimum, get Faysal to refrain from upsetting incipient course of political reconciliation Yemen; at maximum, get him to influence Royalists to cooperate with reconstituted YARG.

2. Tactic: Mention in Presidential letter (II, B, 2, d).

C. UN.

1. Objective: Expedite and assist UN undertaking to provide appropriate technical assistance to reconstituted YARG and coordinate outside aid.

2. Tactic: Send Department economic experts to New York for consultation with UN.

D. Kuwait

1. Objective: Get Kuwait, which has recently displayed active interest in assisting resolution Yemen problem, agree to provide required initial budgetary support to enable reconstituted regime survive, recognizing that Kuwait’s contribution would form part of overall outside economic assistance effort coordinated through UN.

2. Tactic: Following his arrival in Kuwait Ambassador Cottam raise with Emir and Department discuss with Ambassador Ghoussein.

E. Yemen

1. Objective: Let Yemeni people know that UN, USG and other free world countries prepared coordinate economic assistance program, including initial budgetary support, contingent upon establishment broad-based YARG and evidence satisfactory UAR compliance with disengagement.

2. Tactic: Department inform YAR Ambassador; Cortada inform YARG leaders; Embassy Taiz spread word as appropriate; and Department officer informally and discreetly inform ex-Yemeni royalist Charge in Washington with request he transmit to royalist headquarters in Yemen.

F. UK

1. Objective: Get UK pass word to royalists that (a) it supports current efforts broaden base YARG and hopes royalists can eventually participate, and (b) in HMG’s view restoration of old Imamate out of question.

2. Tactic: Raise both in London and Washington.

IV. SAG-UAR DIALOGUE

A. UAR

1. Objective: Get UAR to suspend its covert propaganda attacks against Saudi Arabia and to continue offer meet with Saudis.

2. Tactic: Since Sabri has recently indicated receptivity to this possibility, Ambassador Badeau raise with Nasser upon return from Istanbul and press for immediate commitment for suspension or major abatement.

B. Saudi Arabia

1. Objective: Persuade SAG agree sit down with UAR if and when latter suspends propaganda attacks.

2. Tactic:

a. In Jidda keep pushing at Saqqaf level for time being.

b. In Kuwait Ambassador Cottam raise with Emir (III,D,2), suggesting Kuwait use its good offices with SAG to bury hatchet with UAR.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Symmes, Moose, Ozzello, Campbell, Komer, and Sisco; and approved by Grant. Repeated to Jidda, Cairo, London, Taiz, Dhahran, Aden (by pouch), USUN, and Kuwait.
1. Dated October 16. (Ibid., POL 27–14 YEMEN/UN)
2. Telegram 302 to Jidda, October 15, discussed ways of bringing U.S. influence to bear on Saudi Arabia to dissuade it from resuming aid to the Royalists. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)