347. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic0
1618. Following is oral message from President to be delivered by Ambassador when he sees Nasser.1
“In the spirit of frank exchange which I believe we have both come to value, I must tell you of my own personal concern over the UAR’s failure to date to carry out its part of the Yemen disengagement agreement. I think it fair to say that the Saudis are carrying out their end of the bargain. Indeed I gather the UAR shares the view of our own intelligence that arms supply over the border has been almost if not entirely cut off. We are confident that the UKG and the SAG are honoring their assurances to us that they are not aiding the Royalists. I therefore have no leverage with Faysal when, having carried out his end of the bargain, he continues to see Egyptian troops in Yemen and hear expressions of UARG hostility from Cairo.
“On the other hand, the UAR has not made phased withdrawals on a scale consistent with our understanding of the spirit of the agreement. While we think we understand some of the reasons, we cannot blink the fact, which is becoming public knowledge, that the UAR is not carrying out a compact made with the UN, and in effect underwritten by the US as a friend of both parties. Because of my own personal role in the matter, I think you will understand why I feel involved when the US is criticized both at home and abroad. This issue is inevitably complicating, not least in the Congress, my own effort to carry forward our policy of friendly collaboration in areas of mutual interest with the UAR.
“I continue to believe in this policy. I also continue to believe that disengagement, under an UNYOM umbrella, is in the long-term interest of the UAR. Thus I feel you will not misconstrue my friendly intent when I ask you to take those measures, some of which I have asked Ambassador [Page 753] Badeau to suggest, which will demonstrate that disengagement is proceeding sufficiently well so that UNYOM can be extended and a political solution worked out. The alternative—a breakdown of disengagement, withdrawal of UNYOM, and probable renewal of direct Saudi-UAR confrontation—could not but lead to a situation in which the US and UAR, instead of moving closer together, would drift further apart. If we should let Yemen affect our larger interests in this manner, we would have lost our ability to shape events and have permitted events to dominate us.”
Separate telegram contains detailed instructions.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 UAR-YEMEN. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Symmes, Jones, and Komer on October 18; cleared by Sisco, Grant, White House, and Marvin; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Jidda, London, Taiz, Dhahran, USUN, and Kuwait and Aden by pouch.↩
- A telegram from Bundy for the President, sent through Clifton on October 19, reads as follows: “We’re moving ahead fast to keep Yemen from flaring up again November 4 by keeping UNYOM in business beyond that cut-off date. First need is to get Nasser to show some movement, which we can then use as lever on Faysal. Badeau has braced Nasser and Rusk pressed UAR FornMin. As next step Badeau sees Nasser Monday [October 21]. It will help greatly if we can lead off with brief oral message indicating President’s personal interest in the matter. Rusk and I approved following Komer draft; we need Presidential approval or amendment this evening.” A handwritten notation indicates that President Kennedy read the message and approved it. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, 09/63–11/63)↩
- In telegram 1610 to Jidda, October 19, the Department of State reconfirmed the course of action described in telegram 77 to Istanbul, Document 340, as modified by Talbot’s comments in telegram 82 to Istanbul, Document 342. It also directed Badeau to deliver the President’s oral message to Nasser and presented additional talking points. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 YEMEN) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.↩