Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

342. Telegram From the Consulate General in Istanbul to the Department of State⁰

Istanbul, October 18, 1963, 4 p.m.

82. From Talbot. Reference Deptel 77.¹ In considering how to reduce dangers Yemen situation Mission Chiefs meeting here have reached consensus largely paralleling points in reftel on analysis, objectives and tactics. Essential point is to preserve disengagement process as best safety valve available. No way to achieve this without continuation UNYOM beyond November 4 and restraint of Faisal from resuming active support of Royalists. These steps in turn depend heavily not only on reaffirmationby Nasser of intent carry out withdrawal commitments but also immediate convincing action by UAR.

We need therefore to make exceptional effort with Nasser, while not basing our approaches to Faisal solely on prospective success with Nasser. Simultaneous and similar approaches should be made to Ambassador Kamel and Mahmoud Riad.

Specific comments on proposed steps re Yemen follow. References are to paragraph numbering given in reftel.

I. Preservation of UNYOM.

Concur generally in recommendations. May be useful point out to Canadians (I,C,2) that developments since establishment UNYOM have not indicated that Yugoslav security elements necessary, particularly in Saudi territory. Need has been primarily for increased number of observers.

Re I,D,2 Ambassador Hart’s presentation to Faisal should include indication that US has made exceptional demarche to UAR and that further report will be forthcoming. Otherwise Faisal who has now come to regard one-sided disengagement as hunting license for UAR mop-up of Royalists may consider arguments advanced for SAG support of UNYOM to be insufficient. Also desirable that Ambassador Hart be able to present at this juncture critical Presidential message proposed II,B,d.

SYG should be informed that Ambassador Badeau has been instructed to urge Nasser instruct UAR commander in Yemen cooperate fully with UNYOM in facilitating inspections UNYOM believed necessary.

II. Continued Adherence to Terms of Disengagement Agreement.

Concur in recommendations with additional suggestions.

Additional points should be made in Presidential message to Nasser (II,A,2) that:

1) Failure UAR to live up to commitments in international agreement negotiated under US auspices mars UAR image and is increasingly limiting our ability carry forward our policy of close cooperation with UAR in areas of mutual interest such as UAR economic development.

2) USG has no indication of infiltration into Yemen of any significance either from north or south and will take strongest position with SAG and UK to ensure that this remains the case. In the meantime, allegation cannot be accepted as excuse for UAR nonfulfillment its undertakings.

3) As General al-Qadi recently indicated in informal conversation [garble] that military position UAR/YAR Army could be secured and maintenance security in north could be carried out initially by force of one division strength (he estimated ten thousand to twelve thousand), USG believes UAR affirmation on intent and action to reduce troop strength to this level without delay is essential ingredient in efforts resolve Yemen conflict.

Re II, C. Concur in London’s recommendation in Embtel 1885² that re Faisal request to UK for defense commitment, we suggest that HMG make clear that defense Saudi Arabia not feasible without active US participation (II, B, C).

Re II, D. Inasmuch as Faisal’s reaction (Jidda tel 392 to Dept)³ seems to have been triggered by SYG’s statements to Pharaon and Faisal’s belief US views reflected by U Thant believe Presidential message to Faisal should state categorically that USG cannot agree with Faisal’s formulation that disengagement has failed and situation reverts to status quo ante. It should also make clear that US pledges of support are conditioned on SAG’s for [not] undertaking provocative activities and that US and SAG must not work at cross purposes in efforts to restore peace in Yemen. Manner in which these points are put to Faisal is of overriding importance in gaining his cooperation. Suggested text of message follows in separate telegram.⁴

Re Deptel 68 to Istanbul, Deptel 290 to Jidda.⁵ No decision re Hard Surface should be taken pending results our present diplomatic initiative. Saudis have been put on notice that provocative action on their part may bring about withdrawal so that its effect as leverage has been applied. Given implications withdrawal in terms inviting resumption UAR air strikes at interior supply points (and possibly Taif and Riyadh) we may wish in any case to leave it in place with curtailed patrol mission pending developments which may necessitate highest level decision as to extent to which US willing involve itself militarily in area of prime US economic and strategic interest.

We are not sanguine re success of efforts with UK (II, C) given present disarray in London, but approaches should be made. Preferable not to cite numbers for withdrawals, but to indicate we working for cutback to training mission for YAR Army.

III. Political Settlement in Yemen.

UAR acquiescence in or support of Yemeni efforts achieve viable coalition of tribal and other elements sine qua non for solution.

Despite reservations expressed in Kuwait’s 100⁶ believe it advisable continue to stimulate Kuwait’s interest in problem because of importance of its financial capabilities and desire to play role in Arab area politics (III, D).

Ambassador Hart can also pass to Royalists our ideas on nature of political settlement through contacts in Jidda (1888, 3, 1).⁷

In approach to UAR on cessation its propaganda attacks, Ambassador Badeau will note that campaign has been one-sided since May. Saudi action has not been reciprocated. “Major abatement” as specified in IV, 2 not adequate for this situation. Suppression of anti-Saudi propaganda essential if Faisal to be brought to cooperate in objectives we seek.

While recognizing external aid, probably including US aid, will sooner or later be essential to the ongoing solution of the Yemen problem in order to furnish Yemen an alternative to complete dependence on the UAR or the USSR, that question need not be dealt with in relation to the specific objectives of securing a sufficient withdrawal of UAR troops to set the stage for the continuance of UNYOM.

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Jidda, Cairo, London, Taiz, Dhahran (also for CHUSMTM), Aden, USUN, and Kuwait.
1. Document 340.
2. Telegram 1885 from London, October 16. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 YEMEN/UN)
3. Dated October 12. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 83 from Istanbul, October 18. (Ibid.) See the final message in Document 346.
5. Telegram 68 to Istanbul was also sent as telegram 302 to Jidda; see footnote 2, Document 340. Telegram 290 to Jidda, October 11, is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–3 US.
6. Dated October 15. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)
7. Reference not identified.