Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

164. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, February 25, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Presidential Meeting on Yemen 25 February 1963

PRESENT

• The President, Mr. George C. McGhee, Mr. Phillips Talbot, Mr. Paul Nitze, Mr. Frank Sloan, Lt. Gen. E. G. Wheeler, Rear Admiral W.F.A. Wendt, Mr. R. W. Komer

Mr. Talbot gave the gist of the next steps State proposed in our effort to close down the conflict in Yemen. The President indicated that he had been following Yemen closely. Referring to Joe Alsop’s article on 25 February, he said he had heard that Kim Roosevelt was the source, and that the oil companies were very unhappy with our policy. Mr. Komer mentioned Roosevelt’s denial.¹ The President queried why the oil companies were mad. Mr. McGhee responded that they couldn’t abide seeing Nasser win; they were violently anti-Nasser in their policy. The President asked if we had talked with the companies; Mr. McGhee indicated that we had done so and would again this week.²

Mr. Talbot explained how Faysal was hurting because of the attacks on him. He was also unhappy about the Iraqi coup. Meanwhile, the Egyptians were running a major offensive and claimed they would win in three weeks (he described the attack on a map). While they had resumed bombings and made a paradrop, we saw no evidence that they actually would invade Saudi Arabia. But they had the capability to do so.

In response to the President’s query as to why Faysal seemed so determined to fight on in Yemen, Mr. Talbot said Faysal took the position of the Royalists as part of the defense of Saudi Arabia and said we couldn’t ask him to turn it off. The President asked if it were essential to Saudi’s security that Faysal win in Yemen. Mr. Talbot replied that we did not think it vital since the Yemen was far from the center of power in Saudi Arabia and would probably be fully occupied with its own internal affairs. Mr. Talbot then described the State Department’s proposals (as outlined in the Brubeck to Bundy memo on “Review of Policy on the Yemen Conflict” of 24 February 1963).³

We proposed that Bunker go out Wednesday⁴ with a letter from the President as part of his effort to convince Faysal that we would support him. We would offer the politico-military reassurance of a “plate glass fighter squadron” in the Jidda area if Faysal would agree to suspend aid to the Royalists.

Mr. Nitze explained the Defense Department concerns over such a proposal. “Let’s not start down the toboggan until we know where we might land.” He feared that we would lose the whole of the Middle East if we attacked the UAR. This would be highly unpopular with most Arab states, including the new Iraqi regime. Yet the only militarily effective course would be to attack at the source, i.e. to counter against the airfields in the UAR from which UAR bombers were flying. The President indicated that we couldn’t do that. In this case the problem, in Mr. Nitze’s view, was how we could do anything short of attacks at the source which would be militarily effective. Air defense of an area as large as Saudi Arabia was exceedingly difficult. The smallest even semi-effective program would cost about $60 million in capital outlays, largely for the necessary radar and ground environment. Gen. Wheeler interjected that it would be almost impossible to locate intruding aircraft without some kind of a radar net.

Mr. McGhee commented that we were not faced with a “military” threat. We don’t think Nasser would attack but we want a plate glass window to insure that this is the case. The President also didn’t think that Nasser would attack. He asked why we needed aircraft. Couldn’t we warn Nasser off? Mr. Talbot and Mr. Komer pointed out that we had already given Nasser certain warnings; the need was to make them credible. If Faysal suspended aid to the royalists, further UAR aircraft incursions would be highly unlikely. Mr. Talbot then briefly described the second step in our proposals which would be to assist Saudis to develop a better air defense capability of their own.

At this point, Mr. Nitze indicated that DOD might be willing to go in if it were sure Faysal would suspend aid in return. He wanted to be mighty sure that the proposal turned out the way we saw it. He commented on the difficulty of policing whether Faysal did in fact cease aid. Mr. Talbot indicated our hope that we could get Nasser simultaneously to withdraw a contingent from Yemen as part of a reciprocal disengagement process.

The President wanted Bunker to say to Faysal that we were trying to help him but felt that he must suspend aid to the royalists and let the disengagement process go forward if we were to give such help. He then asked whether we could get Faysal to stop. Mr. McGhee thought so.

The prospective mission of Ralph Bunche as UNSYG representative was discussed. Mr. Talbot pointed out the importance of dovetailing our effort with that of the UN and of not getting U Thant’s back up.

The President told Mr. Nitze that he wanted to be sure that Defense was latched on to an air defense proposal of the sort discussed. Nitze again opposed unless Faysal clearly disengaged, and queried how we could make sure he was doing so.

The President directed that if Faysal accepted our package proposal we should tell Nasser we were sending the squadron as a gambit to get Faysal to withdraw support from the Royalists. This would look better to Nasser. The President also directed that we not have the squadron look as if it were in Saudi Arabia on a “permanent” engagement. We should tell the Saudis it would be there for only two months or so, though we would be prepared to keep it there longer if necessary. On Mr. Komer’s suggestion, the President agreed we should also tell Faysal we would withdraw the squadron if he resumed gun-running.

There was a brief discussion of the importance of our interests in Middle East oil, McGhee pointing out that we didn’t use much but that Western Europe was heavily dependent on it.

Concluding the discussion, the President said that he did not think Faysal would accept our offer. He felt we should make the proposal tentative and take every precaution to be sure that we did not end up defending Saudi mercenaries intervening in Yemen. He also said that we could not expect Nasser to withdraw from Yemen under present circumstances (i.e. short of Saudi disengagement).

R. W. Komer⁵

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yemen. Secret. Drafted by Komer on February 26.
1. See Document 145.
2. See footnote 2, Document 145. On February 28, McGhee and other Department of State officials met with representatives from Aramco, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil (New Jersey), Texaco, Mobil, and Gulf Oil. The memorandum of conversation and a briefing paper prepared by Strong for Talbot on February 26 are in Department of State, Central Files, POL US–YEMEN and POL 27 YEMEN, respectively.
3. Document 163.
4. February 27. Following this meeting on the evening of February 25, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Jidda in telegram 515 that the President had decided to send Bunker as his special emissary to deliver a letter and talk with Faysal and that Bunker was scheduled to arrive on February 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN) The following day, the Department informed USUN in telegram 2214 that Bunker would be in Saudi Arabia March 6–9. (Ibid., POL 7 US/BUNKER)
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.