Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

165. National Security Action Memorandum No. 227⁰

Washington, February 27, 1963.

TO

• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

• Decisions Taken at President’s Meeting on Yemen Crisis, 25 February 1963

After hearing a presentation by the State Department of proposed new steps to damp down the Yemen crisis, the President approved the following actions:

1. We will send a special emissary to Faysal as soon as possible with a letter from the President to Faysal.

2. His mission will be to: (a) reassure Faysal of US interest in Saudi Arabia; (b) convince him of the importance of his disengaging from Yemen; (c) explain to him how we think this can be done without loss of face.

3. To this end, our emissary is authorized to tell Faysal that the US will consider temporary stationing of a token air defense squadron with associated ground environment in western Saudi Arabia to deter UAR air operations.¹

4. This offer will be subject to the following expressed conditions: (a) it will be wholly contingent on a firm Saudi undertaking to suspend aid simultaneously to the Yemeni royalists and not to use Saudi soil for air operations against the YAR/UAR; (b) it will be a tentative offer so that the US will have a chance to consider it further before final agreement; (c) the offer will be for a brief period of two months or so, but with the understanding that we will be prepared to keep the squadron there longer if the situation required; (d) the squadron will be withdrawn if Saudi Arabia resumes aid to the royalists without US concurrence.

5. Our emissary should also offer US assistance in expediting the buildup of Saudi Arabia’s own air defense capabilities at Saudi expense.

6. Our emissary should try to convince Faysal to use the visit of a UN mediator as a means of promoting simultaneous UAR and Saudi disengagement with honor.

7. If the Saudis accept our offer, we will inform Nasser of the planned US deployment and present it to him as an essential gesture to get Faysal to disengage. We will press Nasser to withdraw an initial contingent from Yemen simultaneously with Saudi suspension of aid, as an earnest of UAR good faith, and to restate UAR determination to withdraw.

McGeorge Bundy

0. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 227. Secret. An earlier draft of this NSAM is ibid., NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 116, POL Saudi Arabia–United States.
1. In a February 27 memorandum, Nitze informed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the President’s decision and requested JCS views and recommendations on the air deployment. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Saudi Arabia 000.1–334 1963) The Joint Chiefs responded in a March 2 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (JCSM–174–63) that delineated certain technical requirements relating to the deployment and their views concerning the rules of engagement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 1963, 9180/3100 (27 Feb 63) Sec 1a)