Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

163. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, February 24, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Review of Policy Toward the Yemen Conflict

Enclosed in outline form is a “Policy Review of the Yemen Conflict” which the President may wish to take a few minutes to read before the meeting on this subject Monday¹ in order to avoid an oral presentation of some length.

Those from the Department attending the meeting have copies of the outline. We ask that prior to the meeting the White House make any further distribution desired to the others who will be present.

I also enclose a letter to the President from Crown Prince Faysal received February 23,² and a draft reply.³ We recommend that the reply to Prince Faysal be carried to Saudi Arabia by Ellsworth Bunker or such other person as the President may designate, that he discuss with Prince Faysal the problems involved in the Yemen conflict including a formula for disengagement.

William H. Brubeck⁴

Enclosure⁵

POLICY REVIEW OF THE YEMEN CONFLICT

I. Rationale for US Policy

A. Right or wrong, Egyptians are in Yemen in force.

1) Committed to success of regime—probably have military means to victory

2) Likely to escalate if balked

3) Must not be removed by US force—political formula needed

B. Our interests involved.

1) Aden—security of Persian Gulf

2) Saudi Arabia—oil—avoid chaos

3) Faysal is on a course of self-destruction

C. Russians standing by to pick up advantages.

1) Soviet military, technical assistance, economic presence in Yemen through the UAR and bilaterally

D. Return Yemen to Yemenis.

1) But don’t want to be committed to restoration of Imamate

2) Even Yemeni republicans want UAR forces out when no longer needed

E. Offered good offices—as friend of parties—situation likely to have become even worse if we stayed out.

1) We caught squarely in middle

2) Must remain friend of both UAR and Saudi Arabia

F. Face-Saving Device—UN Mediator.

1) Faysal—disengage with honor—US has supported militarily

2) UAR—disengage with YAR secure

II. Costly Delays Since Outbreak of Revolution

A. First, to avoid explosion by Saud and get Faysal in place.

B. Then in deference to UK.

C. Lately, problems over UN mediator.

III. Present Situation

A. Faysal determined continue support to Yemen royalists so long as UAR forces remain in Yemen.

1) Believes Nasser will use Yemen as base against Saudi monarchy

2) Thinks prolongation Yemen conflict can bleed Nasser white

3) His prestige and honor committed in eyes of Arabs

4) Saudi resources adequate to support royalists indefinitely

5) Appears to want US side with him against Nasser

B. Nasser is committed to the survival of the YAR.

1) Believes we can force Faysal to disengage if we want to

2) Wants to rid Near East of reactionary monarchies blocking spread of “Arab Socialism”

3) After Syrian failure, Nasser must have “victory” in Yemen

4) YAR wants UAR troops stay until regime secure

5) UAR forces beginning clean-up campaign—cost no deterrent

C. Effects of continuance of conflict.

1) UAR may repeat air attacks—step up subversion—cross Saudi border with ground forces to wipe out Najran supply base, possibly occupy Jizan

2) Faysal’s reform and development efforts suffer from lack of attention

3) Faysal seeks increased US military support. In absence disengagement this holds dangers for Saudi Arabia, as well as for US, by exposing Faysal to charges of dependence on US

4) Positions have hardened

5) Increasing risk Yemenis will stir things up in Aden and Saudi Arabia

6) Foregoing may strengthen opposition elements in Saudi Arabia and weaken Saud regime

D. New Factors.

1) Iraqi revolt new source of pressure on Saudi monarchy

2) Stepped-up bombings and parachute drops indicate UAR readiness to accept substantial risks of escalation

3) Signs of fear and unrest in Saudi Arabia

4) US oil companies fear we throwing Faysal and companies to the dogs

E. Alternatives Open to Faysal.

1) Mercenaries—would create problems

2) Security Council—unlikely to help

F. Larger Implications for Future.

1) We must consider where we want to end up. Yemen only one part of bigger picture involving relations with such states as UAR, Iraq, Algeria, etc.

2) If we openly take sides with the monarchy in Saudi Arabia while it continues to support royalist factions, we may end up with serious deterioration in relations these states without gaining much in terms strengthening Saudi regime

3) If we fail to support Faysal, we risk collapse of the monarchy, chaos in and fragmentation of the country

IV. Key Considerations

A. Make clear to Faysal:

1) We continue deeply interested in integrity of Saudi Arabia

a) Demonstrated by our military measures to date

2) Formula can be found protecting his honor

3) Risks to him involved in relying on US military support

4) Augmented US military support must be conditioned on Saudi disengagement from Yemen

5) We committed to departure of UAR troops from Yemen as soon as it can be accomplished

6) Urgency of reforms and development as providing real defense of regime

B. Make clear to Nasser and Sallal:

1) Necessity to avoid further attacks on Saudi territory

2) Our opposition to subversive efforts in Saudi Arabia and Aden

3) Need to implement pledge to remove troops—by agreeing to start troop withdrawals simultaneous with Saudi suspension subject to verification on both sides, they will permit Faysal to disengage with honor

C. Press UK to:

1) Exert caution in dealing with Yemen border problems

2) Recognize YAR

D. Support UN Emissary.

E. Assure that Jordan stays out.

V. Recommendations.

A. High-level emissary to Faysal with Presidential letter—no publicity—inform U Thant in confidence.

1) Deal with points in IV.A. above

2) Offer military support as follows:

a) Assuming that agreement by Faysal to suspend aid to the Yemeni royalists will remove the motive for UAR bombings of Saudi territory adjacent to the Saudi-Yemeni border and related UAR air activities, station a US fighter-intercepter squadron together with portable early warning acquisition, GCI, etc., radar equipment and operating personnel in Western Saudi Arabia with the mission (i) of demonstrating to the Government and people of Saudi Arabia and to the UAR continued US interest in and support for Saudi Arabia; (ii) of providing by its presence a deterrent to overt UAR air operations against Saudi Arabia; and (iii) in event of continued UAR intrusions into Saudi airspace, of attempting to intercept intruding aircraft, making positive identifications, attempting to establish communications, instructing the intruder to leave Saudi airspace, in event of failure to comply endeavoring to force intruder to land, and if intruder initiates offensive action shooting it down.

b) Concurrently offer to expedite the training of Saudi air forces and air defense personnel and, subject to Saudi concurrence to an expanded air defense training program, provide air and ground training personnel, technicians, and necessary equipment (at Saudi expense) in sufficient numbers to initiate an augmented training and construction program designed initially to have a beneficial psychological effect and in the long term to improve Western Saudi Arabian air defense capabilities.

c) As and when Saudi operational capabilities improve through the implementation of an intensified training program, make available to the Saudis for purchase air defense equipment in sufficient quantities and consistent with improving operational capabilities to meet legitimate Saudi requirements in the field of air defense.

( FYI. Military Implications for US: US–UAR military clash must be avoided, if at all possible; (2) US military presence in Saudi Arabia without Saudi disengagement would be dangerous to both US and Saudi interests; and (3) US deterrent force in Saudi Arabia after Saudi disengagement would present minimal risk. End FYI.)

B. Continue to press Nasser through Ambassador Badeau.

1) Points in IV.B. above

C. Instructions to US Chargé in Yemen to encourage Sallal to:

1) Moderation in public utterances

2) Eschew subversion outside Yemen

3) Cooperate in any formula permitting mutual UAR-Saudi disengagement

D. Continue dialogue with UK and Jordan.

E. Encourage SYG to continue and to expedite UN role.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Strong and cleared by Talbot. A handwritten note on the source text in an unidentified hand indicates that the memorandum was approved by NSAM No. 227 (Document 165), and that the letter signed by President Kennedy was given to Ambassador Bunker to hand-carry to Faysal on March 1.
1. February 25. See Document 164.
2. Ambassador Al-Khayyal delivered Faysal’s letter to Secretary Rusk on February 23. (Memorandum of conversation, February 23; Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN) In it, Faysal maintained that recent U.S. demands that Saudi Arabia cease supplying the Yemeni Royalists and stop allowing foreign airplanes flying for the Yemeni Royalists to use its territory contradicted Kennedy’s assurances of October 1962 of unconditional U.S. willingness to assist Saudi Arabia in maintaining its security, stability, and progress. Faysal noted that the U.S. position had come as a violent shock to him, and he vowed that Saudi Arabia would continue to take measures to assure its safety and security. (Telegram 512 to Jidda, February 25; ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)
3. Attached to the source text is a revised version of the letter that is printed as Document 172. A copy of the original draft of the letter is in Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 5, White House Memoranda.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was signed by the Operations Center and forwarded to the White House.
5. Secret. Drafted by Strong and Seelye.