Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia⁰

Washington, February 22, 1963, 5:57 p.m.

509. View your belief Faysal will not accept our latest proposal for inducing him disengage from Yemen and that Faysal more adamant than ever in refusing make first disengagement move, we considering whether something like following course of action would be effective if feasible for USG undertake and would appreciate your comments.

1. Revise package offer upward to include, in addition to stationing squadron aircraft in Hejaz for use in deterring and, if necessary, defending against intrusions over Saudi soil, establishment of modern Saudi air defenses along Red Sea coast. SAG would bear material and construction costs which would be substantial. Initially US military would participate in manning until accelerated MTM training enabled Saudis to take over. In return for foregoing Faysal would agree suspend SAG assistance to Yemeni royalists.

2. Above understanding would involve a third ingredient if Egyptians could be persuaded to agree: Faysal’s undertaking to suspend assistance to Yemeni royalists would be matched by initial UAR withdrawal of military unit, with remainder phased out by stages. Thus there would be an element of simultaneity. This formula midway between those advocated by the SAG and UAR respectively and would offer face saving all around. It would require presence of neutral observers to verify suspension of support and initial UAR withdrawal, as well as later dismantling of Najran supply and training base, pullback of Saudi forces, and phaseout of UAR troops. We exploring this in Cairo and informing Ralph Bunche who seems likely be mediator.

3. Transmission via Embassy of a message from President to Faysal as follows:

“Since my letter to you of October 25,¹ I have followed with close interest developments in Saudi Arabia. I have been most pleased to note plans for modernization and reform which you have charted for Saudi Arabia and shall watch for rapid movement in these directions. As you know, over last few months I have authorized adoption of certain US military measures on behalf of Saudi Arabia as earnest of US support for Saudi Arabia’s integrity and need for relative tranquility in which to implement your program.

“At same time I am deeply concerned at course conflict over Yemen is taking and fear that unless the process of disengagement commences shortly, there could be more serious trouble which would benefit no one. My principal concern is with eventual effect on Saudi Arabia of forces and trends now running in area unless conflict in Yemen can be terminated, stresses reduced, and full energy and resources devoted to primary task. These forces and trends cannot be combatted externally with any real success. Answer lies in strengthening the fabric of government and society in Saudi Arabia. In doing this you will meet evolutionary requirements and avert danger of revolution. I cannot escape conclusion that continued Saudi involvement in support Yemen faction will in time not only undermine your internal situation but will invite rather than repel outside intervention in Saudi Arabia’s internal affairs.

“You will recall that in my letter of November 16,² I proposed a formula for resolution of Yemeni conflict which I believed offered a practicable first step toward disengagement. This step was achieved last December and was capped by United States recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic. Since then there has been no progress toward withdrawal of the United Arab Republic’s military forces from Yemen as it has publicly undertaken to do, because of continued external assistance to the Yemeni royalists. We have therefore proposed that the United Nations Secretary General take lead in seeking way out of present impasse. It is my understanding that Secretary General is about to appoint UN mediator and I am hopeful he will be visiting you shortly. I would urge you to seize opportunity offered to disengage from Yemen. It is my fervent hope that this mediator will succeed in devising a formula which will enable you to preserve your honor while at the same time promptly suspending your Government’s assistance to Yemeni royalists. Your action would lead to phased departure of UAR troops. To this we are committed. I would urge you to accept such a formula, even if it may not meet the conditions for disengagement which you have earlier announced. Both parties will have to compromise, if conflict with its dangers for the entire Arabian Peninsula is to cease.

“We both would like to see a situation in which Yemenis decide future of Yemen. It is only in how this is to be brought about that we appear to disagree. I believe sincerely that method you propose will not achieve this objective and thus risks allowing conflict to continue unchecked with serious adverse repercussions on your country. What I have set forth I consider both achievable and in our mutual long-run interests. I must ask you in all seriousness to reconsider matter carefully and to find way to cooperate fully with UN mediator.

“In conclusion, I want to re-emphasize that basic to our approach to the Yemeni problem is our concern for integrity of Saudi Arabia. My personal interest in Saudi Arabia remains undiminished. In writing you I am seeking best route to protect Saudi Arabia.

“I send you my warmest personal regards. May God keep you and the Saudi people and grant you peace.”

John F. Kennedy”

Re your specific proposals (reftel), have following comments:

A. We understand UN SYG has designated Bunche as mediator and now seeking approval of parties. If parties approve, Bunche would conceivably reach area within week. He is assured of fullest US backing and has flexible mandate.

B. Weakness this proposal is evident inadequacy of US role if UAR persists attacking border area. Our failure use squadron protect Saudi soil along Yemen border in face continued UAR attacks would encourage Nasser flout us further and even more seriously impair USG–SAG relations.

C. Your recommendation re stand-by role for special forces group under advisement.

Finally would appreciate your estimate what alternatives available to Faysal in event he refuses revised package. For example, could hire mercenaries and take case to Security Council.

Use Roger Channel for reply. Hope receive it prior high level review of problem Monday.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Niact; Roger Channel. Drafted by Seelye, cleared by Talbot and Strong, and approved by Scott. A copy was sent to Komer at the White House.
1. See Document 88.
2. See Document 100.
3. February 25. Hart commented on this telegram in telegram 695 from Jidda, February 24. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.