Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

161. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, February 22, 1963.

SUBJECT

• United States Posture Toward Iraq

1. General Posture

We seek quiet friendship with Iraq, avoiding efforts to press favors on the new regime but standing ready to be helpful where we can without materially increasing the current aid level ($600,000–$800,000 for training of experts in the United States and for eight American professors for Baghdad University).

We have privately assured the new regime that we won’t interfere in its internal affairs.

2. A Dialogue

We have told our Charge to enter a dialogue with senior officials (a) assuring them of our friendship and of considerable identity of United States-Iraqi views on domestic matters, (b) explaining our impartiality in area matters and that Nasser is not our chosen instrument, and (c) explaining our global, cold war concerns and policies (nuclear testing, disarmament, Cuba, Sino-Soviet split, Sino-Indian conflict, etc).

3. Arms Policy

At the moment we think that if Iraq seeks to buy arms from the United States we should limit the categories and quantities. To do more than we are willing to do for, say, Syria, would lead to complications with other Arab states and would make Israel complain.

4. Gestures

a) We had hoped to arrange early EximBank financing for two Boeings for Iraqi Air Lines, but we just learned that for financial reasons the new Government doesn’t want to buy them.

b) We are moving rapidly to restore a normal pattern of cultural relations.

c) We are quietly encouraging the American shareholders of the Iraq Petroleum Company to take a forthcoming attitude toward Iraqi approaches on outstanding issues.

d) Since dates are Iraq’s only real export to the United States apart from oil, we are trying to get a year’s delay in application of stricter tolerances by the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration, buying time to get the new regime to adopt better handling methods that will meet the stricter tolerance.

e) We are advising Turkey and Iran to keep hands off Iraq and shall promote friendly relations in these quarters.

5. Economics—Soviets

a) We think both Iraq and the Soviets will want to continue the present Soviet aid relationship and Soviet arms supplies.

b) Iraq has plenty of hard currency, provided there is proper management. In 1962 Iraq received oil revenues of $266 million, and this should start going up soon if Iraq is reasonable with IPC.

c) If Qasim left a financial mess, Iraq’s credit with IPC and commercial sources is good. We would encourage loans from these sources.

d) We will stress to Iraq the value of doing business with American private enterprise and encourage American firms to look for business in Iraq.

e) If Iraq wants Western technicians, we’ll help find them.

f) We are planning to respond favorably to a recent Embassy request for $200,000 which would permit the designation of about twenty officials of the new regime to come to the United States for training.

6. Ambassador

We want to send a new Ambassador as soon as possible, one with an intimate knowledge of the area.

7. How We Look at the Regime

In the short term the new regime looks a lot better than Qasim, and it sets up a new power pole in the Arab world in fact competing with Nasser.

In the longer term we see problems: (a) Iraqi bias against monarchies (Saudi Arabia and Jordan), (b) Iraqi hostility toward Israel, and (c) Iraqi pan-Arabism including a demand for Arab control over Arab resources (oil).

Dean Rusk¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–2 IRAQ–US. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The memorandum was sent to the White House on February 22, under cover of a memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy (ibid.), indicating that Rusk’s memorandum was in response to President Kennedy’s memorandum of February 18 (see footnote 1, Document 159). Komer forwarded Rusk’s memorandum to President Kennedy on February 23 under cover of a memorandum that reads: “Here is State’s response to your query on Iraq. It adds up to being as friendly as we can be but not rushing in to embrace the new regime, lest it recoil. Better to have it come to us. We don’t think Moscow will cut off aid, but if it does we could make sales offers then (Iraq’s 1962 oil earnings were $266 million).”
1. Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.