Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

145. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, January 28, 1963.

Kermit Roosevelt of Gulf Oil came in to see me today, primarily to express oil company concern over our Yemen and Nasser policies.¹ Despite the briefing which Talbot gave the key company people a few weeks ago,² they are apparently unconvinced. He said McCloy was also worried.

Kim (and he may be speaking for himself rather than for the companies here) feels that there is no real possibility of working with Nasser because our interests and his are simply incompatible. He claims that in long conversations with Nasser in the past, he has gotten Nasser to admit as much. Kim grants that it would be fine if we could “turn Nasser inward” but that each time Nasser has tried this, he has found it so frustrating (because of the enormity of the problem) that he has turned back to foreign adventures.

With specific reference to Yemen, he understood and agrees with our disengagement plan but didn’t think that Faysal would go along. He thought he was bleeding Nasser and that he could keep it up indefinitely. Kim argued that Nasser had less capability to cause trouble in Saudi Arabia than State seemed to credit him with having. Faysal had the loyalty of the tribes; so long as this was the case, he would not be afraid. Faysal was remarkably calm about the defections from his air force, for example. Faysal’s honor was engaged and he was unlikely to quit.

I gave the by now standard counters to the above line, stressing that we were not pursuing a “pro-Nasser” policy but that we did think it folly not to cultivate decent relations with him, since the alternative was to leave him an exclusive client of the Bloc. Kim agreed that we had made it crystal clear to Faysal that we supported him domestically and that Faysal would not desert us simply because he disagreed with our Yemen policy. I think that I at least clarified our views on these matters for him, though I doubt that he went away convinced.

Kim spoke of State’s failure to keep the oil companies clued in on US policy, which might help to clear up misunderstandings. I told him we’d try to do a better job.

RWK

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Komer. Sent to Bundy and Kaysen.
1. On January 28, Roosevelt also met with Grant and Blackiston at the Department of State and conveyed the same viewpoint described in this memorandum. The memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.86/1–2863.
2. On January 11, Talbot and McGhee met with the Aramco Senior Vice President R. I. Brougham and high-ranking representatives from Standard Oil of California; Texaco, Inc.; Gulf Oil; Mobil International Oil; and Standard Oil (New Jersey), most of whom were also Directors of Aramco. The memorandum of conversation is ibid., 780.00/1–1163; for text, see the Supplement, the regional compilation.