130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia0
381. Ambassador Khayyal conveyed to Assistant Secretary Talbot on January 41 following Faysal reactions to USG responses to Crown Prince’s four earlier requests:2 He (1) agrees publish President’s letter of October 25 providing USG makes similar release same day; (2) agrees hold joint US-SAG military exercise in Saudi Arabia soon as possible; and (3) desires expedite shipment US arms to Saudi Arabia.
Department intends inform Khayyal, and Ambassador may similarly inform Saqqaf, following: 1) USG agreeable simultaneous publication President’s letter and proposes release January 7;3 2) US military team scheduled arrive Saudi Arabia January 8 discuss timing joint military exercise and we recommend SAG concert with this team in its efforts arrange small-scale exercise later this month (however, Ramadhan may force postponement);4 and 3) USG doing what it can carry forward credit package arms shipments.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.54/1–463. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies, Quinn (OSD/ISA) (in substance), Cramer (OSD/ISA) (in substance), Padelford, Komer, and Davies (S/S); and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, London, Dhahran, and Taiz.↩
- The memorandum of conversation is ibid., 611.86A/1–463.↩
- See Document 125.↩
- In a January 4 memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, the Department of State recommended that the White House approve release of the letter at noon on January 7. Komer approved the release. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/1–463)↩
- In circular telegram 1324, January 26, the Department of State informed posts that the United States and Saudi Arabia would undertake a modest joint military exercise in Saudi Arabia beginning in early February, with a mobile training team to remain in Saudi Arabia for 30 to 60 days. (Ibid., 786A.54/1–2663)↩
- On January 5, Komer confirmed in a note to Bundy that he had authorized publication of President Kennedy’s letter to Faysal on January 7 “as part of our effort to reassure Saudis and warn off UAR.” He concluded: “However, I am becoming a bit concerned lest we end up overcommitting ourselves to Saudi regime to extent we may not wish to make good on under certain circumstances. Will take this up with Talbot. It is also one reason why I favor stronger line warning Nasser off. It makes more sense to do this now, than to end up shooting at UAR later.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Saudi Arabia, 1/63–3/63)↩