129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic0

686. You should immediately approach Ali Sabri and state that Department hopes it will be possible get neutral intermediary to negotiate modalities disengagement on the scene.1 However situation resulting from accelerated Saudi arms shipment on one side and continued UAR arms buildup and bombing attacks on Nejran from the other (which along with provocative UAR/YAR propaganda have aroused most serious repercussions here) makes it imperative that some urgent actions to reduce state of tension be taken even before intermediary arrives. Department making representations in Saudi Arabia regards cessation arms buildup Nejran (Deptel 374 to Jidda)2 but these are unlikely to be effective without immediate steps by UAR activate at least part of its withdrawal plan, e.g., by removal of tank units or other substantial gesture which would be convincing evidence of UAR peaceful intentions and good faith in carrying out commitments regarding disengagement.

You should make strongest effort gain UAR agreement undertake this step. Additionally, it would be helpful our efforts obtain suspension Faisal’s logistical support royalists if we could convey UAR assurance that on evidence suspension, it would proceed with drawdown its Yemen forces according to specific timetable.

Some evidence UAR good faith and Nasser statesmanship is essential this juncture. Such action would be especially timely while recognition of YAR by UK and number of other states under active consideration. Since YAR now recognized by USG and seated in UN, UAR move this nature would clearly be read by world public opinion as act of strength and confidence in stability new Yemeni regime.

UAR could also help situation immeasurably by cessation inflammatory propaganda specifically such reprehensible material as January 1 Voice of Arab Nation clandestine broadcast disavowing Yemen’s commitments to Treaty of Sanaa of 1934 and inter alia asking Arab people “blow American influence out of Arabian Peninsula.” Material totally at variance with UAR, YAR public and private assurances.

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 686B.86H/1–463. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Barrow and Davies and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Jidda, Amman, London, and Taiz.
  2. In telegram 1803 to USUN, January 3, the Department of State instructed the Mission to explore as soon as possible with Secretary-General U Thant whether he would be willing to make Spinelli available to act as a friend to the parties in developing disengagement modalities. (Ibid., 786H.00/1–363)
  3. Dated January 3. (Ibid.)