Office of the Historian

128. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara0

JCSM-5–63
Washington, January 2, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Saudi Arabian-United Arab Republic Situation (U)
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1.
By memorandum dated 31 December 1962, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) requested the opinion and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the nature and scope of possible US military actions which might be undertaken in support of US policy in the Saudi Arabian-United Arab Republic (UAR)/Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) conflict.1
2.
The objective of US policy in the YAR dispute has been disengagement of the UAR, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia with subsequent independent development of the YAR and the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Saudi Arabia. Based on diplomatic representation and public declarations by the governments of the UAR and YAR in consonance with this objective, the United States recognized Yemen on 19 December 1962. However, neither Saudi Arabia nor Jordan has agreed to proposals regarding withdrawal and disengagement. Najran has been a focal point for Saudi aid to the Royalists, and the current incident is a continuation of previous UAR/YAR action against forward Saudi bases.
3.
The current Saudi Arabian-UAR/YAR crisis is characterized by fragmentary information and a complex interplay of political factors. There is no doubt that the outcome of the revolution in the YAR is interpreted by the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan as a threat to their continued existence. While the most recent attacks upon Najran would appear to be unwarranted aggression, the circumstances are not entirely clear and are clouded considerably by Saudi action within the area and the emotional reaction of the Crown Prince. In such a situation it would appear that reconciliation of the existing situation would more likely evolve through application of political pressure rather than military action.
4.
It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that active employment of US military forces should be undertaken only in the event that political measures fail to reconcile the existing situation and such employment is considered necessary to reinforce political actions in furthering US interests in the area. Implicit in any decision for a US military “show of force” must be recognition that subsequent military action may be required.
5.
A current plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides for military action to support any US decision to intervene in the area. This plan envisions an initial show of force to deter aggressive acts and demonstrate US support for Saudi Government. Should aggression not be deterred, subsequent operations would be undertaken in conjunction with Saudi forces to defeat the aggressors and cause them to desist. Only that degree of force would be employed to ensure accomplishment of mission and preserve integrity of US forces. This plan provides in ascending order of magnitude, military measures ranging from a show of force by US Naval and Air Force forces to the conduct of operations including blockade, air defense, air support, interdiction of shipping supporting the aggression, and attacks against military targets in the UAR and YAR. Earmarked forces consist of one seaplane tender (command ship), two to four destroyers, one carrier task force, two tactical fighter squadrons, one refueling element, one composite reconnaissance element, plus airlift, security, support, and service units as required. Assuming advance warning of six hours, the tactical air contingent could be deployed and operational in Saudi Arabia 48 hours from the time the execution order is received. On the scene naval presence is contingent upon the location of naval ships at the time the execution is ordered. One destroyer of MIDEASTFOR is now in the Red Sea area and could be off the coast of Yemen in approximately 10 hours.
6.
If a decision is made to commit forces, the following courses of action are recommended as progressive steps in the application of military power. Each measure should be fully exploited by diplomatic means prior to moving on to the next course of action:
a.

A recommended initial “show of force” would be the introduction of a Composite Air Strike Unit consisting of about eight tactical fighters and two to four reconnaissance aircraft with necessary air refueling and support elements. This unit, comprising about 300 personnel, could be in Saudi Arabia in 36 hours, assuming a six hour tactical warning. One destroyer of MIDEASTFOR could visit Jidda as an additional “show of force.”

[Page 298]

Comment: This force would serve as evidence of US support for the Saudi Government and would probably deter further UAR bombing attacks on Saudi territory. Additionally, this small force could be injected into and withdrawn from the area easily without undue political repercussions.

b.

In the event an additional “show of force” were deemed necessary, a Sixth Fleet carrier task force could reach launch positions for air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean in 18 to 24 hours. The balance of forces cited in existing plans would be alerted for commitment if the situation warrants.

Comment: This would provide additional evidence of United States intent in this situation as it would serve to bring pressure on the UAR itself.

c.

Should these measures fail to achieve US objectives, the plan referenced in paragraph 5 above can be implemented.

Comment: This course of action goes beyond that considered desirable in the present situation. Should future events indicate that the US should implement this plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the opportunity to evaluate the situation then obtaining and make further recommendations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Curtis E. LeMay2
Acting Chairman
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 1961, 9180/3100 (31 December 1962). Top Secret. On January 3, Gilpatric forwarded this memorandum to Ball under cover of a memorandum indicating: “I am in agreement with the views enumerated in paragraph 6 of the JCS memorandum. However, before implementation of any follow-on military action by the United States, I would hope the U.S. might secure prior action on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government to curtail its activities in support of the Yemen Royalists and thereby reduce the provocation for the bombing attacks.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Arabia 1963)↩
  2. Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 1961, 9180/3100 (31 December 1962))↩
  3. Printed from a copy that indicates LeMay signed the original.↩