Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

127. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, January 2, 1963.

McGB:

Rusk has concluded that we just can’t announce a Nasser visit now,¹ when his planes are bombing Saudis. So State favors holding off visit till spring, and in effect making it conditional on some progress toward Yemen disengagement.

We should clue JFK (should I write a note or could you mention on phone?). I’m afraid I see no alternative, though I fear this may put quietus on any Nasser visit. I still feel the long-term benefit from giving Nasser the Kennedy treatment would far outweigh the short-term flak it would create. So I hope we can keep visit open.²

Meanwhile Saudis are in a swivet over Najran bombing (which we’re all convinced was a quite deliberate attempt to get Saudi aircraft ferrying in arms). Faysal is asking for US jets to protect him and for a public declaration of where we stand. State is proposing to: (1) press Nasser hard to apologize for “accident”; (2) get the UN to send its good Mideast man Spinelli to start talking disengagement; (3) offer a few US planes to Saudis if Saudis will back down on planes and mercenary pilots they’re planning on using in Yemen. We’re convinced that if Saudis bomb Sana, UAR will retaliate on Jidda, Riyadh, etc. and we’ll have a real mess on our hands. We’ve got to forestall escalations of this sort.

So I’m plugging for a strong pitch to Nasser, who may think he has us in tow. Obviously he’s trying to cow the Saudis into quitting in Yemen, but he’s producing just the opposite result. I’d like to see us threaten him a bit (as I did last November) but State fears we may just make him sore. I may need your help; a few harsh words now may save our Nasser policy rather than wreck it.

RWK³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, Nasser Visit. Secret.
1. A note from Komer to Bundy, December 28, 1962, indicates that as early as that date, Rusk, because of concern expressed by Ambassador Macomber and Nasser’s public statements, wanted to hold up issuing an invitation for the Nasser visit until after a meeting scheduled for January 2. (Ibid.)

2. On January 7, Komer wrote Kennedy concerning the invitation to Nasser:

   “I hope that you will agree to keep this prospect open, as the obvious short term disadvantages of a Nasser visit are to me far outweighed by the potential gains. A face-to-face talk with Nasser would permit you to clarify what we want out of our relationship in the only effective way.

   “Our Nasser policy has to be looked at as a long term investment; we cannot afford to leave the key Arab nationalist as an exclusive client of the USSR. Even in the short run I’d argue that, while we haven’t had too much positive return from our UAR aid as yet, Nasser’s actions and utterances would be far more painful if he didn’t already feel some vested interest in good relations with us.” (Ibid.)

3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.