Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

126. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, January 2, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Rationale for UAR Policy

During Ambassador Badeau’s recent consultations in Washington the Office of Near Eastern Affairs prepared a basic rationale reviewing major developments since Ambassador Badeau’s 1961 consultations and discussing current major issues in our relationships with the UAR. (Tab A)¹ The document was prepared on the assumption that difficulties to resolution of the conflict in Yemen or in effecting disengagement and withdrawal of UAR-Saudi Arabian forces would not be insuperable.

Inflammatory propaganda from Cairo and Sanaa² and an air strike against Nejran in Saudi Arabia have created new difficulties in resolving the Yemen conflict for which the UAR seems primarily responsible. An element of provocation was not entirely absent, however, in view of accelerated Saudi logistical support to the royalists, to continued British equivocation in recognizing the Yemen Arab Republic and a generally hostile attitude on the part of the British press and pressures against the YAR apparently being mounted by the Sherif of Beihan. Whatever the UAR’s long-range intentions may be, we believe disengagement and withdrawal from Yemen (on the basis of recognition of the YAR) would serve the UAR’s present interests and that thus there is reason to believe the UAR will cooperate on a reciprocal basis in effecting it, albeit it may be difficult to persuade them to make the first move. In his December 30 conversation with Ambassador Badeau,³ Nasser appears to have accepted in principle the concept of neutral mediation and supervision of withdrawal along lines first proposed by Crown Prince Faysal on November 13. We have been informed by a Nasser confidant that the UAR has drawn up a plan for withdrawal within 60 days. We recommend that a mediatory effort be undertaken as soon as Saudi and UAR assent can be obtained (Tab B).⁴

We believe we have enough strings in our diplomatic bow to blunt or divert any UAR thrust that would impinge directly on major US interests in the Arabian Peninsula, in Israel or elsewhere in the area and that our fundamental long-term interests in the UAR and the desirability that we not appear to stand against reformist movements makes it important that we continue to try to pursue a middle course which would neither leave us standing rigidly on the status quo, as the UK has done to its detriment, nor acquiescing to UAR domination of other countries. Direct Western opposition to Nasser’s program might provide the very issue to rally support to him, whereas Nasser, when left alone, has been notoriously unsuccessful in establishing any permanent hegemony over other states.

In advocating this middle-of-the-road policy we hold no brief for President Nasser or his policies and have no illusion that his objectives are or can be made to be consonant with ours. Our case rests essentially on the proposition that there is a better chance of keeping UAR policies and actions within tolerable limits by maintaining and where practicable increasing the degree of UAR involvement in the Western system, especially in the economic field. We continue to believe a personal confrontation between President Nasser and President Kennedy could be useful in moderating Nasser’s actions.

There is some prospect that US-UAR involvement may grow beyond mere government-to-government relations. American private industry is beginning to show interest in participation in UAR economic development program. The UAR appears to be not only responsive but on the verge of a major policy shift toward seeking to increase the level of American private participation with the aim of eventually creating an alternative to dependence on US Government assistance. Early conclusion of the Investment Guarantee Agreement appears a likely first step in this process.

The Chairman of the Board of Koppers Company of Pittsburgh is proceeding to the UAR on January 5 to conclude a contract for the comprehensive management along vertical lines of the UAR steel industry. Representatives of the Pan-American Oil Company are enroute to revive discussions of a concession arrangement for exploration in the Western Desert. The Chairman of the Board of the Food Machinery Corporation of California (Fred Davies) and the President of the Bechtel Corporation (Steve Bechtel) have reportedly agreed to visit the UAR, at the invitation of the UAR Minister of Industry, for the purpose of exploring the possibility of American participation in a number of major industrial lines. The UAR Ambassador has instituted a series of contacts with Mr. Knapp of the Bank of America, with Mr. Knox of Westinghouse, with Mr. Farley of Coca Cola and others.

Thus, though we may have continuing problems with the UAR in respect of its area policies toward third countries, these in our view, should be viewed in the perspective of the demonstrable progress that has been made and is being made in our bilateral relationships, of the UAR’s continued opposition to Communism and the gradual improvement in its international posture toward something like true neutrality as currently manifest in its attitude on the Sino-Indian conflict.

Closer relations with Nasser and the UAR may be a liability to our relations with Israel, a number of other Arab states, and often with our European Allies. Neither can we be unmindful of the problems created domestically. Nevertheless in comparing the US position in the Middle East now with what it was in 1957, and in giving improvement in relations with the UAR a deservedly prominent place in the strengthening process, there is every reason to believe that we are on the right track, and that it would be unwise to alter this course as a result of day-to-day oscillations and without far greater provocation on the part of the UAR than has thus far occurred.

We summarize our views as follows:

1) In power and size, the UAR is the most important Near Eastern state.

2) If the UAR were to direct its power against US interests, it could damage these seriously.

3) If we were to use our power against the UAR by withholding assistance or more directly, the UAR can turn to the countervailing USSR force. We would in effect be exposing our Near Eastern position to indigenous attack and facilitating aggrandizement of Soviet influence in the area.

4) Egypt’s desperate need to progress economically, and its leaders’ aversion to foreign, including Soviet, domination of the Arab area, afford a platform for a long-range effort to build confidence and to establish solid diplomatic strength in a key position.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/1–263. Secret. Drafted by Barrow.
1. Attached but not printed. Tab A is an untitled and undated 7-page paper.
2. On January 2, the Director for Intelligence and Research Thomas L. Hughes sent to Secretary Rusk an intelligence research memorandum (No. RNA-47) on “Factors Underlying the Nature of Current Arab Radio Propaganda.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/1–263)
3. See Document 123.
4. Attached but not printed. Tab B is a paper entitled “Next Steps in Yemen as Related to the Nasser Visit to the United States.”