Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

123. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State⁰

Cairo, December 30, 1962, 11 p.m.

904. Deptel 650,¹ 655,² 657³ and 660.⁴ Nasser received me at 1900 hours tonight for hour’s roundup of my recent trip to Washington with special emphasis on problems Yemen disengagement. In course of interview I

A) Reported briefly on selected conversations in Washington including those with UAR Ambassador Kamel, Bowles, and reports on reception UAR Minister Sidky;

B) Presented Nasser with 16MM kinescope print of President Kennedy December 17 TV interview,⁵ which was most appreciatively received;

C) Presented inscribed personal copy Bowles latest book;

D) Transmitted practically verbatim President Kennedy’s oral message from reftel 650, leaving paraphrased “talking paper” on substance message for later perusal;

E) Discussed briefly Colombo Conference and prospects for acceptance modified UAR proposal;

F) Reviewed at length Yemen situation with special emphasis on problems disengagement.

On Colombo Nasser stated original UAR proposal had been leaked by Burma to Chinese who had forthwith turned it down. UAR then proposed modified version, which was now being presented to Indians, Chinese, Nasser believing both would eventually accept it in substance.

Re Yemen, I stressed American interest in and determination to further disengagement, stating this directly affected American interests since continuation or proliferation of military activity could well threaten stability of Saudi Arabia and cause direct American reaction. At same time disengagement very much in interest of YAR and UAR since Sallal Government not yet firmly established and Egypt paying considerable price for its military support. In view of this I urged possibility of disengagement be considered under two heading of immediate action and longer range activity.

As to immediate action I stated continued irresponsible statements from Nasser Said, particularly one made less than 24 hours after recognition by US of YAR, were doing great harm. Nasser Said was a known extremist on whom we have full dossier revealing unsavory past history of extremist connections and activity. Yet Sami Sharaf had informed Embassy within past week Nasser Said is ”UAR man”, and UAR is able to control him. This being true, I urged that Nasser Said be taken out of circulation immediately. President Nasser responded by saying he did not know whether or not Nasser Said was in fact ”UAR man” and was surprised Sami Sharaf had made such a statement. UAR had not approved of earliest statements re Republic of South Arabia or later reiteration of same. However, he would look into matter since it was obvious these statements did not reflect UAR policy and would hurt UAR position.

Using above as springboard I elaborated on importance of public image created in west by injudicious statements, radio propaganda, and Presidential speeches of which Nasser’s speech at Port Said last week was latest. Nasser immediately picked up the ball on Port Said speech and said while UAR had agreed in good faith to participate in disengagement, and intended so to do, he had made no agreement to stand silent in face of attacks upon him or UAR. Sheikh of Baihan, who is British backed, had publicly called Nasser a “son of a dog”, and he could not let this pass without reply. I responded by saying USG understood UAR undertaking merely encompassed disengagement but public image created by political speeches and propaganda played an important role in determining public and Congressional attitude toward USG Arab-world policies. If YAR [UAR?] seeks fruitful relations with USG, including continuation of aid program let alone any increase of same, it is necessary to create image of moderate and responsible government. Whatever Presidential policy may be toward UAR, it is Congress that votes funds for aid and foreign policy programs and Senators follow closely all public and propaganda statements from Cairo. In this connection I mentioned adverse effect of Sallal’s rocket rattling statements in Sanaa. Nasser stated according to his information Sallal had made no such statement. Fact is Yemen radio commentator describing parade had inserted rocket mention on own volition. I asked Nasser to furnish me with exact text of Sallal remarks, then said whoever had made statement, its effect was bad. Nasser admitted this but said UAR not able exercise complete control of YAR radio broadcasters or government speech makers.

My second suggestion for immediate action preparatory to disengagement was possibility of returning defecting aircraft to HKJ and SAG. On mention of this Nasser made long face but before he could object I outlined legal position as stated reftel 655, at its close handing Nasser paraphrased talking paper on subject. Nasser read this carefully, then said while no overt state of war existed between UAR-YAR and opponents, in fact war was going on. SAG is building up supplies of arms and technicians at staging bases for use after UAR troops withdrawn and under these circumstances it would be difficult to return aircraft. I urged matter be carefully considered since it would be an impressive earnest of UAR’s seriousness in seeking disengagement, yet would not affect present UAR military position. I suggested it might be possible to obtain undertakings from SAG and HKJ that returned aircraft would not be used for further offensive purposes against UAR or YAR. I then urged this matter be given careful consideration and discussed further with me.

Re longer range disengagement activity, I raised question of verification by some intermediary as suggested reference telegram 660. Nasser admitted some form of verification probably necessary, since any UAR military withdrawal would be quite public whereas SAG flow of gold and arms could continue surreptitiously. I stated suggestions had been made for using either UN, selected Arab states, or US in intermediary role. There is no evidence contending parties are interested in UN and USG is not seeking intermediary function since nobody loves a verifier. Nasser’s answer was to dismiss UN without comment and state there seemed little prospect of effective Arab action since UAR already under some criticism in Arab world for having accepted USG mediation in preference to Arab offers. He seemed vague as to how USG might fulfill verification role but said undoubtedly we were fully informed about activities in SAG since American pilots being used to fly Saudi arms to staging areas. He thought we already had enough information to satisfy ourselves, and therefore UAR, as to what, in fact, the Saudis are up to at any given moment. Upon my suggesting this matter should be discussed by him with his colleagues and then further discussed by me with Ali Sabri, he heartily concurred, noting, however, Ali Sabri is due to leave UAR for trip on January 10.

Comment: My appointment was originally set for evening December 29, but temporary illness forced me to cancel. Request reinstituted this morning, followed immediately by appointment for evening.

Nasser very earnest throughout whole discussion, avoiding immoderate statements but playing heavily familiar theme, “we only react”, especially in regard to Port Said speech and radio propaganda. It will take prolonged discussion to make any headway on disengagement and I suggest absolutely essential to seek some minimum withdrawal gestures from SAG and less importantly HKJ that can be used as counterparts against any UAR initial action. Nasser warmly appreciative of President Kennedy message and also of opportunity to see Presidential TV film.

Badeau

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786B.11/12–3062. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Jidda, Amman, London, and Taiz.
1. Document 120.
2. Telegram 655 to Cairo, December 27, instructed Badeau to make representations to the UAR Government concerning the return of Saudi and Jordanian military aircraft that had defected to the United Arab Republic. The telegram also contained a discussion of the legal basis for the prompt return of the planes. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5622/12–2762)
3. Dated December 27. (Ibid., 786H.02/12–2762)
4. Telegram 660 to Cairo, December 28, instructed Badeau to seek a commitment from Nasser to agree in principle to cooperate with a possible intermediary, who would be acceptable to all parties, for the purpose of effecting an early disengagement and withdrawal from the Yemen conflict. (Ibid., 686B.86H/12–2862)
5. Reference is to an interview with William H. Lawrence of the American Broadcasting Company. For a transcript of the interview, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 889-904.