Office of the Historian

124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic0

Washington, December 31, 1962, 1:21 p.m.

662. You should immediately contact highest available UAR authority (preferably Nasser or if unavailable Ali Sabri) regarding December 30 aerial attacks, presumed of UAR origin, on Nejran (Jidda Tel 516).1 You should state USG has repeatedly made clear importance it attaches to integrity Saudi Arabia and that it would consider any attack on that [Page 289] integrity as damaging to direct US interests. As UAR knows, USG has made and will continue to make every effort bring about peaceful settlement to Yemen conflict. In recognizing YAR USG went to considerable lengths to express confidence in peaceful intentions UAR and YAR Governments. If that confidence is now shattered by provocative attacks on Saudi territory, difficult see how policy of cooperation with UAR to which US attaches highest importance could remain unaffected.

USG not unaware of problems which exist for UAR and YAR on Yemen-Saudi frontier. Urgent efforts are underway to find suitable intermediary with view to bringing about abatement of conflict. Such efforts compromised, however, unless UAR and YAR desist from further provocative activity. USG is similarly advising SAG to refrain from any retaliatory action tending escalate conflict. UAR public disavowal of intent to attack Saudi Arabia would be helpful. Department making parallel representations to UAR Ambassador.2

FYI. Actions such as this and provocative UAR propaganda raising questions at high levels as to validity our policy toward UAR. Department now considering what overt gestures of support for Saudi Arabia can be taken. End FYI.3

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5486B/12–3162. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Barrow, cleared by Davies, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Jidda, London, Amman, and Taiz.↩
  2. In telegram 516 from Jidda, December 31, Hart reported that Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf, acting on Faysal’s instructions, had conveyed to him the text of a cable reporting that an attack by a UAR airplane had taken place on Saudi soil in the Najran area near the Yemeni border. (Ibid., 786A.5486B/12–3162)↩
  3. The memorandum of the January 2, 1963, conversation is ibid., 686A.86B/1–263.↩

  4. Prior to receipt of this telegram, Badeau had emphasized U.S. displeasure and concern over the Nejran bombing incident during a conversation with Sami Sharaf on January 1. Sharaf had explained that UAR-YAR forces had executed the air strike, because the previous day military intelligence had learned that 15,000 Saudi-supported Royalist troops, armed with some heavy weapons including anti-tank artillery, were at Wadi Akeed in Najran area. Sharaf insisted that the YAR-UAR air chiefs had not ordered an incursion over the border or bombing of Najran. Following this conversation, Badeau received a telephone call from Talbot, evidently informing him of the telegram printed here. (Telegram 914 from Cairo, January 1; ibid., 786A.5486B/1–163)

    Badeau met with Ali Sabri the morning of January 2 and repeated his expression of U.S. concern. Sabri in response conveyed an official UAR statement that it was not UAR policy to undertake planned excursions across the Saudi border. He noted that the UAR would seek to avoid a repetition of the incident, but the forces near Najran were tribal groups that moved back and forth across the border, at the risk of further incidents. (Telegram 915 from Cairo, January 2; ibid., 786A.5486B/1–263)

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