Office of the Historian

125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia0

Washington, December 31, 1962, 8:34 p.m.

367. Jidda Tel 516 to Dept and Deptel 662 to Cairo.1 Ambassador should convey to Faysal either through Saqqaf or directly grave concern with which USG views reported UAR attack Najran, indicating USG has made strong representations to UAR Ambassador Washington and has requested Ambassador Badeau make highest level demarche in Cairo. Assistant Secretary Talbot telephoned Ambassador Badeau upon receipt reftel with instructions express serious US concern, restate US interest in integrity Saudi Arabia, deplore additional difficulties placed in path US efforts abate conflict and stress adverse reaction USG official circles.

Ambassador should emphasize to Faysal USG determination do everything possible to check spread of conflict and urge Faysal not be drawn into action which would enlarge conflict. USG would view with concern any possible SAG retaliatory measure and wishes Faysal clearly understand USG deadly serious in its intent prevent escalation Yemen conflict and get on with business of disengagement external forces in Yemen.

FYI. Assistant Secretary Talbot conveyed essence foregoing to Ambassador Khayyal December 31.2 Khayyal stated Faysal had 4 requests of USG: (1) USG public declaration of support for SAG; (2) despatch of USAF planes to Saudi Arabia; (3) USG “support” in providing SAG with “necessary” military equipment (including, according Khayyal, AA guns and radar); and (4) US view re taking matter to UN Security Council.3 Talbot stated USG would immediately examine 4 points and consider appropriate response. End FYI.

Ambassador should also acknowledge Dept’s receipt via Ambassador Khayyal of Faysal’s four requests, stating US proposes respond as follows: (1) if Faysal will release for publication text of President’s October 25 letter, Dept will issue public announcement in Washington supporting integrity SAG along lines of letter; (2) subject Faysal approval, [Page 291] public announcement of planned USG-SAG military exercise in early 1963; (3) carry forward shipment of 30 caliber ammo (which subject earlier urgent SAG request) and process rest of arms order as expeditiously as possible; and (4) USG believes inadvisable take matter to UN Security Council at this juncture and believes best present course is through USG representations Cairo.

You may inform Faysal that his overt importation of war materiel for dispatch to Yemen could provide reason for UAR-piloted Yemeni aircraft to strike at supply depots in Saudi Arabia. The US has no intention of being drawn into hostilities between Saudi Arabia and the UAR nor as you pointed our to Azzam (Embtel 513)4 can US serve as “shield” protecting Saudi Arabia while SAG stokes fires of war by supplying weapons and ammunition to Royalists. You should again urge that such activities be suspended to permit us exert our influence in Cairo to get UAR military withdrawal under way.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5486B/12–1362. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies, Quinn (OSD/ISA) (in substance), and Padelford (NEA/NR) (in substance); and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Kuwait, London, Paris for CINCEUR, Tel Aviv, Dhahran, and Taiz.↩
  2. See Document 124 and footnote 2 thereto.↩
  3. The memorandum of the December 31 conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 686A.86B/12–3162.↩
  4. On December 31 in Jidda, Saqqaf conveyed to Hart messages from Faysal posing these same four points. (Telegram 522 from Jidda, December 31; ibid., 786A.5486B/12–3162)↩
  5. Telegram 513 from Jidda, December 29, reported on a December 27 conversation between Hart and Faysal, during which Faysal again reiterated his strong opposition to U.S. recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic. (Ibid., 786H.02/12–2962)↩