Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

131. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State⁰

Cairo, January 9, 1963, 5 p.m.

959. Policy. Deptel 717.¹ From available intelligence it is now clear that UAR bombings in Saudi Arabia² are deliberate and that “hot pursuit” explanation does not hold water. Bombings may be response to stepped-up SAG activity in supplying pro-Royalists and a worsening YAR/UAR military situation in Yemen. Equally important, however, in analyzing UARG’s motives for these deliberate provocations we bear in mind that UAR had anticipated that along with YAR/UAR declarations of intent and US recognition of Yemen there would be an early if not simultaneous move by SAG to commence suspension of assistance to Royalists. We believe UAR bombings are designed to pressure the SAG to move rapidly towards cessation aid and/or to stimulate USG into increased efforts so to persuade SAG.

On these assumptions we have canvassed possibilities re courses of action.

Measures the USG can take alone.

I should convey to Nasser personally warning I gave to Fawzi today (Embtel 951)³ that any repetition of bombings will result in positive response by USG. We need not at that time identify to UARG precise nature of response.

2. I am opposed to suspension or withdrawal of US economic assistance to UAR. I continue to believe that policy decided upon early in 1962 that US Government would maintain its economic undertakings to UAR even though there might be serious difficulties between us over problems arising in third countries is valid and to our long-term interest in this area. Suspension or refusal of aid was singular failure in 1956–58 as tactic to force Nasser to moderate his policies. Nasser’s emotional reaction to what he considered USG endeavors to “humiliate” Egypt was major factor in anti-Western character of Nasser’s policies during that period. With considerable belt-tightening and continued access to commercial sources of grain UAR could feed itself even if denied PL-480 assistance but only at expense of almost all of development program which cannot be in our long-term interest. It would undoubtedly drive UAR to seek to strengthen its ties with and to obtain increased economic assistance from USSR.

3. We favor presently planned (or stepped up) “display of US force” in support of Feisal including naval patrols of SAG Red Sea coastline north of Yemen frontier. For obvious reasons, I do not favor patrols in immediate vicinity YAR land or sea borders which might result in clash between UAR and US aircraft or vessels.

4. I have already suggested to Fawzi that US recognition of YAR might be placed in jeopardy. Withdrawal of US recognition would in turn imply passive if not active US support of Royalists in Yemen. Such an about-face would have a dramatic initial impact in Arab world but would be followed by accusations of vacillation in US policy, support of archaic discredited regime in Yemen, and would result in serious setback in development of UAR/US relations. Against this we would have made clear in unmistakable terms our support of Faisal as well as our conviction that UAR with YAR as agent is actively engaged in bringing about downfall of house of Saud, and our determination to prevent this. This appears to be drastic measure out of proportion to seriousness of bombing incidents themselves. I feel, however, that if our representations to UAR continue to be flouted, this or some other equally strong measure necessary to impress on UAR our determination to protect our interests in Arabian peninsula and we might apply this tactic by degrees with first step being suspension US aid to Yemen and withdrawal aid mission.

Measures requiring concurrence of others.

5. From USUN’s 2626 to Department⁴ we gather pace of discussion at UN not such as to permit timely establishment informal UN machinery. We therefore recommend that we make immediate offer to Feisal to station US military observers at key points along SAG/YAR borders. Such observers would provide us accurate, immediate, and publishable information re UAR/YAR frontier violations and should have some effect of deterrence. They would also of course be in position provide information re SAG help to Royalists and, hopefully, exercise same deterrence on this operation. Faisal’s response to such a USG offer should provide insight into his intentions re Yemen. Upon acceptance by Feisal of observers, USG would then press UAR and YAR to extend them full cooperation including access to Yemen territory and air space.

6. Concurrently with above, we should continue our efforts to arrange specific acts of disengagement, a process begun with my talk to Fawzi this morning. We have suggested to UAR that it analyze first phases of its disengagement plan and productive offer to implement them against specific actions to be taken by SAG. The sooner we can get both sides engaged in such a bargaining process the better.⁵

Badeau

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.5486B/1–963. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Taiz.
1. In telegram 717 to Cairo, January 8, the Department of State requested Badeau’s views on what the next steps with the UAR should be in view of recent bombings of Saudi territory. (Ibid., 786A.5486B/1–863)
2. On January 8 in telegram 548 from Jidda, Hart conveyed another message from Faysal reporting that on January 7 Egyptian aircraft had bombed Najran three times. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 951 from Cairo, January 9, Badeau reported on a 50 minute conversation with Foreign Minister Fawzi, during which Badeau conducted a full review of the Yemen situation, emphasizing the need for constructive UAR action to forestall a worsening of U.S.-UAR relations. (Ibid., 611.86B/1–963)
4. Dated January 7. (Ibid., 786H.00/1–763)
5. On January 10, in telegram 776 to Cairo, the Department of State conveyed the following comments on the six measures proposed in telegram 959: 1) Concur; 2) concur but make clear handling of aid requests linked with UAR behavior; 3) concur; 4) preferable not to continue indicating possibility of U.S. withdrawal of recognition as only Yemen’s loss of control over the country would precipitate such action; 5) while not ruling out possibility of U.S. observers, this subject should be left in domain of neutral intermediary; and 6) specific steps of disengagement should initially be the responsibility of the neutral intermediary, but discussion on the disengagement process should begin as quickly as possible. (Ibid., 786A.5486B/1–963)