359. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State0
957. Paris for Thurston, Rome for Rood. During call on Foreign Minister Sarper February 3 he prefaced remarks re action Soviet Ambassador Rijov by urging that information be handled with greatest care since his (Sarper’s) usefulness and perhaps mine would be seriously impaired if this discussion leaked out.
Rijov had visited him earlier in day to deliver note re IRBMs. Note said Soviets had seen references in press to fact IRBMs being constructed Turkey under NATO auspices but US command; USSR did not like development which might bring Turkey to “dangerous adventure”. Sarper said note not provocative and contained no threat but clearly implied IRBM would be impediment to development good neighborly relations. In course conversation Rijov also stated U–2 flight had “complicated” Turkey-Soviet relation since Turkey was original base for plane.1
Sarper said he promised Rijov formal GOT reply in due course but made following points orally as his personal opinion: (1) Turkish leaders would never lead people into “dangerous adventure”; (2) GOT as NATO member would lose no opportunity improve its defensive strength; (3) Turkey already “surrounded” by countries equipped with atomic weapons all types and ranges. Hence for GOT deprive itself these means of defense would be limitation its sovereignty; (4) GOT nevertheless would be happy see end of atomic weapons and conditions which made them necessary through proper international agreements and controls. Abandonment atomic weapons question of global international import.
Sarper then went on discuss current activities of Soviet Ambassador. He said Rijov was visiting various Cabinet Officers and CNU members for general discussions which almost invariably included description of various economic and technological advances made by USSR and concluded with statement US-Soviet relations improving very rapidly under new US Administration to point where agreement might soon be reached which would leave Turkey “outside the club”. Obvious implication not overtly stated was that before Moscow and Washington finally got together Turkey should improve relations and [Page 693] reach agreement with their strong and powerful northern neighbor which had demonstrated ability to conquer type of economic problems Turkey faced.
Sarper said that Rijov had not tried this line with him or even in recent call on Inonu since both too sophisticated to swallow it but that he was using it on many more naive officials. Gursel aware Rijov activities which he considered nuisance and overstepping proper bounds. Described as being furious and demanding Rijov be stopped “or else”. Sarper said he had urged restraint since first they did not wish take any action which would imply Turkey afraid of Russia and second any action taken against Rijov might only drive this type of activity underground. Sarper said he felt it better continue as at present but to keep close watch over Soviet activities.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.06270/2–561. Secret. Also sent to Moscow and repeated to Athens, Bonn, London, Tehran, Rome, and Paris Topol.↩
- Reference is to the May 1, 1960, downing of a U.S. aerial reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union. The aircraft took off from a base in Turkey.↩