358. Letter From the charge in Turkey (Cowles) to the Deputy Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Thurston)0
Dear Ray: There are a few angles of the recent Turkish request for additional military budget support, not explicitly mentioned in the wires, which we thought might interest you and General Norstad. One is that the request was made completely outside normal channels. Colonel Tunckanat of the Committee of National Unity (which has been the Turkish Government, above the Cabinet), assisted by some military officers, presented the Turkish request. The ministers who normally deal in budgetary matters played a silent role and in some cases made known their opposition. As you know, the highly competent Finance Minister, Alican, resigned because the Committee insisted on carrying through the pay raise and other benefits for the military which threatened his budget and the government’s financial stability. General Alankus, former General of the Ground Forces and new Minister of Defense, has told Embassy staff members that he opposed very strongly the request for additional aid at this time.
A second interesting point is the divergence in Turkish presentations of their own intentions. According to your wires 28 and 311 to Ankara, General Sunay in his conversation with General Norstad, proposed force levels which are in consonance with NATO planning. He has reiterated these levels in a subsequent conversation with General Morin. In Colonel Tunckanat’s briefings (Embtels 788, 789 and 805 to the Department),2 however, we were told that unless the GOT received the requested aid, it would reduce the level of its forces by 35–40%, which would mean a reduction in army personnel to a point far below that mentioned by General Sunay and very drastic reductions for the Air Force and Navy as well.
[Page 690]Although we do not know what the outcome will actually be, certain factors will undoubtedly be taken into account in arriving at a decision. One is, if the military budget finally comes out at the 1.788 billion TL, as proposed by the Minister of Finance, and if this limited budget must absorb a large pay increase and other benefits for military personnel, substantial reductions in force levels will have to be made. We cannot estimate at this juncture whether or not under these conditions it would be possible for the Turks to support the level of forces which General Sunay indicated.
Although General Sunay is in a most influential position as Chief of Staff, his is by no means the only voice which must be heard in arriving at a decision on the military budget. The Committee of National Unity, as mentioned above, has been the Government of Turkey in this revolutionary period, and its decisions on funds and force levels, which would presumably be determining, cannot be ignored by General Sunay. After we informed him of the adverse U.S. decision on his request for additional aid, Colonel Tunckanat of the Committee told us that the Government would proceed on the basis of the smaller budget involving reduced force levels. It will be most interesting to see how this squares with General Sunay’s projected levels.
A complicating factor is the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly. Review of the budget is one of the specified powers of this body. Hence while we may know about the proposed budget soon, it is unlikely that we will know the final figure until Assembly action has been concluded, a process which could take some weeks. Although the Committee’s power will be less now that it constitutes only the upper house of this new organization, it still retains an ultimate veto power since an average of 51% of the vote of the two houses (voting separately and weighted equally) is required to reach a decision when there is a difference between them.
We have one question about your wire No. 31 to Ankara. In paragraph one it is stated that General Norstad sees no need for the Turks to pursue discussion of their aid request with the Embassy in light of the procedure to be followed involving General Sunay’s memorandum as to the breakdown of forces and General Norstad’s prospective recommendation thereon. We are pleased that the Turkish problem is now in the hands of the competent NATO authorities which is in keeping with our own recommendations (Embtel 789). However, since we delivered the Department’s reply to the Turkish request for aid, which was a fairly categorical “no”, it appears to us that the main discussion is over and there is nothing left to pursue.
There remains, I suppose, the possibility that General Norstad might himself wish to effect a change in the U.S. Government’s negative position when he has studied General Sunay’s program. This would resemble [Page 691] somewhat the process which occurred in connection with the Turkish request for $12 million of “additional” aid last August. Leaving aside the question of the merits of additional aid, we can see some difficulties for you in this process. The Turks may get the notion that an approach to SACEUR is the most profitable means of obtaining aid which is otherwise difficult or impossible to secure. The Turkish Government can allocate its existing resources, including counterpart, to cover any budgetary requirement it wishes, leaving others uncovered. The present budget, for instance, apparently includes increased appropriations for health and education to be met out of existing resources. This is one reason why the military are receiving less in the approved budget, leaving their needs partially uncovered. Since the Turkish Government can thus control to a large degree the sectors of their budget for which external aid must be sought, it may not be entirely a matter of chance that it is the military sector which has been selected on this occasion.
By the way, we note from your wire No. 28 to Ankara that General Sunay mentioned our letter of November 12, on the Turkish budget process. As you will have guessed, it offered no encouragement regarding increased aid, as he claimed, but it did make major recommendations for a more orderly budget making process. I am enclosing a copy as of possible interest to you.3
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/1–1061. Top Secret; Official–Informal. Cowles was serving as charge after the departure of Ambassador Fletcher Warren on November 15, 1960.↩
- Telegram 28 from Paris to Ankara, December 14, 1960, reported on Norstad’s informal discussions with Sunay on the Turkish Air Force aid program. (Ibid., 782.00/12–1460) Telegram 31 from Paris to Ankara, December 31, analyzed the Turkish request for military aid. (Ibid., 782.5/12–3160)↩
- Dated December 10, 11 and 17, respectively. (Ibid., 882.10/12–1060, 882.10/12–1160, and 882.10/12–1760)↩
- The letter was not found. In telegram 965 from Ankara, February 7, the Embassy reported that the budget presented to Parliament by the Turkish Government included a significant increase in defense expenditures financed by new taxes and a reduction in military manpower. The Embassy cautioned, however, that the Turkish Government might resurrect its request for substantial new U.S. financing of its defense program. (Department of State, Central Files, 882.10/2–761)↩