Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

360. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State⁰

Ankara, April 4, 1961, 6 p.m.

1193. During first courtesy call on Foreign Minister Sarper¹ I referred to great interest of American people in Turkey despite relative absence of press stories and of hope all Americans shared that current difficulties would be solved. Sarper immediately said Turkey had two very great problems today, one was economic situation and other was Yassiada trials.

Elaborating on trials he said violence occurring in heat crisis understandable but is accepted with much greater difficulty after months of calm and opportunity for reasoned judgment. He added, however, that both General Gursel and Ismet Inonu were watchfully waiting and hoped that “everything would work out for best” though final decision of course rests with CNU and assessment current political situation at time might be important determinant. Recognized possible impact abroad but said domestic impact just as serious for future of Turkey. He added that high court showing “amazing independence” and that Gursel said Chief Judge Basgol had even indicated might resign if more pressure brought on him to expedite trials.

I commented that I had not intended raise this subject and had no instructions but since it had come up in conversation I would venture express some personal views. Yassiada trials and final verdict were of course internal matter and so regarded by us. Nevertheless it was internal matter which under certain circumstances could lap over into foreign field and produce strong reactions. In my judgment American people ready accept “adjusted” solution but not “ultimate” (death sentence) decision. Latter could in my opinion very seriously damage image of Turkey which Americans had formed, which would be most unfoertunate. Additionally could not but place USG in difficult position, as I believed had been prviously brought out.²

Sarper said he understood and would in his own time and way pass on my thoughts to Gursel which he felt he knew how to do but he advised against my mentioning subject during first call on Gursel. I said I had no intention of raising with Gursel and reiterated that I had only mentioned them since he himself had raised subject.

I gained impression that while Sarper in no sense confident of what outcome of trials might be and fully aware of serious implications internally and externally of death sentences he was seeking give impression that efforts being made within existing law to guard against such extreme action. Fact that this gave uninhibited opportunity reiterate our concern may also have served useful purpose.

Hare

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/4–461. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Istanbul, Izmir, and Iskenderun.
1. The Senate approved President Kennedy’s nomination of Raymond Hare as Ambassador to Turkey on February 24. Hare presented his credentials to President Gursel on April 5.
2. In telegram 1029, February 24, the Embassy reported on the results of earlier discussions with senior Turkish officials, advising the Department that it was unable to submit a “meaningful” estimate of the likelihood of executions following the trials. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/2–2461)