86. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0
Secto 50. Following based on uncleared memcon Secretary-Gromyko conversation July 24.1
Secretary, Kohler, Hillenbrand had two and half hour session with Gromyko, Ilyichev, and Kovalev following lunch hosted by Gromyko. Gromyko invited Secretary speak first.
Secretary opened saying he little puzzled as to what Gromyko and he could profitably say to each other at this point. Problems at hand had been discussed at considerable length here and US point of view had also been expressed by President on number occasions. Secretary noted he had reported to President what had been said in Geneva and that he personally did not see any prospect for satisfactory progress on issues at this time, unless Sovs advance in one of two directions: (A) To make clear that whatever they thought needs were with respect East Germany these would not interfere with Western presence in West Berlin and access to that city. On larger questions in which there is common interest between US and USSR, West had made clear to West Germany that all-German problems and Berlin reserved from full sovereignty West Germany. We saw no reason why Sovs could not do same with respect East Germany. (B) Alternatively, we could try to sit down and see how to handle fact of disagreement without conflict. US general principles paper suggested one way to dealing with it. If there were other suggestions re handling this matter in similar fashion, we would be happy think about them.
Secretary expressed view great deal of time had been spent in these discussions reviewing respective points of view and it was not necessary go over them again since they well known. Problem is where we should go from here.
Secretary observed that in terms of longer-run future, if there was no permanent settlement German problems on agreed basis, that was likely cause restiveness and be source of danger Central Europe. Sincerely, as we saw situation, if Germans stood against Germans and if Germans on both sides were to indulge in adventures, that would gravely affect peace Central Europe. We regard effective presence US and indeed USSR as stabilizing factor in this situation.
[Page 244]Secretary recalled Gromyko’s remark at lunch it good idea if US and USSR, and preferably also UK and France, tried discuss these problems and find solution. US had made suggestion along these lines in its general principles paper. Noting he was unable speak with full authority for two additional countries, particularly since—as Gromyko aware from reading newspapers—De Gaulle had his own views this subject, Secretary stated that if Sovs had any ideas for quadripartite discussions along lines we had been talking about, we would see what could be done to get cooperation others concerned.
Secretary said he wished add one word re President and Khrushchev. Noting he had already exchanged some comments on this point with Gromyko, Secretary said he believed great deal depended on whether these two men could find some basis on which our two countries, in spite their different social systems, could move toward better relations. However, he also believed it would be unfortunate if President and Khrushchev just exchanged views on this subject without coming to any apparent result. US had tried be imaginative as to how circumstances could be created where direct contact between these two men could take place fruitfully. However, Secretary said, he did not think such circumstances existed now, and there was danger two leaders reaching same point where we were now, which would not be satisfactory to either side. Secretary pointed out that he was making these comments only in connection his earlier conversation on this subject, and that he had no direct instructions from President in this respect.
Gromyko agreed both he and Secretary had set forth in detail and in clear manner positions their respective govts during these meetings in Geneva. He wished once more emphasize that Sovs regretted US Govt had taken such position re main problems, i.e., withdrawal Western forces from West Berlin. He contended this was further evidence US Govt’s desire maintain occupation status in West Berlin and keep that city in hands three Western Powers as NATO mil base. This conclusion had not been arrived at today; USSR had thought so before, but today Western intentions this respect were even clearer than before. Gromyko observed he had made this comment in view Secretary’s remark at earlier meeting Sovs had only recently started talking about West Berlin’s being NATO base. Gromyko continued USSR would never agree to perpetuation occupation regime in West Berlin and to that city’s remaining NATO base eternally. USSR could not agree to that because that ran counter interests of peace in Europe—and not only in Europe—but also counter interests relaxation tensions in Europe and Germany. If Sovs were to agree to this they would be helping those who were pouring oil on fire and thus would be accomplices of West German revanchists and militarists. It was impossible expect Sov Union to agree to this. USSR [Page 245] would not agree and regretted US Govt, and apparently its Allies, failed duly appreciate this position.
Gromyko recalled that on more than one occasion Western, including US leaders, for example Macmillan, De Gaulle, President Kennedy, and Secretary himself, had stated West understood Sov desire ensure its security, particularly in light lessons past history, when Hitler had attacked USSR and latter had lost millions of lives in defeating Nazis. However, while saying this, West failed draw necessary conclusions which would lend substance to these words. USSR position re German peace treaty and other questions to be settled in connection such treaty was based on desire prevent events in Europe from taking tragic turn and causing new disaster in world. Sov Govt and Sov people were resolved to go through with this and they believed this was in accord with interests peace in Europe and in world at large, as well as with US interests, if such interests were correctly understood. If US was seeking peace and good relations with USSR, this should not be in conflict with its interests. USSR, just as US, was great power and if it was interested—as it had to be—in matters of war and peace in all corners of world, including Africa and Asia, then it was easy to understand reasons why it was doubly interested in events in Europe.
Gromyko went on, saying another aspect problem was that in pres-ent situation where there was no German peace treaty and West Berlin was occupied city in hands Western Powers, sovereign rights of GDR were being crudely flouted. USSR was fully aware of US dislike for GDR, its system, its govt, and Ulbricht personally. However, this was something that did not depend on US; fact was that GDR, its govt, and Ulbricht existed. Admitting he might be repetitive, Gromyko stated West Berlin did not belong to West and there was no reason why US, UK and France should stay as bosses of West Berlin. Neither USSR, nor GDR, nor some other states could reconcile themselves with present state of affairs. It appeared to Sovs West failed appreciate duly these arguments which USSR had been advancing in its quest for mutually agreeable solution.
Gromyko observed that every once in a while US attempted link question German peace treaty and normalization situation West Berlin with question German reunification. He supposed that was done only for record. In his view this was waste of time and energy. New situation existed in Germany today; two German states had emerged from ruins Hitler’s Reich and it was from this fact that one must proceed. USSR was convinced unification would be resolved only between two German states. On other hand question German peace treaty and normalization West Berlin situation could not be postponed indefinitely. It was this that he had wanted particularly emphasized in his conversations with Secy here in Geneva. It was regrettable US failed draw necessary conclusions [Page 246] from this. USSR was convinced its position correct and in full accord with interests peace and detente in Europe.
Referring to Secy’s remark it would be well if USSR made clear in one or two directions what situation would exist with regard to presence Western Powers and Western forces West Berlin in event Sovs went through with their intentions re German peace settlement, Gromyko contended he had spoken on this during his meetings with Secy in New York and later in Geneva. During present conversations, he had also twice replied to this question. He continued that, if understanding was reached on appropriate questions connected with German peace settlement, situation would be simple: Access would be unrestricted and it would be ensured by all parties concerned, including GDR fulfilling its obligations; it would be ensured on basis respect GDR sovereignty, including its sovereignty with regard transit. A different situation would exist if peace treaty with GDR were signed unilaterally, i.e., without Western Powers’ participation or without agreement with those powers; then West would have to deal with GDR Govt re all questions, including transit arrangements; USSR would have nothing to do with these. Only GDR would be responsible and Western Powers would have to deal with GDR.
As to Secretary’s remarks about desirability avoid conflict, Gromyko asserted Sov Govt had always proceeded on that basis. Sov Govt believed both sides must do their utmost to avoid conflict. Sov Govt believed conflict could be caused only by Western Powers, US in particular, due to their position. If USSR wanted create conflict for sake of conflict it would have acted differently, and it would have had no prolonged negotiations with US in order seek possibility agreed solution.
Gromyko recalled that, last March in Geneva, Secy had spoken to him about Sovt flights in air corridors to West Berlin. Secy had said these flights were complicating matters and it would be better if they stopped. Gromyko continued that, although USSR categorically rejected assertion that such flights were illegal, upon his return to Moscow he had reported Secy’s remarks on this point to Sov Govt and Khrushchev personally. He had told his govt that President apparently shared Secy’s views on this matter, but although both of them were wrong, they did appear feel this was complicating factor for them. Khrushchev had then replied that suspension such flights might perhaps facilitate negotiations, and had ordered them suspended (at this point Gromyko told his interpreter not to use “stopped” but rather “suspended” in this sentence). Gromyko said Sovs had not expected US to express special gratitude to USSR for this. US had taken this for granted, although perhaps it had noted this in its own mind. He had made these remarks by way of reply to Secretary’s comment re need not do anything to heighten conflict. [Page 247] Gromyko reiterated that if Sovs had wanted conflict they would have been acting differently. However, not to want conflict for sake of conflict was one thing; it was another thing when legitimate interests of USSR and legitimate interests of GDR as sovereign state were affected, interests which were in full accord with interests of peace.
Commenting on Secy’s remark that present circumstances did not favor direct contact between President and Khrushchev, Gromyko noted that this was apparently Secy’s view on this point and that Secy was of course free draw conclusions from situation as he saw it. US knew Sov positions, including its latest proposal re Western forces West Berlin, well enough and there was nothing he, Gromyko, could add. He did wish repeat however that he regretted very much US was taking such position re Western forces West Berlin. He wished emphasize with all vigor Sov Govt would never, never agree with that position and would never accept perpetuation presence Western troops West Berlin.
Secy said he wished make observation re Gromyko’s very last point, because he believed he should draw distinction between contacts, i.e., communication, and a situation where we would have to imagine what the two leaders could say if they met face to face. This was of course up to the President, but he thought that contacts, i.e., communication, were of very considerable importance.
Referring to Gromyko’s remark that Western attitude on presence forces West Berlin had been distinct in past but not as distinct as it was today, Secy first observed he understood word today to mean recent days. He then recalled that pressure on this point had come from Sov side in most recent conversations. Of course insistence on part USSR clarified and made more distinct basis attitude Western Powers. Secy pointed out President had said in Vienna no US President was in position make this kind of surrender Western position in present circumstances.
Secy said he was again sorry hear words such as “eternal” and “perpetual” being used in connection presence Western forces. No one had said such presence should be eternal or perpetual. What we had said was that USSR could not unilaterally, by itself, say when it should end. To say West insisting on staying perpetually in Berlin was incorrect and misrepresentation Western position.
Recalling Gromyko’s comment Western leaders had expressed understanding USSR desire ensure its security, Secy stressed this understanding did not mean that, if Sovs alleged basic rights of West were some kind of vague threat to their security, they could expect US move out at risk of catastrophe to West with regard to its security. Secy said he wished assure genuine understanding Sov security did not mean West would lie down and play dead when alleged Sov security at stake.
[Page 248]As to Gromyko’s remark that talk about unification was waste time and energy, Secy stated Sov position today inevitably led to conclusion Sovs wanted brush aside all agreements they had concluded with West between World War II and middle “fifties” and that apparently their solemn assurances were valueless because they wished change situation to their advantage in spite of fact that would violate Western vital interests. Secy strongly emphasized we were not children and understood situation. If Sovs intended throw existing agreements into junk heap, no one could expect West to think any new agreement re presence and access West Berlin would have solid backing unless Western Powers were in West Berlin. As to Gromyko’s assertion there was new situation in Germany characterized particularly by existence GDR and Ulbricht, Secy stressed there was another element in that situation, i.e., presence Western Powers in West Berlin with access thereto, which had not changed, was part of situation, and was as much of a fact as any other facts cited. Sovs said that when peace treaty was signed by them, these questions would be for GDR to deal with and Sovs would have no relation to them. Surely this was not accurate description their position. We could not believe Sovs would indeed turn over what they say are their security interests to Ulbricht. Gromyko himself had said USSR would be involved in situation in case of trouble. In any event concern with situation must remain between signatories to agreements. As far as we were concerned USSR and West continue be responsible for situation. We see no way Sovs could, would or would want to transfer this responsibility to another entity.
Re Gromyko’s assertion there was dangerous situation in Berlin, Secretary pointed out source of danger easy to identify. There had been no source of war in that area for a number of years, even since Jessup-Malik agreement, which had relieved dangerous tensions and which Sovs now want throw out window. Danger or threat did not come from our side but from East, because Sovs said unless you do this we will make situation dangerous. West made no demands and was not asking anything. Source of danger came from source of demands. If that was peace or peaceful coexistence, Secretary emphasized, then he did not understand those words. This lack of regard for interests and position other side was element lack of reciprocity we had been concerned about in recent discussions. Secretary agreed Berlin was serious problem.
However, he pointed out, it was also true there were other problems, some connected with Germany and some not. Prudence required not to translate Berlin problem into sole determining issue in US–USSR relations. It was not only issue on US–USSR agenda. Perhaps progress could be made on other problems. However, if Berlin problem was treated without any element reciprocity, then indeed it was major issue between US–USSR.
[Page 249]As to corridor flights, Secretary said he had been very much aware of difference in situation this respect after his departure Geneva. However, since he had no way of knowing Gromyko had intervened, and since he was not sure Gromyko wanted to be personally cognizant of situation—something the Sov FonMin did not want in Geneva—he had not communicated with Gromyko on this point. However, Secretary wished express gratification at hearing Gromyko’s remarks, and thought this had been positive and helpful act on his part.
Secretary recalled he had made two remarks re possible ways dealing with matters at hand.
One way would be for USSR to make clear its possible actions re East Germany would not affect rights Western Powers and access. From what Gromyko had said he apparently did not think well of this suggestion. However, Secretary pointed out, Gromyko was trying make East Germany more sovereign than West Germany. Gromyko had said USSR would back up East Germany with regard steps East Germany would take in exercising that kind of sovereignty. Of course that would lead to very dangerous situation, and was unwise on part USSR. The second way—possible discussions including UK and France—US had made certain suggestions re Deputy Foreign Ministers. Secretary wondered whether Gromyko had any suggestions of his own.
Secretary then expressed view point had been reached where, unless there were new instructions received, both sides should report in detail to their governments, give serious thought to what had been said, and be in touch again, as he was sure two Heads of Government would want them to be. Secretary expressed regret it had so far been impossible make serious advance in Geneva, despite demonstration great efforts on our side during past months find mutually acceptable solution. Sovs now concentrating on point of most vital interest to West. Western position on this had been made clear to Khrushchev by President in Vienna. Indeed it had been clear since events of 1948/49, and therefore our attitude could not possibly be surprise to USSR. Secretary continued that, in view what had been said, he saw no direction in which Gromyko and he could go ahead here in Geneva. He wondered what Gromyko’s view was on this.
Gromyko rejoined by referring to Secretary’s remark USSR security considerations with regard German peace treaty and normalization West Berlin situation were vague and represented very free and easy interpretation Sov arguments in favor German peace treaty and normalization West Berlin situation on basis free city.
There was nothing vague or nebulous in this. In fact everything was crystal clear. There was this intolerable situation where West Berlin was held by Western Powers in their fists and maintained as NATO base, and where GDR legitimate interests were being crudely flouted. All of [Page 250] this was nothing nebulous; these represented weighty arguments militating in favor solution this problem. This situation will unquestionably be changed, with or without prior understanding with Western Powers. However, USSR believed it would be best have solution with prior understanding with Western Powers.
Gromyko said Secretary had tried present situation in such way as to make it look as if creation two Germanies had been caused by USSR’s violation its solemn obligations. This was inaccurate. It had been Western Powers, and only Western Powers which had torn up agreements between Allies and had split Germany. It was on this basis that two German states had emerged. Gromyko said there was no need reminding Secretary of creation such things as Bizonia or Trizonia, nor of creation of revanchist, militarist, but independent FRG. There was no need to review history. USSR had been from very outset in favor creation single, peaceful Germany, but that had not been possible due to Western Powers. Apparently no common language could be found on this point. Secretary repeated himself and so apparently did he, Gromyko, too. However, since Secretary had raised point, it was necessary to restore history, i.e., truth.
Gromyko contended USSR would always remember how its Allies in war had acted with respect their commitments as Allies. Hardly was ink dry on those agreements and hardly had first grass grown on graves millions of dead, when West started crudely to flout all its agreements with USSR, which duty bound remember this and draw necessary conclusions. Gromyko asserted this was road that had led to present situation. This all a very sad story, but must be taken into account.
Recalling Secretary’s statement about transfer USSR security interests to GDR, Gromyko asserted this question did not arise at all. USSR did not intend to transfer its security. However, USSR had mutual obligations to certain states, including those under Warsaw Pact, and in event any aggression against GDR, USSR would meet its obligation under Warsaw Pact. As to USSR, its security was firmly in its own hands.
Gromyko then referred to Secretary’s remark Sovs trying make GDR more sovereign than FRG and wondered why Secretary thought FRG should be yardstick of sovereignty for GDR. If FRG not fully sovereign, if West had pocketed part its sovereignty, why should GDR take its cue from that? In any event question of greater or lesser sovereignty out of place. Sovereignty was sovereignty, and could not be cut up in pieces and placed on different shelves. It had been known for a long time that, if any sovereign state agreed yield some of its sovereign rights by voluntarily entering into international agreements to this effect, this was exercise of sovereignty.
Gromyko then observed Secretary had for second time advanced idea continuation discussion by Deputy Foreign Ministers. Gromyko [Page 251] said he had two comments: He was not clear what Secretary had in mind—bilateral or broader discussions? Also he was not clear what Deputy Foreign Ministers would have to do. He said this suggestion would remain unanswered by USSR here in Geneva for time being. Secretary wondered whether Gromyko’s last sentence referred to four Deputy Foreign Ministers or to bilateral contacts. Gromyko replied he was talking about Secretary’s specific reference to Deputy Foreign Ministers. As to contacts, Secretary had said present circumstances not conducive to direct contact Heads of Government, but he understood this did not mean indirect contacts should not continue.
Secretary confirmed Gromyko’s understanding on latter point, while noting he could not speak for President formally. Re Deputy Foreign Ministers, US had made some general suggestions as to what Deputy Foreign Ministers could discuss. We had in mind Four Powers responsible for questions relating to Germany; however, Secretary noted, he would have be in touch with those not present here. Secretary expressed view it was important in not too distant future agree on appropriate tasks for Deputy Foreign Ministers. Some such tasks were contained in US general principles paper given to Gromyko during previous meeting in Geneva.
Secretary then noted Gromyko had referred to Sov insistence re “GDR interests.” He wished to remind Gromyko there were number other interests, such as those of US and its Allies, Germany and German people as whole, West Berliners, and peoples of USSR and US, all of whom interested in not allowing major crisis develop. It was clear GDR interests not paramount when vast interests were at stake in this situation. Secretary agreed there was no use in talking about degrees of sovereignty. However, point he had wished make was that Western Powers reserved re West Germany certain points with regard this situation, and Gromyko had in fact praised this as something constructive. We had also reserved re West Germany points regarding settlement German problem as whole. In reply Gromyko’s inquiry re specific points, Kohler pointed out Western Powers in their agreement with West Germany had reserved all matters relating to Berlin, peace settlement, and Germany as whole. Secretary said he wished simply point out this possibility was open to USSR as well.
Re Gromyko’s remark grant of rights also represented exercise of sovereignty Secretary said he agreed with this and recalled that US had told USSR that, if it signed treaty with East Germany and if East Germany said to USSR what was in Zorin-Bolz agreement, that would also be exercise of sovereignty. If, e.g., France agreed to flights by aircraft from London to Rome, even if such aircraft did not touch ground in France, that was also exercise of sovereignty. Secretary observed he understood Gromyko not in position comment on question Deputy Foreign [Page 252] Ministers today. Meanwhile we would give more precise thought this question and we would be in touch with other side.
Secretary then raised question schedule. Said in normal course he would return to Washington tomorrow, to be there in time for his dinner for Souvanna Phouma July 26. This was not categorical imperative for him. However, he had rather gathered impression both sides had said all they could here, and perhaps it would be desirable for each to consult own government. It would be useful if Gromyko could say when he was leaving for Moscow, and whether he thought they should be in touch again before he left. Secretary noted he would be able to stay if Gromyko thought he would have anything further from Moscow to discuss before leaving Geneva, and of course would be in touch if he had anything new from Washington.
Gromyko referred to Secretary’s comment GDR interests could not be compared with Western interests, and thought Secretary probably regarded Western interests as big mountain and GDR interests as small pebble. While it true US great power and bigger than GDR, any state, even small, considered its own interests, close and vital to it. Moreover when Sovs spoke of GDR interests, they had in mind vital, fundamental interests GDR, since West Berlin in center GDR and all air, land and water communications to West Berlin ran through GDR territory. Gromyko reiterated suggestion re Deputy Foreign Ministers would remain unanswered for time being. Re schedule, Gromyko indicated he tentatively planning leave July 26. However, if interests negotiations warranted longer stay and if further meeting agreed, he would not object. Thus whether further meeting will take place depended not only on him but on Secretary as well. Meeting closed with agreement two delegations would check in morning whether anything new on either side.