Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

85. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, July 24, 1962, 8 p.m.

Secto 48. Eyes only for President and Acting Secretary. Eyes only for Ambassador Thompson. No other distribution. Detailed report my luncheon and third session with Gromyko coming separate telegram.¹ Following are my personal comments on three sessions taken together in an attempt to help judge where we are.

1. Stiffest moment was at end first session when Gromyko read from his piece of paper. Otherwise our discussions in all three sessions were in more relaxed tones even if business-like atmosphere. This means that what Gromyko has said in his own formulations has been more moderate than language used publicly by Soviets in this past month.

2. As you will see from record I threw two ideas into the pot in third session. First, that Soviets use with East Germans same techniques we used in 1949 with West Germans in reserving our rights with respect to Berlin, a German peace treaty and Germany as a whole. Gromyko seemed to reject this suggestion, claiming that in absence of prior agreement West would have to deal with East Germans. At later stage, however, he showed some interest in more information on this point and I am not at all sure that this approach is foreclosed.

3. My second point was to refer to the use of Deputy Foreign Ministers for further discussion on German-Berlin questions along lines our “principles” paper. Fortunately I was able to tie this to an earlier remark he had dropped at luncheon table that they thought it was important to talk these matters out with US or “better still with the US, UK and France”. He inquired whether by Deputy Foreign Ministers we meant bilateral or quadripartite and what they would talk about. I told him I could not today speak officially for other governments but our own idea was that these should be quadripartite, that some of the questions to be discussed have been formulated in our “principles” paper but that we could review agenda of Deputies if that seemed desirable or necessary. He said that he would not wish to comment on that suggestion today, thereby leaving door open either for instructions or later discussion.

4. Note that insistence by Soviets that, after East German peace treaty, the Western Powers would be required to deal with East Germans is a proposition that seems to assume the continued presence of the West in West Berlin. I do not, therefore, believe that we should think that we are being presented with ultimatum which makes the actual presence of the West the breaking point.

5. He told me today that, upon returning from our last session in Geneva, he had gone directly to Khrushchev and had obtained the suspension of harassments in Berlin. This may be of some interest as indication possible Gromyko influence and effect of his judgment as to whether it is possible to back us down in negotiations on presence Western troops.

6. Today I returned to a formulation I used some months ago with Gromyko, namely, to try to imagine the situation if Khrushchev and Kennedy were to say to each other what we both had been saying. I pointed out that it would be very bad to reach such an unsatisfactory result. You will see from detailed record that matter again came up at the end in terms of keeping contact between our two governments. Gromyko seemed genuinely disturbed when he, through a complete misunderstanding, thought I was suggesting that even diplomatic or indirect contacts not be maintained. I promptly reassured him on that point but his anxiety, linked with other things he has been saying, reinforces our analysis that he was under instructions to see how far he could go in talking us out of Berlin but not to let the matter come to a complete impasse. I also added, of course, that on the matter of possible meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy I would not add any comments, without the instructions of the President, to what had been said publicly and privately. He did not himself raise or pursue “summit.”

7. I have tried to be very direct and very clear about the point of Western forces in West Berlin and reminded him today that the President had told Mr. Khrushchev that “no President of the United States could make such a concession.” Such direct statements made more than once did not bring further threatening language from Gromyko. Indeed, the only threats he used were those in his prepared portion of our first session.

8. It seems to me that there may be a possibility to work out an arrangement with the Russians governing a post peace treaty situation which the Russians themselves would agree with the East Germans. They could claim that East German agreement was an exercise of GDR and our rights would remain intact. Alternatively, I think our modus vivendi approach may have a breath of life. Further, there is always “Solution C”² to fall back upon if going gets tougher.

9. Home, Couve de Murville, and Schroeder have all left Geneva. Gromyko is tentatively planning to return to Moscow on the 26th. I am under the definite impression that these talks at Geneva are not our last opportunity for a settlement and that further communication would precede drastic act on their part. I therefore told him that I would tentatively plan to leave late tomorrow but that I would be in touch with him tomorrow morning to see whether either one of us felt that there were any other points we might profitably cover here. My guess is that it would be a good thing for both Moscow and Washington to do a little fresh thinking about these three sessions. It is unlikely that Gromyko will receive different instructions while Khrushchev is away from Moscow.

10. I regret inability to button up this problem at this point but I suspect that Soviets have not made their final decisions and have been trying to find out whether additional public and private pressure could produce significant Western concessions. I could be wrong and Soviets could move toward a peace treaty at almost any time but it does not feel that way to me.

11. Of some interest is my very private remark to Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki that now is a good time for those who have influence in Moscow to counsel moderation and he replied “you may be sure that is being done.” Today, after a rather sharp retort to Gromyko during my brief remarks in the disarmament conference, the Polish chief delegate remarked privately to one of my colleagues that I had made a “fine statement.”

12. There has been good feeling among four Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva and unity on the line to take at this point as well as on necessary urgent review of Western position on contingency planning. This plus fact that Gromyko keeps door open encourages me to think that additional patience may work this out, distressing as it is to listen to and to play certain long-playing records ad nauseam.

13. Of course, if it is felt that I should take several more days here to pursue particular points I should be glad to do so but I am inclined to think that they would cause Russians to expect some major concession on presence of Western forces, would make our Allied consultation more awkward, and, on basis of Gromyko’s apparent present instructions, would promise little result.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–2462. Secret; Niact. Passed to the White House.
1. Document 86.
2. For a description of “Solution C,” see the Report by Dean Acheson, June 28, 1961, in vol. XIV, Document 49.