Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

67. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, June 21, 1962.

SUBJECT

• US and Soviet Military Buildup and Probable Effects on Berlin Situation

REFERENCE

• General Taylor’s Memorandum of 14 June to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Acting Director Central Intelligence¹

General Taylor’s memorandum asked for a comparison of the military buildup of Soviet forces with that of United States forces over the past eighteen months and for our views of the probable effect of the current relative strengths on Soviet attitudes toward the Berlin situation in the coming months. I shall treat these as two separate but related subjects in this report which has been prepared with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff and Defense Intelligence Agency and has the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, Joint Staff.

Forces Buildup

The size and composition of the USSR’s military forces have been influenced importantly by Soviet policy decisions of the past year and a half, in which the Berlin crisis has been an important factor. A programmed reduction in military manpower and in older air and naval equipment was underway in 1960 and had cut total military strength to 3,000,000 men in the first part of 1961. In response to our reaction to the Berlin pressures, the process was reversed in the summer of 1961 by calling some key reserves and delaying the discharge of conscripts in the Fall of 1961. We believe that the force level now stands at about 3.25 to 3.5 million men. The increase in personnel strength seems to have been used to bring existing units up to strength and provide needed combat and service support units rather than to raise the number of divisions. We believe Soviet Army strength is now approximately 145 divisions, of which 79 are at 70% or higher strength and have an immediate combat capability. The remaining 66 vary in strength and training status but are essentially cadre units of 40% or less strength.

During the same period the United States armed forces have been increased by 325,000 to 2,825,000. More significant than the number is the form which our buildup has taken. We have made a major increase in operational missiles, both tactical and strategic. We have filled out skeleton combat units, relieved tactical forces of basic training missions, added needed support units, reequipped with modern weapons, increased mobility, improved the alert status of both strategic and tactical forces, eliminated critical shortages of equipment, and raised forward stockage levels—in sum, we have put our forces on an increased war readiness basis.

It is difficult to be precise in cataloging specific measures taken by the Soviets and particularly in determining the timing of their moves. However, the Soviets have made important qualitative improvements, notably in mechanizing their ground forces, adding to their formidable submarine fleet, and in expanding their strategic nuclear capabilities. Soviet missile capabilities for nuclear delivery and air defense have continued to increase in the past 18 months, and the tempo of the ICBM program has quickened. At present, the USSR possesses a ballistic missile force capable of delivering massive nuclear attacks against targets in the European area, and a much more limited force of missiles and bombers suitable for attacking the United States.

In sum, we believe that the measures it has adopted since 1 January 1961 mean that the USSR is now retaining ground, air, and naval forces at levels higher than originally planned, while at the same time proceeding with an expansion of capabilities with advanced weapon systems. But, on balance, we believe there is no question that the relative improvement has been in our favor and that the Soviet leadership knows it. I have attached to this report two annexes, one showing, for both sides, strengths and changes in personnel and in key organizations and weapons and another describing measures taken to improve combat readiness in critical categories.

Implications for Berlin

With reference to Berlin, I feel certain that our improved military position and our firm response to provocation have had a major influence on Soviet attitudes. From the beginning Khrushchev has sought to develop his campaign against Berlin in such a way as to avoid serious risk of general war. At the same time, he evidently believed that Allied concern over a military confrontation would lead the West to compromise its position in Berlin.

While the Soviet leadership has received a firmer reaction than expected from the West, it has been beset with mounting internal and intra-Bloc problems. In the wake of the October Party Congress, the Kremlin has had to deal with problems raised by the renewed attack on Stalin and the anti-Party group and with a widening rift in its relations with Peiping and Tirana. Another factor that may be inducing caution is the status of the East German regime which continues to be plagued with economic problems and a resentful, hostile population. It is a singularly unstable Satellite upon which to base a major political issue. The Soviets also apparently intend to continue their efforts to woo West Germany, as a possible alternative to negotiating with the Allied Powers and as a device for driving a wedge between Bonn and its NATO partners.

Another important factor which contributes to the USSR’s hesitancy in pushing its Berlin objectives by precipitate action is that the Soviet leaders appear now to realize that the shift in the political-military relation of forces in the world has been less significant than they anticipated two or three years ago. The United States acceleration of military programs beginning in 1961 has clearly impressed them as a manifestation of United States determination and has also forced them to confront the economic implications of a new round of arms competition. At the same time, they have had to recognize that the West cannot be persuaded to accept their inflated strategic claims. Perhaps equally important, they have become aware that their real accomplishments in strategic weapons cannot be so readily translated into concessions by the West as they had earlier imagined.

We recently estimated (in NIE 11–9–62),² in conjunction with the other USIB agencies, that it is unlikely that the Soviets are resolved to bring the Berlin issue to a head in some fixed period of time, and that they will probably continue their effort to obtain concessions through negotiations. We believe it likely that the Soviets will not sign a separate peace treaty in the near future, but we do not exclude this possibility. At the same time, we believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets regard Berlin as an issue to be settled by a genuine or lasting compromise; they aim at eventual incorporation of the western sectors of the city into East Germany. We see no evidence that the Soviets feel able either to reduce their basic objectives or to abandon negotiations and seek these objectives by unilateral action.

Accordingly, in the more recent NIE 11–13–62³ we concluded that for the near future at least, the Soviets are not likely to moderate their demands in order to take the negotiations off dead center. However, we think they are more likely to do this than to resort to major unilateral action, such as a separate treaty. Most likely of all is a continuation for the present of the same rigidity in negotiations without at the same time any serious move to break them off. While this judgment in the NIE is derived from an interpretation of recent Soviet behavior, rather than from any significant body of intelligence data, we feel that it is the best evaluation which can be made at the present time. The chances are good that there will be a new round of Berlin harassments, intended primarily to keep pressure on West Berlin morale and on Western negotiators.

Robert S. McNamara⁴

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 37, 101 Soviet Buildup. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Two annexes entitled “Comparative Data Soviet-US Forces 1 Jan 61–1 July 62” and “Major Measures Taken To Improve Readiness of Soviet-US Forces” are not printed.
1. Not found.
2. “Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy,” dated May 2, 1962. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)
3. “Soviet Intentions With Respect to Berlin,” dated June 13, 1962. (Ibid.)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.