Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

66. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SET/MC/13

Berlin, June 21, 1962, 4 p.m.

SECRETARY’S EUROPEAN TRIP (June 18–28, 1962)

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Dowling
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Mr. Manning
  • Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Lightner, et al.
• Germany
  • Governing Mayor Brandt
  • Mayor Amrehn
  • Senator Schiller
  • Senator Kielinger
  • (other Berlin officials)

SUBJECT

• Berlin

Mayor Brandt began by expressing his appreciation for the Secretary’s visit. He then gave a report on the local situation noting particularly that:

(1) Morale was better now than at the end of 1961;

(2) This contrasts with the mood of desperation in the GDR which led to a heightened flow of refugees despite the difficulties of crossing the border;

(3) The economic condition of West Berlin is good with production 5% greater than last August despite the loss of 60,000 members of the labor force;

(4) The flow of people into West Berlin was still not sufficient to offset the losses normally incurred because of the unfavorable population structure, but the outflow had been halted;

(5) Berlin was going ahead on economic programs under the Senator for Economics, Professor Schiller;

(6) Security problems at the sector border were causing concern and more shooting was possible (this might lead to a request that Allied personnel be brought closer to the wall in view of the orders in the Eastern side not to fire at Allied uniforms).

The Secretary then gave his general impression of discussions which he had been having with the Soviets. He pointed out that our commitment to Berlin was beyond question. Our troops were not in Berlin as tourists; they represented the US presence. We had told the Soviets we are here and will stay here. If they try to drive us out they have been told this would mean war and all the destruction which war would bring. Because of the seriousness with which we view our commitment, we feel we must maintain responsible contact with the other side.

Frankly speaking, the Secretary said, he could not report any significant progress in his talks with the Soviets. No agreement was in sight. The simple issue which had emerged was the presence of our forces in Berlin. At the same time we do not believe that the Soviets wish to precipitate a crisis or to create a diplomatic impasse. This may, of course, change at any time. If the Soviets continue to repeat their position we will continue to repeat ours. We had nothing to trade in Berlin with since our vital interests represent fundamental commitments to Berlin.

On one aspect of the situation, the Secretary continued, the West Berliners could help. If there were any sign among the population of a lack of confidence, the danger arose that this would give the wrong signals to Khrushchev, who might think we are weaker than we are and overreach himself. Hence, the confidence of the West Berliners was important.

We were concerned about the situation in the GDR, the Secretary noted. Berlin is involved because a crisis in the GDR enables the Ulbricht Regime to put pressure on Khrushchev, who in turn puts pressure on us. Another point, the Secretary said, which he wanted to make was there was no disarray on principle among the Allies. He had told De Gaulle in Paris¹ that he must confess that the French had been right so far about the difficulty of finding a basis for negotiations with the Soviets. On the other hand, De Gaulle had confessed that the talks had not produced the kind of disturbances and collapse of morale which he had thought might be possible. Our differences, therefore, are essentially on tactics and procedures, and there is an underlying agreement on policy.

As to the press leaks on the makeup of the International Access Authority, the Secretary said, we had not put this proposal to the Soviets but had been discussing it with our Allies. When Khrushchev read about it in the newspapers, he rejected it because of the provision for West German membership. We are not going to argue about a hypothetical question with the West Germans. So far the Soviets have been talking about access to a Berlin from which we are removed.

In response to Brandt’s question as to whether the Berliners feel that the recent Warsaw Pact Declaration² might portend a stronger engagement of the Warsaw Pact Powers and a pushing ahead towards a peace settlement, the Secretary commented that we could not, of course, stop the Soviets from signing a peace treaty. What was important was the alleged consequences for us. The question was whether they would have a sort of Bolz-Zorin arrangement,³ or tell the GDR to do nothing, or let the GDR attempt to control our access. We were a little inclined, on balance, to think they should not proceed with their peace treaty at the present time. He did not think the other Warsaw Pact members, with the exception of the GDR, played much of a role in this situation. Mr. Bohlen suggested that a more likely interpretation of the Warsaw Pact Declaration was that this obtained the endorsement of the Pact countries for further deferral of the peace treaty deadline.

Mayor Amrehn stated that the danger of such declarations is that it raises the prestige factor. He wondered whether the question of status had arisen in the Secretary’s talks with the Soviets with particular reference to the ties of the West Berliners with the Federal Republic as they have developed over the past thirteen years. The Secretary said that, on the latter point, the matter of these ties had been referred to briefly some times before. We, of course, had made our legal situation clear long ago in terms of the reservation we had entered on certain articles of the Bonn Constitution. However, we have always insisted that the West Berliners, as far as the other side is concerned, must have freedom to establish whatever relations they wish with the outside world, including the Federal Republic, and that this is intimately linked to the viability question. Because the discussion had centered on other matters, this question has not arisen with the Soviets in any direct way. As to the question of status proper the Soviets are, of course, talking about eliminating the occupation status. Since this is unacceptable, other aspects of status have not arisen.

Mayor Brandt thanked the Secretary for his presentation and added that he would like to emphasize the necessity to take some action to create holes in the wall by political means. This might be done within the framework of the Federal Republic trade negotiations with the GDR, through the International Red Cross, through some action by the Western Powers vis-a-vis the Soviets, or finally by some effort to mobilize world opinion, e.g., using the Human Rights Commission of the UN (Brandt added that the last point was not the position of the Federal Government in Bonn). The Secretary said we would discuss this matter in Bonn. We have not come forward with any proposals on the wall because we did not want to seem to give the wall status by accepting its presence. When he had raised the question with Dobrynin, the latter had said this is not a subject for the Soviets but for the GDR.

At this point the discussion terminated and the participants left for the Golden Book Ceremony.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.00–RU/6–2162. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on June 22 and approved in S on June 25. The conversation was held in Mayor Brandt’s office.
1. A record of Rusk’s conversation with De Gaulle on June 20, transmitted in Secto 13 from Paris, June 20, is printed in vol. XIII, Document 255.
2. For text of the June 7 Warsaw Pact declaration, see Pravda, June 10, 1962.
3. Regarding the Bolz-Zorin letters, exchanged on September 15, 1955, see footnote 3, Document 8.