Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

65. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Paris, June 20, 1962, midnight.

Secto 20. Following summary based on uncleared memorandum of conversation which being pouched.¹

During meeting with Couve afternoon June 20, Secretary briefly reviewed recent talk with Dobrynin on June 18² and made following general observations:

1. Soviets now seem to be concentrating on point of direct interest and confrontation: presence of Western forces in West Berlin.

2. Soviets have shown interest in other matters such as Warsaw-NATO non-aggression pact, nuclear non-diffusion and mixed German commissions, but key point remains question of troop presence.

3. In talk with Dobrynin of May 30, Secretary had urged need for Soviets to bring more reciprocity into discussions in recognition vital interests of West. In latest conversation Dobrynin merely repeated stand-ard position in systematic form and urged US to bring forward new ideas. US accused of repetition and Dobrynin referred to Soviet concessions, i.e. various formulae to get US out of Berlin.

4. There has then been no advance on substance, but we did not have impression Soviets are moving toward early military crisis, although this might change tomorrow.

5. As Secretary has indicated at Athens, Soviets also do not seem to want register complete diplomatic impasse.

6. While exchanges with Soviets therefore becoming increasingly sterile, we believe they have been worthwhile and have served purpose. Khrushchev has pointed to them as justification for elimination of time table and of harassments. Should Berlin situation come to crisis no one could say we had neglected any resources of diplomacy. In discussion of present Soviet intentions, both Secretary and Couve agreed that while these highly relevant to Western position evidence lacking on basis of which any definite conclusions could be drawn beyond those noted above. There was also agreement that situation in East Germany was threatening and might lead Soviets to apply further pressures and threats similar to those in pre-wall period last summer. Secretary said that if we were not sure what Soviets up to, we were also not sure that Khrushchev was certain which course to take. On one hand, he made relatively subdued statement such as recently in Bucharest.³ On other hand, Soviets seem to have caught themselves on prestige problem of separate peace treaty. They also seem to be going ahead with rather active military buildup in missile and nuclear field, and they may just be waiting until they attain stronger military position.

In commenting on French position, Secretary said we seem to be in general agreement on substance and that French views as to whether any headway could be made on substance had so far proved correct. We felt it necessary to go ahead with talks, and would welcome greater French participation.

Our differences might well be resolved by events themselves. Couve said he agreed much of drama had disappeared since December NATO meeting, but maintained position that, while French take it as a fact that the US will go ahead in talks with Soviets, they could not approve or participate.

In response to Couve’s query as to whether we still had idea of giving new paper to Soviets, Secretary said that we had put in no further paper since Geneva. However, we did not want to exclude possibility of revising paper. At present this did not seem useful, since Soviets have remained adamant on troop presence. We did believe there would be some advantage to putting access question into some sort of framework so that great issues of prestige were not raised on either side.

After further discussion of central issue of Western troop presence, Couve asked whether Secretary did not think that at some point Soviets would change position. Secretary indicated that there was time at Geneva when this possibility seemed to be opening up, but Soviets had since then shown no further flexibility in discussion of Berlin.

After discussion of present Fed Rep attitude on relations with East Germans, Secretary said that, with respect credit request by GDR, we were inclined to think positive response might be a good idea. Couve said French had no real views on subject, and he did not know whether East Germans would insist further on credits in view of publicity.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6–2062. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Moscow, and London. Secretary Rusk visited Europe June 18–28 for discussions on topics of mutual concern.
1. SET/MC/10. (Ibid., 110.11–RU/6–2062)
2. See Document 64.
3. For text of Khrushchev’s June 24 speech at Bucharest, see Pravda, June 25, 1962.