Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

252. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 28, 1963, 11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The Berlin Christmas Pass Problem and its Relationship to Berlin and All-German Issues. Part One of
• Two¹

PARTICIPANTS

• Germans
  • Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
  • State Secretary Ludger Westrick
  • State Secretary Karl Carstens
  • Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
  • Dr. Horst Osterheld, FRG Foreign Office Adviser to Chancellor
  • Mr. Weber, Interpreter
• US
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador George C. McGhee
  • Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR
  • Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. Robert C. Creel, Director, Office of German Affairs

The Secretary suggested that since the President and Chancellor Erhard were meeting in private session,² the other participants might hold a separate meeting.

The Secretary told Foreign Minister Schroeder he was very happy to see him here and looked forward very much to this opportunity to discuss many things. He thought it would be useful to start with Berlin, where developments were taking a form not entirely predictable. While he was aware that the Foreign Minister had been away from Bonn during a good part of the discussions about Christmas passes, he would be interested in learning how the Foreign Minister saw the situation and what he thought was likely to develop from it, particularly insofar as it might affect the responsibilities of the Three Powers in Berlin.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said he thought it would be useful to have a look at the background to this development. He felt we could learn a good deal from what had happened on the Christmas pass matter. Both Carstens and Westrick had been in Bonn during these developments and they could report more fully. He, himself, had had a couple of concerns—First, that when the FRG had received a letter from Absuch³ which reflected no change in the basic GDR position, there should have been the most careful consideration of what results we might expect from our side before making a change in our position. Secondly, there was a danger that we might be exposed to more public pressure than we had expected; it was necessary to weigh the pros and cons of the issue and to determine the extreme limits to which we were prepared to go. This was a matter of continuing importance since he felt we could expect continued pressure from the GDR. The Foreign Minister asked Carstens to review the developments on the Christmas pass issue.

Carstens said the problem had started with a letter from Abusch, a Deputy Minister of the GDR, to Mayor Brandt on December 5. Abusch had suggested negotiations between the GDR and the Berlin Senat to open East Berlin to West Berliners over the Christmas period. The FRG had discussed the matter with the Senat and expressed the view that the reply to Abusch should be that the existing interzonal trade channels (Leopold-Behrendt) should be utilized for this purpose. A reply in this sense had gone forward from the Senat, but the other side had said it could not continue the talks on this basis and that there must be talks on the GDR/Senat level. The FRG had then agreed that it would be all right for the Senat to inform the other side that some individual would be designated by the Senat to discuss the matter. The reply had come from Wendt, a State Secretary in the GDR Ministry of Cultural Affairs, that on this basis talks could be held, the first in East Berlin, and the second in West Berlin. The Senat designated Korber, a Senatstrat.

Carstens said that all the foregoing had been done in agreement with the FRG except on one point: the FRG had asked Mayor Brandt not to make any reference in this exchange to the authority of the Mayor or the Senat, but this line had not quite been followed. The Senat had sent a message which contained an introductory phrase to the effect that “the Governing Mayor has asked me to tell you this”.

Carstens said it had become evident after several discussions that general agreement regarding procedural details for Christmas passes had almost been reached. The Secretary commented that meanwhile the status of the matter had become public knowledge. Westrick said that the GDR had given a press conference on the matter but had made reference to earlier stories in the Western press on the subject.

Carstens said it turned out fairly promptly that what the other side really wanted was a signed agreement, signed in the name of the Berlin Senat. At this point a further discussion was held between the FRG and the Senat. The FRG had said it would be better to avoid any signed agreement but that if this had to happen, it was important that there should at least be no reference in it to the Governing Mayor or the Berlin Senat. Carstens said the object was to play the whole thing down to the question of agreements on the strictly technical level. He was sure the people in Berlin had tried hard to get this point established. But then came the GDR press conference which revealed how far agreement had progressed on the details for Christmas passes; this served to increase public and emotional pressures, particularly since the GDR had said the only missing ingredient was a signed document. At this point Mayor Brandt had agreed that his representative, Korber, should sign a paper indicating he was signing “by order of the Chief of Chancellery of the Berlin Senat, who was in turn acting on the orders of the Governing Mayor”. The FRG had been informed of this only after this proposal had been put forward. Carstens said it had been very difficult for the FRG to decide whether to accept or veto the proposal. They had finally decided to accept, because a veto would have destroyed the hopes of a large number of West Berliners.

Carstens said he felt there had been one mistake in the procedure followed—the FRG and the Senat had not coordinated their actions and decisions to a sufficient degree. As concerned the future, he felt it necessary that the FRG agree with the Senat that some individual in Berlin should act as the FRG representative and that decisions would be made only with his consent.

The Secretary asked if the Berlin Commandants had been contacted about this final reply to the GDR. Westrick said the Commandants had issued a statement that they were in agreement with what had been done; the statement had also stressed that nothing had taken place which in any way affected the status of Berlin.

Ambassador McGhee pointed out that while the Commandants had been consulted, this had taken place only after earlier consultations with the FRG. He thought it important that full consultation should take place before any decisive step was taken. Carstens said he agreed completely. He added that the FRG had reports that the GDR had also been acting under some pressure, in the form of representations from Gromyko to Ulbricht. Another point was that the GDR was in a somewhat ridiculous position since, under recent developments, East and West Germans had been able to meet with each other in Prague but not in Berlin.

The Secretary said he wondered why the other side had been willing to accept this startling and dramatic contrast between the treatment given West and East Berliners. He recalled that one West Berliner who had gone into East Berlin with a Christmas pass had commented that it was like visiting a penitentiary. Carstens said he thought there were two factions in the GDR on this issue. One faction had been in favor of granting Christmas passes since it felt this was a device for extracting concessions and an element of recognition for the GDR from the FRG. This faction had obviously prevailed.

The Secretary said he wanted to make two comments:

1. He believed the Federal Republic and West Berlin had an enormous gravitational pull on East Germans and East Berliners. If it were possible to open up and increase contacts, travel and communication between the people on both sides of the line, this would in a sense amount almost to de facto reunification. Admittedly, this was an historical, evolutionary process which would take time.

2. On the other hand, we did not know very clearly just what the East had in mind. We should be particularly careful regarding the responsibilities of the Three Powers in Berlin. If we were to be involved in a crash landing we must also be there for the takeoff. It was most important that the three Commandants be fully consulted. He emphasized that we did not object to these contacts, but it must be made clear at every stage just how the responsibilities of the Three Powers are affected.

Ambassador McGhee commented that the three Commandants were responsible for the security of West Berlin and this matter had presented a number of problems for them of a security nature.

The Secretary said that we were not disposed to raise any formal or hypothetical questions, but that if anything threatened to undermine or erode Allied rights in Berlin this could be dangerous.

Mr. Tyler asked Carstens whether von Eckhardt was not already in Berlin as the FRG representative and whether he could not handle this matter of FRG/Senat consultation. Was Carstens proposing anything different? Carstens said that von Eckhard could handle this “in principle”. Schroeder said there might be a question whether von Eckhard would be the right person for this; there was no institutional problem but only a question of the person involved.

At Schroeder’s request, Weber read a press ticker item that the Berlin Senat Press Chief, Egon Bahr, had issued a public statement in Berlin to the effect that the FRG and the Senat were united in the hope that further facilities for travel between East and West Berlin could be obtained, but that further steps would be taken only in agreement with all the parties concerned.

Carstens said the FRG did not wish to make public the fact it felt it had been informed too late. He commented that it was very difficult for the people in Berlin, where there were so many emotional pressures, to instruct the negotiators properly. It might be better for the instructions to come from people further away from the scene where the emotional pressures were less.

The Secretary said he had the feeling that over the past five or six years the West Germans and the West Berliners had underestimated the power of the attraction the West had for the East Germans. If contacts could be increased, the East Germans were bound to be attracted even more. The contrast between West and East Germany was very great indeed. He recalled how many East Germans had “voted with their feet”. We were, therefore, relaxed about opening up these contacts. But we must remain in close touch on this life-and-death matter. This was probably the principal issue involving war or peace between the East and the West. In any case, he was sympathetic with the efforts of the West Berliners to put holes through the wall in Berlin.

Schroeder said he was not so optimistic as the Secretary on this point. He felt it essential to think through to the final conclusion the consequences of the steps now being taken. While he agreed that the West had a magnetic attraction for the East Germans—after all, this was the basis for their firm hope that if self-determination were granted to the East Germans they would opt for the West—there was still the very serious question of how far we could make use of this factor unless at the same time some of the institutional aspects in East Germany could be changed. If we merely went along the path of accepting all offers from the East to ameliorate conditions, this could work out to the advantage of the other side, since it would serve to make them look more human and increase their attractiveness. There was a danger that this could reach the point where world public opinion would feel it was possible for the West Germans to reach agreement with the other side even though there were no basic changes in the status quo. It was vital that things in the GDR be changed basically; otherwise, world public opinion might force the West Germans to accept the GDR theses of “all Germans around one table”, confederation, and the like, even though there was no basic change in the situation. There would be a problem about where we could draw the line without running into trouble with public opinion.

Ambassador McGhee inquired whether this development might not have been a response to the speech made recently in Berlin by Federal Minister Mende. Maybe the original initiative had in effect come from the FRG? Schroeder said he did not think the Mende speech had anything to do with this though Mende perhaps thought differently. The GDR offer was mere repetition of offers which had been made in the past, even as long as two years ago. When he had first heard about the Absuch offer, he had, himself, seen no chance of agreement being reached. He had pointed out to the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee the danger that the GDR would indicate readiness to talk any time about Christmas passes or anything else, but without making any basic concessions, with the risk that public opinion could shift against the FRG if it did not agree to such talks. His first reaction had been that the Absuch letter should be rejected. He had felt that to accept the offer would be a step toward recognition of the East Zone and of West Berlin as an independent entity. But then things had gotten out of hand. He thought it was too early to take such steps. This particular step had been taken as an “unpolitical” step because of Christmas sentiment, but he thought it was a mistake. (He asked Weber to translate for the group the Christmas greetings which had been handed to each West Berliner visiting East Berlin, which was full of propaganda and appealed to West Berliners to support the idea of rapprochement between the two Germanies by negotiations.)

Schroeder said he felt we must think through this concept of the powerful attraction of West Germany and West Berlin for the East Germans. No one had yet been able to develop for him a complete theory as to just what the final result would be from promoting these contacts. It must be explained to him just what changes could be brought about in the East Zone system which would bring reunification closer. Admittedly these steps might improve conditions from the humanitarian standpoint, but he had not yet met anyone who could convince him that going along this path of quasi-recognition would not consolidate the status quo.

The Secretary said we had no particular fixed theory on this. There was in any case no problem with us about recognition. We were more strict on this than other members of the Alliance. He was, himself, impressed with the longing on the part of the East Germans to rejoin their brothers in West Germany. Things were changing in Eastern Europe. it would be a good thing if the people in Eastern Europe could lose their fear of Germany and in particular of a unified Germany. To the extent that they lost these fears this would help remove the obstacles to reunification. Another question was to what extent the East German Army would prove reliable to the Soviets in a crisis. There was in any case movement in the status quo and the question for us all was how we could make use of this movement to our advantage. This sort of question might well be discussed in the Ambassadorial Group.

Schroeder said that the FRG’s long-term policies in Eastern Europe reflected the Secretary’s thinking, and he agreed this would all take time. But he was concerned that if the Soviets had told the East Zone regime to adopt a different approach the Soviets had not done this in order to help the FRG but rather to help consolidate Ulbricht and his regime. Schroeder said it was difficult for people who had not lived under a totalitarian regime to appreciate its effectiveness. He cited the example of Poland, where 90 per cent of the people were opposed to the regime but where the country was effectively controlled by the 10 per cent representing the armed Communist elite. The same situation prevailed in East Germany. He felt that the basic situation could be changed there only through either a change in the world power situation or through armed intervention. The latter was obviously excluded. He was not, himself, convinced that the internal structure of a Communist regime could be changed by the measures we had been discussing.

At this point, Under Secretary Ball arrived, and the Secretary suggested that we might come back to this issue later and start talking about what had happened in the trade negotiations in Brussels.

Foreign Minister Schroeder agreed we should come back to this point about consultations on Berlin problems and the need to improve the consultative process. Before leaving it, he wished to offer one suggestion. Maybe we should consider that these consultations should be held in Bonn rather than in Berlin. In Bonn there were the three Ambassadors and the Federal Government, and we could get representatives from the Berlin Senat down to Bonn. The present situation was very bad indeed because no one seemed to have a clear idea of just what was happening.

The Secretary agreed that we must have clear procedures, but he would like to think about Schroeder’s suggestion before making any definite reply. He commented that there was one further problem. Should the East Germans continue to let West Berliners come into East Berlin regularly and improve conditions in other respects, there could come a time when the GDR might approach the Berlin Senat and suggest that the Senat ask the Allies to reduce their troops in Berlin by 50 per cent and accept Swedes and other neutrals in their place. This would put us in a bad position. We had run the risk of war in the past in order to resist just such proposals.

Schroeder said there still was a question as to whether Berlin should be permitted to make all-German policies. This could be dangerous not only for the Allied governments but would be contrary to the policies of the Federal Government.

Mr. Tyler said he wished to point out that Allied rights in Berlin rested on occupation rights dating back to 1945, and that we should be careful about undermining the authority of the Berlin Commandants by shifting the focus of discussions of this nature to Bonn.

Ambassador McGhee said we should think in terms of what price should be paid in exchange for gaining improvements in the Berlin situation. Schroeder said this was precisely the point he was trying to make. What we needed to do was to think through the consequences of the first step which had now been taken. It was difficult to predict where this might end. What we needed was an overall strategy concept rather than pursuing the matter on the basis of the “optimism of dilettantes”.

The Secretary stressed the need to have full discussion of these problems with Mayor Brandt. It was absolutely necessary that we proceed only with the complete unity of everyone on our own side. We would harm our own cause greatly if developments should take a turn which would lead the West Berlin population to disapprove of Western policies. He said he wished to say in complete confidence that he felt there was only one circumstance which could remove US forces from Berlin—this would be if the West Berliners should say that we do not want your forces here. US public opinion would then be a controlling factor. We must all be together, including Mayor Brandt.

Schroeder commented that the viewpoints in Berlin seemed to differ now more than in former years. Mayor Brandt, for example, was trying to mediate the situation, but there were others in Berlin who had reproached the FRG for not being strict enough about this matter of Christmas passes. This showed how much more complicated the situation in Berlin had become.

At this point Governor Herter arrived, and the Secretary suggested that the meeting now turn its attention to the “dismal science” of the economic problems raised by the matters covered in the recent Brussels agreement.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL E GER-W GER. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Creel and approved in S and U on January 1, 1964. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 1 from the Ranch, December 29. (Ibid., POL 36 GER) For McGhee’s account of the conversation, see An Ambassador’s Account, pp. 129–130.
1. A memorandum of Part 2 of the conversation, which included Christian A. Herter, U.S. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, beginning at 12:40 p.m., is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2354.
2. See Documents 248–251.
3. For text of Abusch’s December 5 letter, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1963, p. 982.